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ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to answer the question of how to explain voluntary disclosure of 
companies listed on an emerging capital market. It intends to investigate the extent of 
voluntary disclosure especially that of Thai listed companies, and the influence of company 
characteristics, financial attributes, and corporate governance related factors on voluntary 
disclosure practices. 
The objectives of this research are (i) To evaluate voluntary disclosure practices of Thai 
listed companies over the period 1995 to 2005. (ii) To examine the contribution of 
company characteristics, financial attributes and corporate governance related factors in 
explaining variation in the extent of voluntary disclosure. (iii) To investigate perceptions of 
persons positioned to influence voluntary disclosure in order to obtain further insights into 
voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed companies. 
This study applies an empirical approach to investigate voluntary disclosure practices of 
Thai listed companies. The quantitative and qualitative methods are employed in order to 
provide the best understanding of the research problems. This study intends to combine the 
benefit from obtaining perception towards voluntary disclosure from a semi-structured 
interview with a quantitative data analysis derived from a self-constructed disclosure index. 
Results from the qualitative analysis are used to confirm the results and enhance the 
interpretation of the results from the quantitative analysis. 
The examination of the extent of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports reveals 
that even among the most actively traded stocks on the SET, there was considerable 
variability in the amount of information voluntarily disclosed. By using the univariate and 
multivariate analyses, significant variables that explain variation in voluntary disclosures 
I 
are found to be company size, type of industry, and CEO/Chairman role duality. The 
results also suggest that variation in voluntary disclosure could be influenced particularly 
from differences in time periods, especially period before and after the 1997 financial 
crisis. Of the three specific information categories, non-financial information is most 
explained, while financial information is least explained by the variables specified in the 
model. Results on specific information disclosure tend to support those reported at the 
overall level. The results also support the relative applicability of disclosure theory, 
especially the agency theory in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure. 
The interview findings suggest that voluntary disclosure behaviour is more complicated 
than previously assumed by the quantitative study. The opinions of preparers, users and 
regulators help to validate and complement the interpretation of statistical findings. The 
interviewees reveal some areas that could influence voluntary disclosure decisions which 
have not been included in the quantitative study. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on voluntary 
disclosure practices of Thai listed companies, as an example of the emerging capital market 
in economic transition. Results from statistical analysis, together with perceptions of the 
influential individuals interviewed, provide a better understanding of voluntary disclosure 
practices. The examination of voluntary disclosures at the disaggregated level, which has 
not been observed thoroughly in the Thai context, contributes to in-depth understanding of 
disclosure behaviour and helps to validate the findings of disclosure at the aggregated level. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction, Objective and Organisation of the Thesis 
1.1 Introduction 
It is widely recognised that the quality and quantity of information available to investors 
has a strong influence on investment decisions. Prior studies on corporate disclosure have 
identified a wide range of factors influencing the extent of both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. Therefore, this study aims to extend the knowledge of corporate disclosure 
practices, mainly voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies. 
This chapter provides the foundation for the thesis. It explains the motivations of the study 
and discusses the problems to be investigated. The research objectives and related research 
questions are presented. A summary of the research methodology and methods undertaken 
is provided. The chapter also emphasises the significance of this study in terms of the 
contribution to knowledge. The organisation of the thesis is summarised at the end of the 
chapter. 
1.2 Motivation 
The importance of corporate transparency is not only for protecting the interests of 
investors, but also preventing the breakdown of capital markets and maintaining economic 
stability. Disclosure is claimed as an important factor in evaluating the transparency of 
companies since a lack of adequate accounting disclosure prevents investors and creditors 
from receiving important information that helps in their decision making. In the discussion 
of corporate transparency, unique characteristi cs of Asian businesses such as concentrated 
ownership, bank-centric financial system, ineffective shareholders' rights and low degree 
of transparency are often mentioned. According to Ball et al. (1999), special attention is 
needed for corporate disclosures in Asian countries as companies in this region tend to 
have less incentive for transparent disclosure than Anglo-American firms. 
Although it has been over a decade since the devastating financial crisis hit Thailand and 
many fast developing Asian economies, discussion with varied perspectives on its causes 
and consequences still continue among many scholars and analysts. According to 
Jaikengkit (2002), the 1997 financial crisis set in place a paradigm shift concerning the 
development and evolution of voluntary measures to improve the quality of disclosure, thus 
restoring trust in, and the reputation of Thai companies in the global community. Since the 
crisis, there has been an increasing demand from investors, creditors, and stakeholders for 
improvement on corporate governance practices and disclosures of Thai companies. The 
government also considers corporate governance and disclosure as necessary measures to 
boost the confidence of investors. Thailand is still at an early stage of developing good 
practice in this area. Hence, variances possibly exist in corporate governance practice and 
disclosure among Thai companies. At present, there are limited empirical studies in the 
Thai context. 
Although all countries affected by the financial crisis underwent a reformation process of 
financial reporting. The impact of the financial crisis on financial reporting, especially on 
voluntary disclosures, may depend largely on country specific institutional factors. 
Circumstances also varied among the countries concerned, for example, between countries 
with or without assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Therefore, a 
country-specific empirical study can provide in-depth understanding of the problem. 
Findings from this study could contribute to the development of corporate transparency in 
developing countries, especially those that were affected by the 1997 financial crisis. 
Gaps in previous studies can be identified in four areas. Firstly, the review of prior 
literature reveals that the majority of prior studies applied quantitative techniques to 
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identify factors influencing voluntary disclosure. This leaves room for research on 
voluntary disclosure to include qualitative analysis to investigate the perception of persons 
positioned to influence voluntary disclosure. Personal interviews with market participants 
could provide further insight into factors influencing voluntary disclosure, and other factors 
not so easily captured from quantitative analysis. Information obtained from the interviews 
should help to validate and enhance findings from quantitative analysis. 
Secondly, the literature review has shown that voluntary disclosure at the disaggregated 
level had not been investigated thoroughly in the Thai context. The investigation of factors 
affecting specific information disclosure may help in determining whether factors, which 
explain overall disclosure, prove the same in specific information disclosure. 
Thirdly, there is a lack of studies regarding the impact of some specific Thai business 
characteristics, including ownership structure (ownership concentration and foreign 
ownership) and corporate governance characteristics (CEO/Chairman role duality and 
independent non-executive directors) on corporate voluntary disclosure. By including these 
factors in the study, a better understanding of voluntary disclosure practices in Thai 
companies may be created. Although Priebjrivat (1991), Suphakasem (2008), and 
Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) included ownership concentration in their studies, the results 
seem to be in conflict. Therefore, ownership concentration is also included in this study in 
order to verify the mixed results reported in previous studies. In addition, this study 
includes foreign ownership, which is another important ownership structure related 
variable that has not been included in previous studies on corporate disclosure in Thailand. 
Proportion of non-executive directors on the board and CEO/Chairman role duality were 
included in a study by Suphakasem (2008). However, the focus of Suphakasem's study is 
only on corporate governance disclosure. Therefore, these two variables have not been 
examined thoroughly in the context of corporate voluntary disclosure in Thailand. 
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Finally, the literature review suggests that there is a lack of longitudinal studies on 
voluntary disclosure. Most prior studies are based on voluntary disclosure made in a single 
year. As a result, changes in disclosure practices largely remain unexplored. In addition, 
some previous studies capture changes in levels of disclosure by comparing with other 
studies. Comparability of results from different studies, which measure disclosures by 
employing different indices, is likely to be reduced. Therefore, incorporating data from 
different time periods may provide a better picture regarding the change in voluntary 
practices over time, especially in the case of Thailand, which was affected seriously by the 
1997 financial crisis and underwent a process of financial reporting transformaticn. 
1.3 Overview of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis started in Thailand with the devaluation of the Thai Baht currency on 
July 2"d, 1997. The crisis then spread to other Asian countries. Although East Asia as a 
whole was affected by the crisis, the severity of its impact varied from country to country. 
Indonesia South Korea and Thailand were the worst affected (Wang and Tang, 2009). 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Laos, and Hong Kong were also involved in the crisis. The 
People's Republic of China, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, and India were 
less affected, though all suffered from loss of demand and confidence throughout the 
region. 
Although circumstances varied among the countries concerned, some broad similarities 
were evident across developing Asian countries. Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea 
faced similar problems contributing to the financial crisis which were weak corporate and 
financial systems, excessive unhedged private short-term foreign currency debt, inadequate 
regulations and supervision, and lack of transparency about the ties between governments 
(Fischer, 1998). In addition, economic and financial information were inadequate for 
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making informed decisions, which resulted in inadequate risk assessment in creditor 
countries. 
The IMF arranged rescue packages for Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. In return for 
accepting the emergency loans, these three countries agreed to several conditions and 
reforms in order to strengthen their economy. The IMF's requirements included 
strengthening financial supervision and regulations and measures to increase transparency 
in the financial, corporate, and government sectors. Accounting practices and disclosure 
rules had to be upgraded to be compliant with the international standards (Fischer, 1998). 
Although Malaysia and the Philippines were also affected badly by the financial crisis, they 
handled the situation differently. Malaysia stood out as a country that refused IMF 
assistance and pursued the crisis recovery programme independently. The Philippines 
implemented a successful IMF-supported programme of macroeconomic adjustment and 
structural reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which enabled it to cope with the 
financial crisis effectively (IMF, 2000). The outbreak of the financial crisis served as a 
wake-up call for Asian economies and forced policy-makers in the region to place more 
emphasis on capital market development as well as improving corporate governance 
practices in the business sector (Mortreevat, 2006). 
1.4 Objectives of the Studies 
This study seeks to answer the question of how to explain voluntary disclosure of 
companies listed on an emerging capital market. It intended to investigate the extent of 
voluntary disclosure especiallythat of Thai listed companies, and the influence of company 
characteristics, financial attributes, and corporate governance related factors on voluntary 
disclosure practices. 
The main objectives of this study are as follow; 
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Objective 1: To evaluate voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed companies over the 
period 1995-2005. 
There have been substantial changes in the Thai business environment over the last two 
decades (see Chapter 3). The 1997 financial crisis seems to be a big turning point. It 
resulted in the issuance of new laws and regulations, establishment of new accountancy 
bodies, revision of accounting standards, and government encouragement to enhance the 
quality of financial reporting. In addition, demand from investors for Thai companies to 
improve financial disclosures has been increasing. Therefore, this study intends to 
investigate if there are any changes in voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed 
companies in response to changes in the financial reporting environment. 
Objective 2: To examine the contribution of company characteristics, financial attributes 
and corporate governance related factors in explaining variation in the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
Examination of certain company characteristics and different calegories of variables, which 
have not been investigated thoroughly in the Thai context, might help to identify additional 
factors that could influence voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed companies. Hence, 
this study provides opportunity to contribute to current knowledge on corporate voluntary 
disclosure. 
Objective 3: To investigate perceptions of persons positioned to influence voluntary 
disclosure in order to obtain further insights into voluntary disclosure 
practices of Thai listed companies. 
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The literature review reveals that the majority of prior research on corporate disclosure 
applied quantitative techniques for analysing factors influencing voluntary disclosure. On 
the contrary, Watts and Zimmerman (1990 p. 147) declare that: 
"The study of accounting is a social science. An accounting theory that seeks to 
explain and predict accounting cannot divorce accounting research from the 
study of people. The contracting approach to studying accounting requires 
researchers to understand the incentives of contracting parties. " 
Voluntary disclosure is a sensitive issue because it is a matter of managerial discretion. 
Consequently, it might create extensive understandings of corporate disclosure motives by 
incorporating qualitative analysis like interview of persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure. 
The research objectives lead to the following research questions; 
Research Question 1: What is the extent of voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies? 
Research Question 2: To what extent did voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies 
change over the period 1995-2005? 
Research Question 3: To what extent are aspects of company characteristics, financial 
attributes, and corporate governance related factors significant in 
explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure of Thai listed 
companies? 
Research Question 4: What are the perceptions of persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure on issues related to voluntary disclosure, and 
how does interview research help to validate and complement 
statistical results? 
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Research Question 5: How are the variations in voluntary disclosure practices of Thai 
listed companies explained by relevant theoretical frameworks? 
1.5 Summary of Research Methodology and Methods 
Although one of the gaps in prior studies is a lack of perceptual studies, the author decided 
to apply a multi-method strategy instead of focusing solely on a perceptual line of enquiry. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods are employed in this study. Both methods have their 
own strengths and weaknesses. Quantitative research has the weakness of being unable to 
capture the perceptions of participants. On the other hand, qualitative research may involve 
personal interpretations by the researcher and difficulty in generalising findings (Creswell 
and Plano-Clark, 2007). In addition, quantitative and qualitative research can answer 
different types of questions. Qualitative research questions are exploratory, while 
quantitative research questions are confirmatory (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). 
Therefore, both methods complement each other so that results would be better clarified 
(Saunders et al., 2003). Furthermore, contradictory findings from using different research 
methods are valuable, as they lead to re-examination of conceptual frameworks and 
assumptions underlying quantitative and qualitative components (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2003). 
This study intends to combine the benefit from obtaining perception towards voluntary 
disclosure from a semi-structured interview with a quantitative data analysis derived from 
examination of annual reports using the voluntary disclosure checklist. Findings from the 
qualitative analysis will be used to confirm the results and enhance interpretation of the 
results from the quantitative analysis. Therefore, data are obtained from both primary 
(interview findings) and secondary sources (annual reports). 
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Companies included in this study are selected from the SET100 Index. ' To evaluate 
voluntary disclosure practices, a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index is applied to 
the annual reports of selected companies. A dichotomous procedure was applied in order to 
compare the items on the disclosure checklist with contents of the annual reports. Both 
univariate and multivariate analyses are applied in this study. Univariate analysis explains 
the relationship between a single explanatory variable and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Multivariate analysis simultaneously takes into account the relative importance 
of each variable in relation to other variables by providing the contribution of each 
explanatory variable in explaining variability in the dependent variable. The semi- 
structured personal interview included in this study is expected to help validate and 
enhance the interpretation of the results from the quantitative analysis. The interviewees 
are persons positioned to influence voluntary disclosure, including company management, 
investment analysts, external auditors, regulators, and bankers. 
1.6 Contribution to Knowledge 
Despite the substantial amount of studies on corporate disclosure, additional empirical 
evidence of voluntary disclosure from a different financial reporting environment still can 
enhance understanding of the corporate disclosure system further. There are substantial 
differences between developed and emerging capital markets in terms of institutional 
characteristics, culture, and political environment (Jaggi, 1975; Perera, 1989; Saudagaran 
and Diga, 1997). Prior studies on corporate disclosure in emerging capital markets in 
particular have identified the significance of ownership structure (ownership concentration, 
inside ownership, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership), and 
SET100 Index is calculated from stock prices of the top 100 listed companies in the SET in terms of 
market capitalisation, high liquidity and compliance with the requirement regarding the distribution of 
shares to minor shareholders. 
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corporate governance characteristics (independent directors, CEO/Chairman duality, family 
members on the board) in explaining variation in corporate disclosure. 
The major contribution of this study is knowledge extension of voluntary disclosure 
practices of listed companies in an emerging capital market. This is especially important 
for developing country, like Thailand, which is currently in the process of developing a 
respectable financial reporting system. Many areas of financial reporting in Thailand still 
require further investigation. Empirical study could help in investigating the nature of 
voluntary disclosure and assist policy makers in the developing regulations. This could also 
contribute to the development of corporate transparency in developing countries. 
Voluntary disclosure is a sensitive issue because it is a matter of managerial judgement. 
Therefore, it may create extensive understanding of corporate disclosure motives by 
including qualitative analysis from interviews with persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure. Quantitative analysis, which was applied mainly in previous studies, 
has the limitation of only using information from annual reports as a data source. 
Incorporating qualitative analysis in the study could enhance interpretation of the results 
from the quantitative analysis. By using interview methods, a wider aspect of voluntary 
disclosure can be obtained. 
The qualitative approach applied in this study validates and enhances interpretation of 
findings from the quantitative analysis. It also provides further insight into factors 
influencing voluntary disclosure and helps to identify other factors not so easily captured 
from the quantitative analysis. In addition, it contributes to the knowledge of voluntary 
disclosure by incorporating the human aspects of disclosure practices in the analysis. 
Furthermore, the examination of voluntary disclosures at the disaggregated level, which 
has not been thoroughly observed in the Thai context, contributes to in-depth 
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understanding of disclosure behaviour and helps to validate findings of disclosure at the 
aggregated level. 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
After outlining the motivation of the research, its objectives, methodology applied and 
contribution to the knowledge in previous sections, this section shows how the rest of the 
thesis has been organised. 
Chapter 2 discusses relevant theoretical frameworks and existing literature on corporate 
disclosure. The review of empirical evidence helps to identify gaps where research in 
voluntary disclosure can be extended. It thus assists in the formulation of the research 
questions and also in planning the research design. The discussion of theoretical 
frameworks assists in the formulation of testable hypotheses with particular relevance to 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, it helps in the interpretation of statistical and interview 
findings in later chapters. 
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the financial reporting environment in Thailand. It helps 
in understanding the Thai characteristics that are expected to have impact on corporate 
disclosure. The development and characteristics of Thai institutional factors, including the 
political, financial, and economic system are described. This chapter also explains the 1997 
financial crisis and the measures taken by the Thai government to resolve the situation. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology adopted and research methods employed in this 
study. Steps taken in constructing the research instruments, the voluntary disclosure 
checklist and interview questionnaire, are explained. The data collection procedures are 
provided. The research hypotheses are formulated. This chapter ends with a discussion on 
the statistical techniques applied in the study. 
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Chapter 5 analyses and evaluates the results obtained from the measurement of voluntary 
disclosure applied in this study. It also attempts to find the association between voluntary 
items disclosed and the explanatory variables. Findings of extremely high or low disclosure 
scores and disclosure items that have received particular attention in prior studies or in real 
practice are discussed. This chapter also includes the comparison of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in different periods of time to find if there were any changes in voluntary 
disclosure practices after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Chapter 6 reports on results of the univariate and multivariate analysis. In both types of 
analysis, a two-stage evaluation is carried out; the first to identify factors influencing 
overall voluntary disclosure. The investigation of factors affecting specific information 
disclosure (strategic, non-financial, and financial information) follows. The two-stage 
evaluation process helps to determine whether variables that are statistically significant or 
non-significant in the overall disclosure prove the same in specific information disclosures. 
Chapter 7 investigates the perception of persons positioned to influence voluntary 
disclosure of Thai listed companies. An interview study was planned in order to gain 
further insight into factors influencing voluntary disclosure and investigate other factors 
that are not so easily captured from quantitative analysis. 
Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions of the thesis. The chapter highlights the 
interpretation of the quantitative and qualitative results, as well as the contribution of this 
study. The limitations of the study are addressed. Lastly, suggestions for possible areas of 
further research are provided. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Evidence 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews relevant theoretical frameworks and existing literature in voluntary 
disclosure. The review of prior studies helps to identify gaps where research in voluntary 
disclosure can be extended. It thus assists formulating the research questions outlined in 
section 1.4 and also in planning the research design. The discussion of theoretical 
frameworks assists in the formulation of testable hypotheses with particular relevance to 
voluntary disclosure. In addition, it helps in interpreting the statistical and interview 
findings to be presented in later chapters. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the role of financial reporting in 
capital markets. Evaluation of voluntary disclosure, including the definition, driving force, 
and cost-benefit of voluntary disclosure, are discussed subsequently in section 2.3,2.4, and 
2.5. A review of relevant theories of voluntary disclosure is provided in section 2.6. 
Empirical evidence on corporate voluntary disclosure is summarised in section 2.7. Section 
2.8 reviews previous studies in the Thai context. Finally, section 2.9 summarises and 
concludes the chapter by identifying areas where research on voluntary disclosure can be 
expanded in this study. 
2.2 Roles of Financial Reporting 
According to Cooke (1989a), the objective of a corporate report is to supply economic 
information to a number of user groups and enable them to make decisions on the 
allocation of scarce resources. Financial reporting and disclosures are important tools that 
are used by management to communicate the performance of a firm to outside investors 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Stocken and Verrecchia (2004) find that the reporting discretion 
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of managers does not necessarily enhance investor interest in a firm; however, it does 
present an opportunity for managers to convey useful information that would otherwise not 
be communicated. Factors influencing accounting disclosure need to be examined in order 
to understand disclosure choices thoroughly (Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Under 
assumption of the agency theory, the objective of financial reporting is to monitor the 
efficiency of agents. As a result, the agent's performance is evaluated by accounting 
information Information asymmetry results in high costs of capital for a firm, which could 
be reduced by efficient disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001). Bens and Monahan (2004) describe 
the previous accounting studies (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) which indicate that 
commitments to higher disclosure quality could reduce information asymmetry. 
Consequently, the basic assumption in much accounting research is that high disclosure 
quality can reduce the problem of information asymmetry. 
According to Pae (2002), the information asymmetry problem could be resolved by full 
disclosure. Nevertheless, he finds that there is no equilibrium in full disclosure because of 
constant efficiency losses, which happens in terms of discretionary disclosure from the 
rent-seeking behaviour of informed entrepreneurs, especially when there is an unfavourable 
signal. Healy and Palepu (2001) explain the reasons for this information problem by stating 
that entrepreneurs have the incentive to overstate the value of their business, as they have 
better information than the investors. There are also possibilities for entrepreneurs to create 
agency problem by expropriation of the amount that investor have already invested. Healy 
and Palepu (2001) conclude that even with progress on corporate disclosure studies, there 
are still several unanswered questions, which include: 'What is the objective of disclosure 
regulation? ', 'What types of accounting standards produce high quality financial 
reports? ', 'Why do companies engage in voluntary disclosure? ' 
A good understanding of corporate disclosure is beneficial for information preparers and 
users, as well as for policy makers (Meek et al., 1995). Cooke (1989a) suggests that 
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knowledge of the extent of disclosure could support policy-makers in deciding whether 
disclosure meets the needs of users. He also adds that examination of factors influencing 
disclosure may assist policy-makers in choosing a suitable action to cope with deficiencies 
in disclosure and help in setting accounting standards. Empirical evidence on the extent of 
disclosure can provide better understanding of the corporate reporting system and give 
further insight into how companies respond to demands for enhancing corporate 
information. 
2.3 Definition of Voluntary Disclosure 
Information plays an important role in financial markets as it has strong influence on 
decisions made by the investors. Lee (1987) defines information as "a communication 
function which increases the knowledge of its recipient and reduces his uncertainty about 
the future. " Disclosure is defined in the Cambridge Advanced Learner's dictionary as 
making something known publicly or showing something that was hidden. By combining 
these two terms, Tricker (1984, p. 123) defines disclosure of information as: 
"an ex gratia act, by those with knowledge, to convey Information to 
others... (with) the intention to orientate, or to motivate, to create a climate of 
understanding, acceptance, involvement and participation, or to reach a 
consensus between otherwise conflicting views. " 
Corporate disclosure has been defined in different ways. Chandra (1974, p. 733) gave a 
broad definition. He defines disclosure as "the process through which an entity 
communicates with the outside world". Earlier studies define disclosure by focusing on 
financial information. For example, Kohler (1975) describes disclosure as "a clear 
showing of fact or condition on a balance sheet or other financial statements, in footnotes 
thereto, or in the audit report". Choi (1973 b, p. 160) describes it differently by focusing on 
perspective of the investor. He defines disclosure as "the publication of any economic 
15 
information relating to a business enterprise quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates the 
making of investment decisions ". Non-financial information has been included in some of 
the more recent definitions, for example, one from the Accounting Standard Board (ASB), 
which defines disclosure as "economic information whether financial or non-financial, 
quantitative or otherwise of a company's financial position and performance and financial 
adaptability" (ASB, 1994). 
Defining voluntary disclosure is not easy because of its abstract concept (Wallace, 1987), 
which does not always follow a specific or known time pattern (Owusu-Ansah, 1998a). 
This results in diverse understanding of voluntary disclosure. Radebaugh and Gray (1997) 
comment that the operation of voluntary disclosure interrelates with a set of complex 
factors, particularly market forces, and institutional and regulatory characteristics. These 
factors tend to differ across countries and vary in different channels of disclosure. 
The Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 2001) defines voluntary disclosure as 
"disclosure, primarily outside of the financial statements that are not explicitly required by 
accounting standards or regulations ". Most studies define voluntary disclosure by tracing 
regulations and accounting standards. For example, Cooke (1989a, p. 171) defines 
voluntary disclosure of Swedish companies as "those items that are not stipulated by the 
Companies Act 1975, the Accounting Act 1976 and by Notices issued by Accounting 
Standards Board". Similar to Cooke (1989a), Hossain et al. (1994, p. 341) specify 
voluntary disclosure of Malaysian companies as "... which is not referring to the accounting 
standards promulgated by the MIA (Malaysian Institute of Accountants), the Companies 
Act 1965 and the KLSE listing requirements ". 
For the purposes of this research, voluntary disclosure is defined as the discretionary 
release of financial and non-financial information in annual reports in excess of that 
mandated by the Accounting Act, B. E. 2543 (2000); Public Limited Companies Act, B. E. 
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2535 (1992); Securities and Exchange Act B. E. 2535 (1992); or any other relevant 
regulatory requirements. 
2.4 Driving Forces Behind Voluntary Disclosure 
According to Foster (1986), accounting and financial reporting are influenced by a diverse 
and complex set of supply and demand. Forces of supply and demand for information may 
relate to the quality of financial reporting practice and degree of national equity market 
efficiency (Barrett, 1976). Demand for information is from a diverse set of parties. The 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, 1997) classifies the users of 
accounting information into seven groups including investors, employees, lenders, 
suppliers, customers, governments, and the general public. 
The demand for accounting information is not easy to quantify because it comes from a 
diverse set of users who may have different interests. Boesso and Kumar (2007) suggest 
that demand for voluntary disclosure from investors, financial markets, and other key 
stakeholders arises from dissatisfaction with mandatory financial reporting. Ranking of 
items that need to be disclosed also varies across parties, as between them, there are a 
number of conflicts on the requirement of financial information (Foster, 1986). Supply of 
financial information is affected by existing regulations, market forces, and costs arising 
from disclosure (Foster, 1986). 
The growth in stock exchanges makes investors put more pressure on companies to 
increase public disclosure (Gray et al., 1984b). Berardino (2001, p. 12) states that: 
"Investors want governance that is designed and administered to protect the 
interests of all shareholders. They want companies to accurately disclose their 
financial position and business performance" 
Competition among companies on the types of securities tendered, and terms and expected 
return promised can influence financial reporting in capital markets (Foster, 1986). 
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Management acknowledges that a well-managed disclosure policy could bring economic 
benefits to a company (Williams, 2001). In a study to find reasons for managers to release 
earnings forecasts voluntarily, Trueman (1986) finds that managers may be motivated to 
disclose earning forecasts, if they aim is to maximise the firm's market value, while 
keeping control over production decisions. This is because the forecast provides investors 
with a more favourable assessment of the manager's ability to predict changes in the 
economic environment and revise production plans accordingly. Therefore, voluntary 
disclosure could be used as a tool to enhance the investors' perceptions of the manager's 
ability to anticipate future changes. Thus, management may use voluntary disclosure tools 
for the successful implementation of corporate goals. Information about operating 
performance or share prices may be released timely in order to gain advantage of positive 
outcomes or reduce the impact of negative outcomes (Skinner, 1994). Nonetheless, Nagar 
(1999) comments that managers may hesitate to disclose information due to uncertainty of 
its outcome regarding the performance of management. 
Hossain and Taylor (2007) summarise the reasons for managers to disclose additional 
information from the empirical studies on voluntary disclosure. They conclude that 
management voluntarily discloses information to (1) reduce agency and contracting costs 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987), (2) reduce the cost of capital (Suwaidan, 1997; Botosan, 
1997; Sengupta, 1998), and (3) increase f inn value (King et al., 1990; Frankel et al., 1995). 
Healy and Palepu (2001) suggest other reasons for companies to disclose information 
voluntarily by stating that voluntary disclosure might be a response to innovation, 
globalisation or changes in business and capital market environments. 
According to Core (2001), in order to maximise firm value, shareholders endogenously 
optimise disclosure policy, corporate governance, and management incentives. He explains 
that mandated disclosure might be of adequately high quality to produce low information 
asymmetry for a firm with low growth opportunities. This is because a low growth 
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company has no need for external finance and has low litigation, incentive and proprietary 
costs. Therefore, this kind of firm has no need for voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, 
quality of mandated disclosure could be low and information asymmetry could be high for 
firms with high growth opportunities. Reduction in information asymmetry by means of 
voluntary disclosure is the best possibility. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the voluntary disclosure 
literature. They identify six forces influencing management decisions on voluntary 
information disclosure: capital market transactions, corporate control contest, stock 
compensation, litigation cost, proprietary costs, and management talent signalling. For the 
capital market transactions hypothesis, firms tend to make voluntary disclosure with the 
intention of reducing information asymmetry and also cutting the cost of external financing 
by means of reduced information risk. The corporate control contest hypothesis assumes 
that management uses voluntary disclosure to explain a firm's poor performance, and thus 
reduces the likelihood of undervaluation. Regarding the hypothesis of stock compensation, 
management that is rewarded with stock compensation has an incentive to use voluntary 
disclosure to reduce the possibility of insider trading allegations. Firms may also increase 
the level of disclosure to reduce contracting costs for management, who receives stock 
compensation. The litigation cost hypothesis assumes that management tends to disclose 
the bad news to avoid legal action from inadequate or untimely disclosures. However, 
management is inclined to decrease disclosure for forecast information. For the proprietary 
costs hypothesis, management has the incentive to decrease voluntary disclosure if they 
perceive that such disclosure could reduce their competitive position. For the management 
talent signalling hypothesis, the study by Trueman (1986) finds that talented management 
has the incentive to make voluntary earnings forecasts. However, Healy and Palepu (2001) 
comment that there is no evidence either to support or disprove this hypothesis. They also 
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conclude that main factors influencing a disclosure decision by management are 
contracting, political costs and capital market considerations. 
Healy and Palepu (2001) categorise the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure 
into three types of capital market effects. Firstly, voluntary disclosure has the potential to 
improve stock liquidity. Companies with a high level of voluntary disclosure give investors 
confident in stock transactions (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verecchia, 1994; 
Healy et al., 1999). This results from the reduction of information asymmetries among 
informed and uninformed investors. The next possible consequence of voluntary disclosure 
is reduced cost of capital. There is some evidence that voluntary disclosure can reduce the 
cost of equity capital (Botosan, 1997) and increase the market's capitalisation (Piotroski, 
1999). Disclosure is a strategic tool that enables companies to raise capital at the lowest 
possible cost (Lev, 1992; Healy and Palepu, 1993). Lastly, companies with a high level of 
voluntary disclosure are inclined to have larger analyst followings. This hypothesis is 
supported by the studies of Francis et al. (1998) and Healy et al. (1999). 
Information efficiency can create more efficient investment decisions (Fishman and 
Hagerty, 1989). By making disclosure, companies can reduce uncertainty about their 
financial performances and future prospects. Disclosure may also create positive images of 
management performance and their commitment to society (Harvey and Keer, 1978). 
Haniffa (1999) also suggests that disclosure is an important element in supporting a viable 
capital market. It can lead to maximisation of economic welfare, which results from 
optimal decisions based on greater information. Disclosure can also be used to attract 
investors and help a company to compete with others (Mautz and May, 1978). With the use 
of disclosure, companies that need external financing can benefit from the lower cost of 
capital (Frankel et at, 1995). In addition, disclosure is a good channel for public relations 
and a proof of management creditability (Elliot and Jacobson, 1994). With respect to 
response from analysts on additional disclosure, Horngren (1957) suggests that if analysts 
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are well-informed, the following situations will occur: (1) more attention from analysts; (2) 
favourable attitudes from analysts resulting in higher price-earnings ratios; (3) less chance 
of fluctuating share prices that result from startling company news, as analysts can predict 
company performance more precisely; and (4) relatively high stock prices in the long-run. 
Management may timely disclose crucial information about operating performance, future 
results, or share prices in order to benefit from positive outcomes or to reduce impacts of 
negative ones (Skinner, 1994). Bens and Monahan (2004) conclude that managers tend to 
disclose more only if they possess good news. They also mention several theoretical studies 
to support their finding. In the cases of dramatic news such as adverse audit opinions, 
dramatic deterioration, or adverse impacts on public health, management may use 
disclosure as a tool to mitigate possible costs and regain public trust. Skinner (1994) finds 
that managers are inclined to disclose additional information on bad news in order to 
reduce litigation cost. Nonetheless, voluntary disclosure may not be an effective tool to 
protect companies from litigation costs (Francis et al., 1994). Companies may choose not 
to disclose bad news if it would cause unfavourable reaction from users (Waymire, 1984). 
Shaw (2003) reports the negative relationship between disclosure quality (measured by 
financial analysts' ratings of corporate disclosure quality) and the timeliness in which 
accounting earnings capture bad news (measured by the earnings-return association). 
Dye (2001) describes the voluntary disclosure theory as a special case of game theory. The 
central premise is that an entity will disclose information that is favourable to the entity and 
will not disclose information unfavourable to it. Dye (2001) uses the `highlights' section of 
company annual report as an example of this theory. If there are stresses in successful cost 
reductions, but the company does not emphasise anything on the revenue side. This 
situation implies that company revenue growth was disappointing even before inspecting 
the income statement. Dye (2001) also raises the interesting issue that questions on 
financial reporting are not just about disclosures, and therefore, studying disclosures alone 
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is not very meaningful without ultimately providing comprehension of the whole financial 
reporting process. 
2.5 Cost-Benefit of Voluntary Disclosure 
Under the assumption of rationality, individuals always balance potential benefits against 
costs when they make a decision (Williamson, 1985). Bhushan and Lessard (1992, p. 150) 
recognises the influence of cost-benefit analysis in voluntary disclosure. They point out 
that: 
"... it is now generally recognized that a cost-benefit analysis is required, 
weighing the benefits of additional disclosure to investors against the costs, both 
direct and indirect to issuers " 
Management decides the quantity and quality of information to be disclosed based on 
perceived costs and benefits (Radebaugh and Gray, 1997). Choi and Levich (1990) find 
that companies are inclined to balance the advantage of a lower cost of capital with cost 
associated with disclosure and costs of competitive disadvantage. When the benefits from 
disclosure exceed the costs of disclosure, companies are expected to provide voluntary 
disclosure (Cooke, 1989a; Choi and Levich, 1990). 
Generally, companies are unwilling to allow additional costs from additional disclosure 
unless it is a requirement, or the potential benefits exceed the estimated costs (Gray et al., 
1984b). Patelli and Prencipe (2007) explain cost and benefit of disclosure based on the 
agency hypothesis. They recognise disclosure as a control mechanism for reduing the 
chances of opportunistic behaviour by management (perquisites and other personal 
benefits). Reduction in opportunistic behaviour is a cost that managers compare with 
benefits from disclosure when making a decision on disclosure. Choi and Levich (1990) 
find that multinational corporations are inclined to balance the advantage of a lower cost of 
capital with costs associated with disclosure and costs of competitive disadvantage. 
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Costs associated with disclosure are an important factor that affects company decisions on 
disclosing information. These costs include collection and processing costs, litigation costs, 
political costs, and competitive disadvantage costs, as well as additional constraints on 
management decisions (Foster, 1986). Costs of disclosure can be classified as direct and 
indirect (Maulz and May, 1978; Lev, 1992). Direct costs of disclosure are those for 
information production as well as management supervision, audit and legal fees, and 
dissemination of information (Cooke, 1989b). Indirect costs cannot be determined 
straightforwardly, for example, proprietary costs, particularly costs of competitive 
disadvantage. 
Dye (1986, p. 331) defines proprietary information as "Information whose disclosure 
reduces the present value of cash flows of the firm endowed with the information ". 
Proprietary costs could have strong impact on decisions about voluntary disclosures (Meek 
et al., 1995). Empirical studies show that management tends to withhold proprietary 
information. Verecchia (1983) develops a theoretical model on the impact of proprietary 
costs on disclosure. He finds that companies tend to reduce disclosure if the information 
affects the cash flows of company owners. Disclosure of proprietary information could lead 
companies into a competitive disadvantage in the form of the use of additional information 
by competitors to the detriment of the company that discloses such information (Gray et 
al., 1984b). Competitive disadvantage can reduce the ability of a company to obtain 
benefits from innovations, which include technological skills, production methods, 
advertising programs, product differentiation, patents and copyrights, and organisational 
skills (Mautz and May, 1978; Beaver, 1981). According to Mautz and May (1978), chance 
of disclosure creating competitive disadvantage has positive relationships with the timing 
of an event being disclosed, the extent of specific detail disclosed, and the number of 
interest groups that find the disclosed information useful. Prior studies agree that 
companies are reluctant to disclose additional information that will reduce their 
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competitive position even if they have to face a higher cost of equity (Verrecchia, 1983; 
Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough, 1993). 
2.6 Theories of Voluntary Disclosure 
Comprehensive theoretical frameworks can help in structuring empirical experiments, 
identifying appropriate variables and formulating alternative hypotheses (Fields et al., 
2001). Reasons for divergence in the level of voluntary disclosure among firms could be 
explained by discussing theories of voluntary disclosure. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 150) state that: 
"The study of accounting is a social science. An accounting theory that seeks to 
explain and predict accounting cannot divorce accounting research from the 
study of people. The contracting approach to studying accounting requires 
researchers to understand the incentives of contracting parties ". 
Obviously, perception of people can change over time. This results in continuous change in 
disclosure activity in response to changing in values, norms, beliefs and attitudes of 
members in a society. Also, a company has to cope with inconsistent demands from the 
society over a period of time. Changes in situations being investigated make researchers 
apply different theoretical approaches in their studies. In order to understand corporate 
disclosure, numerous theories have been proposed in prior studies. In most of these studies, 
agency theory is regarded as the dominant theory. 
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2.6.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory principally involves a relationship between a principal and an agent. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define agency relationship as: 
"A contract under which one or more persons (the principal[s]) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent " 
Agency theory has long been acknowledged as a dominant theory in business. There is 
evidence of agency relationship since the era of the Greek and Roman accounting. De Ste. 
Croix (1956, cited in Watts, 1977) explains that "... the purpose of Greek and Roman 
accounting was to disclose any loss due to dishonesty or negligence of subordinates" 
Basic assumption in the agency theory is that both agent and principal are risk and effort 
averse. They are both acting in their own best interests. Agency theory explains voluntary 
disclosure in the context of separation between ownership and control. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989), rationales for the agency theory are conflicts in the desired goal of 
principal and agent. Information asymmetry, which happens when the agent has superior 
access to the information, can cause difficulties for the principal in verifying the agent's 
behaviour. It can also result in two agency problems, moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Arnold and de Lange, 2004). In adverse selection, the principals are not able to determine 
whether the agents are performing the work for which they are paid. A moral hazard is 
caused by the fact that the principals cannot verify the actions of the agents but only the 
outcome of these actions. In this case, the principals cannot be sure that the agents have 
performed their work to the best of their ability (ibid. ). 
The principals who entrust the agents to perform a service and make decisions on their 
behalf give two responsibilities to the agent: responsibility for actions and responsibility to 
account for those actions (Gray et al., 1987). The agents are expected to act in the best 
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interests of the principals. However, problems about conflict of interests always occur 
(Morris, 1987). As the agents are both members of the community and self-seeking 
individuals, their role in society is in conflict (Lewis and Collins, 1990). A separation of 
ownership and control of a firm gives rise to agency costs, due to conflicts of interest 
between the contracting parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts, 1977). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define agency costs as the summation of (1) costs of monitoring the 
agents' behaviour; (2) bonding expenditures by the agents to guarantee that no action by 
them will be taken to harm the principals' interests (for example, auditing, compensation 
policies); and (3) the residual loss (reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to 
divergence between the agent's decisions and decisions which would maximise principal's 
interest). 
Conflicts between manager and shareholders are varied. They can be related to effort, 
horizon, risk preference and asset use as defined by Byrd et al. (1998) (see Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1: Types of agency problems 
Problem Definition 
Effort Managers may have incentives to exert less effort than shareholders expect them to. 
Horizon Managers tend to have closer horizons for achieving results than shareholders. 
Differential risk Managers typically have so much of their wealth tied to the ongoing viability of the 
preference firm that they tend to be more risk averse than shareholders. 
Asset use Managers can have incentives to misuse corporate assets or consume excessive 
perks because they do not bear the full cost of such actions. 
Source: Byrd et al., 1998, p. 15 
Agency theory assumes that the agents tend to maximise their interests. This could create a 
problem when the agents decide what information to disclose, as their goals could be either 
to maximise the shareholders' interests or to satisfy their personal needs. Belkaoui and 
Karpik (1989) suggest that the agents have the incentive to disclose more information in 
order to reduce interference from principals. In addition, when the agents perform well, 
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they may use disclosure as away to improve their status. As for the principals, Mangos and 
Lewis (1995), comment that the principals face the dilemma of whether the agents 
discharge their duties out of self-interested or on moral and socially responsible way. This 
results in the demand from the principals to access both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
information on a regular basis. When ownership is dispersed, conflicts between principals 
and agents will increase. This makes widely held companies disclose more information so 
that principals are able to monitor their economic interests effectively. Furthermore, the 
agents can send a signal that they act in the best interests of the principals (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The agents normally gain access to superior information than the principals and thus, there 
is a chance that the agents will use the superior information to their own advantage. A 
greater number of shareholders results in monitoring problems. Increased shareholder 
monitoring or controlling activities could lessen agency problems. As a result, managers 
are expected to disclose more information so that agency costs involved in monitoring 
activities could be reduced (Schipper, 1981). 
Even though it is a dominant theory in disclosure studies, agency theory has received a 
number of criticisms, especially on the main assumptions, and ontology and epistemology 
issues (Armstrong, 1991). Tinker and Okcabol (1991, p. 344) criticised the weakness of the 
agency theory in handling the consequences of monitoring: 
"Agency theory makes no distinction between price and value, and thus is 
theoretically incapable of distinguishing between the merits of `friendly' and real 
monitoring. The absence of a concept of social value, independent of price, 
testifies to the poverty of accounting theory and its inability to put into question 
the social optimality of market equilibriums. " 
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There are also a lot of comments on the unrealistic assumptions of agency theory. Tinker et 
al. (1982) comment that agency theory does not take into account the institutional 
background. Ogden (1993) also adds that agency theory seems to oversimplify complex 
business relations. Consequently, it is not capable of coping with complexities and 
contradictions in the use of accounting information. Ashton (1991) criticises the main 
assumption of agency theory that agents and principals are assumed to act in self-interests 
to maximise their own benefit. He argues that the problem has been exaggerated and there 
are internal and external pressures, which could mutually fulfil the desire of managers 
serving the interests of shareholders and also their own interests. Agency model derives 
normative implications and it is not bias-free, especially in terms of bias associated with 
researcher opinions (Whittington, 1987). 
2.6.2 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory was developed in order to explain problems of information asymmetry 
and to find a way of reducing these with more information signalling to others (Morris, 
1987). It was applied initially in consumer behaviour to explain the problems related to 
buyers being imperfectly informed about quality of products (Akerlof, 1970). Spence 
(1976) explains information asymmetry under two aspects. The first aspect concerns 
difficulty in differentiating high quality products from other products. This may result in 
withdrawal of products from the market by sellers of high quality items. The second aspect 
is a signalling process that represents the efforts of sellers in conveying information to 
buyers about the superiority of their products. Signalling theory is also used in labour 
markets, where productivity of employees is assumed to be unknown by employers. 
Employers pay their employees according to signals from the employees such as their 
educational level (Spence, 1973). The concept of signalling is also applied in the context of 
capital markets, where there are information asymmetries between management and market 
participants. 
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Similarly to the agency theory, signalling theory recognises the separation between 
ownership and control and also motivation of managers to disclose more information due 
to market pressures (Ross, 1979). Signalling theory is different from agency theory in that 
there are signalling costs which have a negative relationship with the quality of informatim 
(Morris, 1987). Signalling theory suggests that managers tend to present quality 
information to minimise signalling costs. 
In a market for goods and services, sellers are inclined to adopt a policy of full disclosure. 
This is because the absence of information creates unfavourable beliefs among buyers 
(Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). This concept is also applicable for the capital market. 
Companies with better performance are inclined to disclose additional information to signal 
their superior performance and differentiate themselves from others (Akerlof 1970). 
Logically, one might assume that companies with unfavourable information are inclined to 
be silent. However, being silent may not be the best solution because investors may 
interpret non-disclosure as a negative signal (Ross, 1979; Milgrom, 198 1). Companies may 
suffer from reputational costs if they fail to disclose the bad news in a timely manner 
(Skinner, 1994). 
When shares are mispriced, a company would have signalling incentives to disclose more 
information in order to adjust the share price to its `true' value and prevent undervaluation 
by the market (Healy and Palepu, 1993; Hossain and Taylor, 2007). As signalling could 
have a strong impact on share price, it might persuade companies to provide misleading 
information. However, only short-term benefits could be obtained from providing false 
information. Being detected for misleading disclosure could lead a company into disaster; 
it would damage the creditability of all future information provided by such a company, 
which would eventually affect the share price. This would results in decreased demand for 
the company's signals in the future (Bird and Locke, 1981). 
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2.6.3 Capital Need Theory 
Capital need theory can help to explain disclosure practice in that a higher level of 
disclosure reduces the cost of capital by lowering information asymmetry, reducing 
estimated risks related to expected future returns, and expanding information availability to 
a wider audience (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Capital need theory suggests that the 
need to raise capital at the lowest possible cost is motivation for voluntary disclosure 
(Choi, 1973b; Spero, 1979). Foster (1986) suggests that enhanced voluntary disclosure 
could support a successful listing or capital raising. A number of studies report that 
companies tend to increase disclosure activities around the period of capital raising (Choi, 
1973b; Firth, 1980; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). There is also empirical evidence that 
companies that frequently access capital markets for finance tend to increase their level of 
voluntary disclosure (Choi, 1973a; Firth, 1980; Healy and Palepu, 1993). The reason for 
increased disclosure is the belief that companies will benefit from the lower cost of capital 
(Choi and Mueller, 1992). There are a number of studies that support this idea, for 
example, those of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), and 
Healy et al., (1999). These studies find that additional disclosure can enhance stock market 
liquidity and reduce the cost of capital through reduced transaction costs and increased 
demand for company stock. Additional disclosure can help to reduce investor uncertainty 
and risk, and also required rate of return, which can eventually lead to a lower cost of 
capital (Cooke, 1989b). In addition, less uncertainty perceived by investors could result in 
higher share prices (Gray and Roberts, 1989). Concealing information can lead to 
difficulties in capital raising. Mueller (1967, P. 68) emphasises the importance of disclosure 
in capital raising that: 
"... secrecy is self-defeating. Failure to make reasonable disclosure in response 
to user needs can severely limit the pool of funds available to a corporation. 
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Potential providers of capital, when kept in the darb will simply put their money 
elsewhere. " 
Cooke (1989a) raises a number of justifications to support the capital need hypothesis. 
Firstly, additional disclosure could attract investors and also help in maintaining a pleasing 
demand for shares. Secondly, information risk could be reduced by additional disclosure 
that can lead to a lower cost of capital. Thirdly, listed companies tend to have a higher level 
of disclosure than unlisted companies because listed companies are inclined to increase 
their voluntary disclosure in order to raise capital on the markets. In addition, multiple 
listed companies are even more likely to have a higher level of disclosure. Fourthly, 
companies may have to increase the level of disclosure in order to gain access to foreign 
capital. This is because overseas capital suppliers may have different disclosure 
requirements. Lastly, companies might increase their social responsibility disclosures to 
show that they act responsibly in order to attain their status on the securities markets and 
attract new investors. However, additional disclosure cannot result in reduced cost of 
equity capital in all cases. Some types of information are very sensitive and can cause a 
higher cost of capital, for example, information that increases market uncertainty. 
A number of empirical studies support the capital need hypothesis. Most of them find that 
additional disclosure can lead to a reduced cost of capital, fewer estimation risks and 
enhanced stock liquidity. Table 2-2 shows the empirical results of the capital need 
hypothesis. 
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Table 2-2: Empirical results of the capital need hypothesis 
Study Finding 
Horngren (1957) Better informed analysts and investors result in a favourable impact on 
company share prices. 
Choi (1973b) Companies increase the level of disclosure upon entry into the Eurobond 
market. 
Firth (1980) Companies increase the level of disclosure around the time of capital 
raising. 
Copeland & Galai (1983) Additional disclosure enhances stock liquidity. 
Barry & Brown (1985) A lower systematic risk is associated with high levels of information. 
Higher level of disclosure reduces estimated risks for investors. 
Diamond & Verrecchia Additional disclosure reduces the cost of capital, and lowers estimated risks 
(1991) associated with expected future returns, lowering bid-ask spreads and 
transaction costs for potential investors. 
Lang & Lundholm (1993) Higher analyst disclosure scores for companies issuing securities in the 
current or future period. 
Frankel et al. (1995) Positive association between disclosing earnings forecasts and accessing the 
capital market. 
Welker (1995) Bid-ask spreads are negatively associated with disclosure. 
Botosan (1997) Additional disclosure can reduce the adverse selection component and cost 
of equity capital. 
Negative association between the disclosure level and cost of equity capital 
for companies with low analyst following. 
Sengupta (1998) Companies with high disclosure ratings have a lower cost of debt. 
Healy et a!. (1999) Increase in analyst disclosure ratings results in upward revisions in stock 
valuation and increase in stock liquidity. 
Lang & Lundholm (2000) Companies that increase the level of disclosure prior to equity offerings 
experience price increases before the announcement, but suffer a large 
decline on the announcement date. 
Richardson & Welker Financial disclosure is negatively associated with the cost of equity capital 
(2001) for companies with low analyst following. However, a positive association 
is observed between social disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
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2.6.4 Political Cost Theory 
A managerial decision on accounting policy and corporate disclosure could be influenced 
by political costs arising from various economic factors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; 
Hagerman and Zmijewski, 1979, Ullman, 1985). The earlier studies of Stigler (1971), 
Peltzman (1976), and Jensen and Mecklin (1976) suggest that politicians tend to interfere 
with company affairs by performing wealth redistribution. Theoretically, political costs are 
wealth redistribution from a company to other parties in the economy (Whittred and 
Zimmer, 1990). Foster (1986) defines political costs as "the costs associated with 
government expropriating wealth from corporations and redistributing it to other parties in 
society". Wealth redistribution can occur in several forms: imposition of price controls, 
increase in governmental control over operations, imposition of higher taxes, and removal 
of subsidies and licenses. In extreme cases, companies might suffer from nationalisation or 
expropriation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Leventis and Weetman, 2000; Hossain and 
Taylor, 2007). 
The effects of political costs to a company tend to relate to its political visibility, which 
prior studies have found applies to large (Buzby, 1975) or highly profitable companies 
(Wong, 1988). In order to reduce political impact, companies that are politically visible 
may modify their accounting policy or apply voluntary disclosure to reduce potential 
political costs (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983). According to Watt and Zimmerman 
(1978), companies that are more politically sensitive tend to choose accounting methods 
that minimise reported earnings and political costs. They find that political costs are highly 
associated with company size. Larger companies are more politically sensitive, as they are 
inclined to have more wealth transfers imposed on them. 
One solution to minimise political costs and government intervention is through voluntary 
disclosure (Gray and Roberts, 1989; Lim and McKinnon, 1993). Epstein et al. (1976) 
discuss the role of regulatory bodies on voluntary disclosure in terms of a forthcoming 
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potential regulation. They conclude that companies may build procedures, such as 
voluntary disclosure, in order to diminish the potential for further governmental 
interference. Apart from disclosing additional information, management tends to reduce 
political cost by changes in the content or timing of disclosures (Foster, 1986). This is 
consistent with the finding of Cahan (1992) that management might adjust some 
accounting information to accord with changes in potential political costs. 
2.6.5 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory is regarded as complementary to political cost theory, as both of them 
aim to explain accounting choice in relation to avoidable future costs. Legitimacy theory is 
based on the hypothesis that business operates via a social contract between a company and 
the society in which it operates (Patten, 1991; Hossain and Taylor, 2007). In a social 
contract, business agrees to act in accordance with social desire in order to get approval of 
its objectives and to survive (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). The social contract also represents 
a multitude of explicit and implicit expectations that society has on corporate conduct 
(Shocker and Sethi, 1974). Legitimacy theory is used widely to explain motivation of 
management for the disclosure of corporate social responsibility information. This is 
because corporate disclosure is a tool that managers use to inform the community about 
their responsiveness to specific social responsibility (Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). Elliott 
and Jacobson (1994) suggest that companies may use disclosure to discharge some of their 
accountability obligations to society, as corporate citizenship is served partly by accounting 
disclosure. However, there is no strong evidence to support legitimacy theory in explaining 
voluntary disclosure. There are predictions of a higher level of disclosure in highly 
regulated companies (NG and Koh, 1994) and also companies in politically sensitive 
industries such as energy sector (Whittred and Zimmer, 1990). 
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2.7 Empirical Evidence on Corporate Voluntary Disclosure 
There is a significant variation among corporate disclosure studies, which contain several 
interesting issues of disclosure. Each study has a different focus, for example: quality 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Dhaliwal, 1980; Forker, 1992; Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995; 
Shaw, 2003), adequacy (Buzby, 1974b; Owusu-Ansah, 1998a), timeliness (Courtis, 1976; 
Whittred, 1980), comprehensiveness (Barrett, 1976; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995), and cost-benefit (Benston, 1986; Gray and Roberts, 1989; Depoers, 2000). 
Furthermore, each study is concerned with different aspects of disclosure such as interim 
reporting (Leftwich et al., 1981; Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998), forecast information 
(Penman, 1980; Trueman, 1986), segmental disclosure (Bradbury, 1992), and social 
disclosure (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, Roberts, 1991). In addition to finding relationships 
between company characteristics and disclosure, some studies try to relate disclosure with 
particular issues such as the legal system (Scholz, 1984; Inchausti, 1997; Jaggi and Low, 
2000), politics (Lim and McKinnon, 1993), and culture (Jaggi, 1975; Jaggi and Low, 2000; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
Empirical research on corporate disclosure has a long history, dating back to the early 
1960s. The first study that applied a quantifiable measure to disclosure in corporate annual 
reports is the study by Cerf (1961). He examines the extent of disclosure in corporate 
annual reports of 527 US firms using a disclosure index containing 31 items. The 
disclosure index is weighted by assigning integers ranging from I to 4 to the disclosure 
items based on interviews with financial analysts. By using class means, he finds that asset 
size, number of shareholders, and the rate of return are positively related to the extent of 
disclosure. Cerf (1961) also finds that disclosure in annual reports vary greatly among 
firms. Companies whose shares were traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
disclosed more information than those traded on an exchange other than NYSE or the 
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Over-The-Counter market (OTC). The study by Cerf (1961) has been a foundation for 
subsequent research on corporate disclosure. 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) give an extension to the study on corporate disclosure by using 
chi-square and a stepwise least-squares regression. They apply weighted disclosure index 
that contains 34 disclosure items, 28 of which derived from Cerf (1961). The sample 
consists of 100 companies listed on the NYSE and 55 companies trading on the OTC 
market. Listing status is found to be the most significant variable providing 89 per cent of 
the explanatory power. This is different from the study by Cerf (1961), where company 
size is found to be the most significant variable. Singhvi and Desai (1971) find that 
companies disclosing inadequate information are likely to be small, less profitable, free 
from listing requirements, and audited by small audit firms. This study received criticism 
from Moore and Buzby (1972) on indiscriminate scoring and failure to resolve the 
multicollinearity issue. 
Buzby (1975) applied a different approach in his study by developing a disclosure index 
containing 39 disclosure items, which were weighted by financial analysts using a scale 
from 0 to 4. The sample consists of two sets of data including 44 companies listed on the 
NYSE or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and 44 companies with shares trading on 
the OTC market. Buzby (1975) introduces a match sample approach in this study by 
matching companies from each set of data in terms of asset size, three-digit industrial 
classification, and fiscal year ending. Buzby (1975) finds that there is no significant 
relationship between the extent of disclosure and listing status and only a moderately 
positive association between the extent of disclosure and size. The findings of Buzby 
(1975) are in conflict with the study by Cerf (1961) and Singhvi and Desai (1971). 
Stanga (1976) applies the weighting methodology developed by Buzby (1975) to examine 
the impact of company size and type of industry on the extent of disclosure. The sample 
comprises 80 of the Fortune 1000 firms. Stanga concludes that there are deficiencies in 
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disclosure and company size is not an important factor in explaining corporate disclosure. 
However, industry type is the most signif icant factor in explaining variations in disclosure. 
The earlier studies mentioned above have provided guidelines for a large number of 
subsequent research. While early studies of corporate disclosure applied the weighting 
score approach to measure the extent of disclosure (for example, Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and 
Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Stanga, 1976), subsequent studies have refined the 
measurement of disclosure by using an unweighted disclosure index and adding more 
variety of independent variables. 
2.7.1 National Studies 
This section discusses empirical studies on corporate disclosure in annual reports. Because 
of fundamental differences between the characteristics of developed and emerging capital 
markets, the discussion is separated into two parts. The studies undertaken in developed 
capital markets are presented in section 2.7.1.1 and the studies undertaken in emerging 
capital markets are presented in section 2.7.1.2. 
2.7.1.1 Developed Capital Markets 
The level of voluntary disclosure in developed capital markets, where the markets are 
assumed to be more efficient, is expected to be higher than that in emerging capital 
markets. Efficient capital markets tend to have fewer issues concerning disclosure (Nair 
and Frank, 1980). The efficiency of capital markets also relies on information production 
and disclosures (Ndubizu, 1992). According to Foster (1986), US and some other 
developed capital markets disclose additional information in response to market forces 
rather than regulatory-based forces. Some US firms publicly disclose financial information 
well before the establishment of major regulatory bodies. Foster (1986) also adds that 
Australian and UK firms noticeably disclose more information than regulatory 
requirements. 
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Apart from a variation in statistical methods and disclosure checklist, studies of corporate 
disclosure in developed capital markets apply different sets of variables in order to explain 
disclosure behaviour. The significance of these variables is compared in Table 2-3. 
Generally, company size and listing status have been found to be significantly associated 
with the level of corporate disclosure in most studies (except Malone et al., 1993 for size, 
and Buzby, 1975 for listing status). 
Most studies explain the significance of company size by applying the agency theory, 
which suggests that large firms tend to have higher agency costs as a consequence of 
complex business activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 1981). 
Additionally, larger companies are likely to have a high proportion of outside capital, 
which also results in higher agency costs (Hossain et al., 1995). Larger companies are 
inclined to have lower information production costs and possibly own information for 
internal purposes (Buzby, 1975). Furthermore, large firms may have lower costs of 
competitive disadvantage related with disclosures (Meek et al., 1995). Greater demand for 
information from financial analysts can also be the cause of a positive association between 
company size and extent of voluntary disclosure (Hossain et al., 1995). 
Listing on international markets results in a high proportion of foreign shareholding as well 
as a dispersed ownership structure. Therefore, companies with stocks listed on international 
markets are inclined to have high monitoring costs, which could be reduced through 
disclosure of additional information Malone et al. (1993) suggest that stock exchange 
registration requirements for companies listed on international markets could be another 
reason for disclosing additional information. Most studies apply agency, signalling, and 
capital need theories to support the listing status hypothesis. 
There seem to be conflicting results regarding profitability, liquidity, leverage, proportion 
of outside directors, audit firm, and industry type. Several possible reasons for inconsistent 
results have been identified, including differences in socio-economic and political 
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environment between countries, institutional frameworks and cultures, variations in sample 
size, statistical methods, disclosure index construction, judgements on scoring process, 
diversity in the nature of disclosure, and periods of time. 
Table 2-3: Significance comparison of variables in studies on developed capital markets 
Variables Significant Results Non Significant Results 
Size Cerf (1961), Firth (1979), Malone et aL (1993) 
Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992) 
Wallace eta!. (1994), Raffoumier (1995), 
Hossain eta!. (1995), Inchausti (1997), 
Depoers (2000), 
Camfferman&Cooke (2002), 
Bhojraj et al. (2004), 
Patelli&Prencipe (2007) 
Profitability Cerf(1961)[+], Singhvi&Desai (1971)[+], McNally et al. (1982), 
Belkaoui&Kahl (1978) [-], Malone et at. (1993), 
Camfferman&Cooke (2002) [-] Wallace et al. (1994), Raffoumier (1995), 
Inchausti (1 997 
, 
Patelli&Prenci e (2007) 
Liquidity Belkaoui&Kahl (1978), 
Wallace et al. (1994), 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002) 
Leverage Malone et al. (1993), Wallace ei aL (1994), Raffoumier (1995), 
Hossain et al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), 
Camfferman&Cooke (2002) Depoers (2000) 
Bho ra et al. (2004) 
Listing status Firth (1979), Buzby (1975) 
Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992), 
Malone et al. (1993), Wallace et al. (1994), 
Hossain et al. (1995), Inchausti (1997), 
Ownership Number of shareholders: Singhvi&Desai Concentration: Lutfi (1989), 
structure (1971), Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992), Depoers (2000) 
Malone et al. (1993) Insider: Raffournier (1995), 
Proportion of Adams&Hossain (1998), Malone et at. (1993), 
outside Patelli&Prencipe (2007) 
directors 
Audit firm Singhvi&Desai (1971), Inchausti (1997) Firth (1979), 
McNally et al. (1982), 
Malone et a!. (1993), 
Wallace et al. (1994), 
Hossain et al. (1995), Raffournier (1995), 
Depoers (2000), 
Camfferman&Cooke (2002) 
Industry type Stan ga (1976), Belkaoui&Kahl (1978), McNally et al. (1982), 
Cooke (1989a; 1991; 1992), Wallace et a!. (1994), Raffournier (1995), 
Camfferman&Cooke (2002) Inchausti 1997 
2.7.1.2 Emerging Capital Markets 
A large number of investors find emerging capital markets very attractive. Due to 
significant growth in recent years, emerging capital markets provide higher returns than 
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developed capital markets (Saudagaran and Diga, 1997). Despite the differences among 
countries of emerging capital markets, they share some common characteristics, which are 
significantly different from developed capital markets. Generally, emerging capital markets 
have limitations in terms of market efficiency (Keane, 1993), liquidity (Feldman and 
Kumar, 1995), and volatility (Sedaghat et al., 1994). Inadequate regulatory framework and 
enforcement are also claimed as important factors influencing the quality of disclosure in 
emerging capital market (Saudagaran and Diga, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998a; Choi et al., 
2002). Perera (1989, p. 149) comments on the accounting profession in emerging capital 
market by noting that "... while some countries have well-established accounting 
professions, there are others which do not even have a professional organisation for 
accountants"Investors in emerging capital markets tend to be less informed or they may 
experience delay in receiving information (Errunza and Losq, 1985). Thus, improvements 
on investor protection are very important for emerging capital markets. In addition, there 
are substantial differences between developed and emerging capital markets in terms of 
institutional characteristics, culture, and political environment (Jaggi, 1975; Perera, 1989; 
Saudagaran and Diga, 1997). 
The majority of studies on emerging capital markets apply unweighted indices. There are 
several additional variables included in the studies, particularly those related to corporate 
governance. Additional variables applied in emerging capital market studies include 
proportion of family members on the board and ownership structure, multinational 
affiliation, qualification of principal accounting officers, foreign investment, parent 
company size, familiarity and language, company age, and race of management. A number 
of exceptional ownership structures can be found in emerging capital markets. Therefore, a 
wide variation of variables that relate to ownership structures are included in the studies 
such as block ownership (Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), inside 
ownership (Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Eng and Mak, 2003; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), 
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outside ownership (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chen and Jaggi, 2000), institutional 
ownership (Suwaidan, 1997; Barako et al., 2006), government ownership (Suwaidan, 1997; 
Naser et al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Huffing and Jianguo, 2007), foreign ownership 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et al., 2002; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), individual 
ownership (Naser et al., 2002), and racial ownership (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et 
al., 2002). This is different from most studies in developed capital markets, which mainly 
include only ownership concentration in the analysis. 
It is not very easy to compare or generalise the findings among studies in emerging capital 
markets because a wide variation of variables has been applied. This makes the variables 
less homogeneous. The significance of variables is summarised in Table 2-4. Generally, 
company size is the most powerful explanatory variable and the most important factor in 
most studies. In some studies, company size is the only variable found to be significant 
(Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wallace, 1987; Tai et al., 1990). While ownership 
structure is not found to be statistically significant in most studies in developed capital 
markets, several studies in emerging capital markets report the significance of ownership 
structure in explaining corporate disclosure. Ownership structures that are found significant 
include ownership concentration (Hossain et al., 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006), block ownership (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), 
institutional ownership (Suwaidan, 1997; Barako et al., 2006), foreign ownership (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007), inside ownership (Eng 
and Mak, 2003), and Government ownership (Suwaidan, 1997). 
Several variables included in studies on emerging capital markets show conflicting results. 
A number of studies find that the proportion of outside directors on the board is negatively 
associated with the level of disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Barako 
et al., 2006). This finding seems to support the idea that having outside directors on the 
board could substitute for public disclosure. On the other hand, Chen and Jaggi (2000) and 
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Huffing and Jianguo (2007) report a positive association between proportion of outside 
directors on the board and level of disclosure. Ho and Wong (2001 a), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), and Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) however, find no association between 
proportion of outside directors on the board and level of disclosure. Similar to the findings 
in developed capital markets, variables including profitability, leverage, audit firm and 
industry report inconclusive results. 
Table 2-4: Significance comparison of variables in studies on emerging capital markets 
Variables Significant Results Non Significant Results 
Size Singhvi (1968), Chow&Wong-Boren (1987), Ahmed (1996) 
Wallace (1987), Tai et al. (1990), 
Priebjrivat (1991), Ahmed&Nicholls (1994), 
Hossain et aL(1994 ), NG&Koh (1994), 
Al-Modahki (1995), Wallace&Naser (1995 ), 
Patton&Zelenka (1997), Suwaidan (1997), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Rahman (1998), 
Abd-Elsalam (1999), Sarpong (1999), 
Chen&Jaggi (2000), Ho&Wong (2001 a), 
Haniffa&Cooke (2002), Naser et al. (2002), 
Eng&Mak (2003), Gul&Leung (2004), 
Barako et al. (2006), Hossain&Taylor (2007), 
Huafan &Jian uo (2007) 
Profitability Singhvi (1968), NG&Koh (1994), Wallace (1987), Abd-Elsalam (1999), 
Wallace&Naser(1995)[-], Ho&Wong (2001a), Eng&Mak (2003), 
Patton&Zelenka (1997), Barako et al. (2006), Hossain&Taylor (2007) 
Owusu-Ansah (1998b), 
Chen&Jaggi (2000)[-], 
Haniffa&Cooke (2002), Naser et al. (2002), 
Gul&Leun (2004), Hassan et al. 2006 
Liquidity Naser et al. (2002)[-] Wallace (1987), NG&Koh (1994), 
Wallace&Naser (1995 ), 
Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Rahman (1998), 
Abd-Elsalam (1999), Chen&Jaggi (2000), 
Gul&Leung (2004), Barako et al. 2006 
Leverage NG&Koh (1994), Naser et al. (2002), Chow&Wong-Boren (1987), 
Eng&Mak (2003)[-], Barako et al. (2006) Priebjrivat (1991), Hossain et al., (1994), 
Wallace&Naser (1995 ), Ahmed (1996), 
Patton&Zelenka (1997), Rahman (1998), 
Abd-Elsalam (1999), Chen&Jaggi (2000), 
Ho&Wong (2001 a)), Chau&Gray (2002), 
Haniffa&Cooke (2002), 
Gul&Leung (2004) Huafan &Jian uo (2007) 
Listing status Hossain et al. (1994), Patton&Zelenka (1997), Gul&Leung (2004), Haniffa&Cooke (2002) 
S on (1999) 
Ownership Concentration: Priebjrivat (1991) Concentration: Mohd Ghazali&Weetman 
structure Hossain et al. (1994 )[-], (2006) 
Haniffa&Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006) Number of shareholders: Singhvi (1968), 
Inside: Owusu-Ansah (1998b ), Suwaidan (1997), Naser et al., (2002), 
Eng&Mak (2003)[-] Rahman (1998) 
Block: Huafang&Jianguo (2007) Outside: Wallace&Naser(1995), 
Institutional: Suwaidan (1997), Chen&Jaggi (2000) 
Barako et al., (2006) Inside: Gul&Leung (2004), 
Variables Significant Results Non Significant Results 
Foreign: Haniffa&Cooke (2002), Huafang&Jianguo (2007) 
Barako et al. (2006), Block: Eng&Mak (2003) 
Huafang&Jianguo (2007) Institutional: Suwaidan (1997), 
Government: Suwaidan (1997) Haniffa&Cooke (2002) 
Foreign: Naser et al. (2002) 
Government: Suwaidan (1997), 
Naser et al. (2002), Eng&Mak (2003), 
Huafang&Jianguo (2007) 
Racial: Haniffa&Cooke (2002) 
, 
Naser et al. (2002) 
Individual: Naser et al (2002) 
Proportion of Chen&Jaggi (2000), Eng&Mak (2003)[-], Ho&Wong (2001a), Haniffa&Cooke (2002), 
outside Gul&Leung (2004)[-], Barako et al., (2006)[-], Mohd Ghazali&Weetman (2006) 
directors Huafan &Jian uo (2007) 
Audit firm Priebjrivat (1991), Ahmed&Nicholls (1994), Singhvi (1968), Tai et al. (1990), 
Ng&Koh (1994), Wallace&Naser (1995 ), Hossain et al. (1994), Al-Modahki (1995), 
Ahmed (1996), Patton&Zelenka (1997), Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Rahman (1998), 
Suwaidan (1997), Abd-Elsalam (1999), Chen&Jaggi (2000), Haniffa&Cooke (2002), 
Naser et al. (2002), Hossain&Taylor (2007) Gul&Leung (2004), Barako et al. (2006), 
Huafan &Jian uo (2007) 
Industry type Ng&Koh (1994), Al-Modahki (1995), Wallace (1987), Tai et al., (1990), 
Wallace&Naser (1995), Suwaidan (1997), Patton&Zelenka (1997), 
Chen&Jaggi (2000), Ho&Wong (2001 a), Owusu-Ansah (1998b), Rahman (1998), 
Haniffa&Cooke (2002) Abd-Elsalam (1999), Naser et al., (2002), 
Eng&Mak (2003), Gul&Leung (2004), 
Barako et al. (2006) 
Role duality Gul&Leung (2004)[-], Haniffa&Cooke (2002), Ho&Wong (2001 a) (CEO/Chairman) Huafan &Jian uo (2007)[-l 
2.7.2 Cross-national Studies 
Comparing disclosure practices in cross-national contexts by looking at different single 
national studies might create a strong bias due to differences in research approach. There 
are also differences in disclosure indices, independent variables, periods of time, statistical 
methods, and scoring procedures. Cross national research could help in reducing such bias. 
Empirical research on cross-national disclosure starts with the work by Barrett (1977). The 
objective of this study was to find whether the extent of disclosure of US companies is 
higher than that in other countries. Seven countries including the USA, UK, Japan, France, 
Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands were selected for this study. Annual reports of 
companies with the largest market capitalisation in each country were chosen for the 
analysis. A disclosure index comprising 17 items was constructed. Barrett (1977) finds that 
there is a wide variation in the extent of disclosure among the seven countries and the 
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extent of financial disclosure in the annual reports of US and UK firms is greater than the 
other five nations. Barrett (1977) concluded that a positive association exists between the 
extent of disclosure and the efficiency of national financial markets 
Since the study by Barrett (1977), there has been a number of cross national disclosure 
studies. Spero (1979) examines voluntary disclosure of 60 companies from France, Sweden 
and the UK. By using annual reports from 1964 to 1972, he finds that the level of voluntary 
disclosure in each sample country increases overtime. Spero (1979) concludes that a firm's 
need for capital explains voluntary disclosure. In an industry-specific study, Kahl and 
Belkaoui (1981) examine the disclosure adequacy in annual reports of 70 banks selected 
from 18 countries. Similar to Barrett (1977), Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) hypothesise that 
disclosure adequacy in the annual reports of US banks is superior internationally. A 
disclosure index consisting of 30 items was applied. The results of this study indicated that 
differences exist in disclosure among the 18 countries with 'US banks leading the list'. In 
addition, a positive correlation exists between disclosure and bank size as measured by 
total assets. In a more comprehensive study, Gray et al. (1995) examine the relative 
influence of international market pressure on the voluntary disclosure practice of 116 US, 
and 64 UK multinational companies (MNCs). The main objective of this study is to find 
whether internationally listed MNCs disclose more voluntary information in their annual 
reports than those MNCs listed domestically. A disclosure index consisting of 128 items 
classified into three major categories: strategic, non-financial, and financial was 
constructed. Gray et al. (1995) find that international listing status and country of origin 
influence voluntary disclosure practices, especially for the disclosure of strategic 
information for international listing status and the disclosure of non-financial information 
for the country of origin. The study by Meek et al. (1995) also examines the influence of 
corporate characteristics on sub categories of voluntary disclosure. Data sources were 116 
US, 64 UK, and 46 Continental European MNCs. The results of this study indicate that 
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company size, country of origin and listing status are associated with overall disclosure. 
However, there are conflicting results for sub categories of voluntary disclosure. 
One interesting cross national study in a Southeast Asian (ASEAN) setting is the study by 
Craig and Diga (1998) which aims to ascertain the extent, pattern and nature of corporate 
disclosure in ASEAN and to find whether existing disclosure requirements would be 
conducive to accounting harmonisation in the region. The sample consisted of 145 public 
companies listed on the stock exchanges of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. A disclosure checklist containing 530 items of financial 
disclosure required in at least one of the five ASEAN countries was applied in the study. 
Craig and Diga (1998) find that there is a relatively high level of common disclosure 
requirements within ASEAN nations. Actual disclosure practices are, however, 
significantly different among the five countries. They comment that there would be 
difficulties in achieving disclosure practice harmony in ASEAN countries because of the 
differences in national environment. They also find that compliance with financial 
disclosure requirements was quite low throughout the region. For factors influencing 
financial disclosure, Craig and Diga (1998) find correlations between disclosure levels of 
ASEAN countries and company size, leverage, foreign operation, industry type, and 
country of origin. Contrary to expectation, companies in the banking and utilities industry 
are found to have the lowest level of disclosure. Unlike the majority of prior studies, Craig 
and Diga (1998) find that foreign owned companies tend to disclose less information than 
local companies. 
A study that covers a larger number of countries was made by Archambault and 
Archambault (2003). The extent of corporate disclosure was measured by an unweighted 
disclosure index containing both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. By using a sample 
of leading industrial companies from 33 countries, they find that the financial disclosure 
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decision is complex and influenced by many factors including culture, national systems, 
and corporate systems. 
Boesso and Kumar (2007) use a different method to measure the extent of voluntary 
disclosure by applying content analysis. This study aims to investigate country differences 
in the voluntary disclosure of Italian and US companies. In order to determine the quantity 
and quality of voluntary disclosures, content analysis was applied in the management 
discussion and analysis section of annual reports of 72 Italian and US companies. Boesso 
and Kumar (2007) find that company emphasis on stakeholder engagement was the 
strongest predictor of voluntary disclosure volume and the only predictor in the case of US 
companies. Regarding Italian companies, a number of significant predictors exist including 
business complexity, industry volatility, and company emphasis on stakeholder 
engagement. However, the results are mixed in the case of disclosure quality. Emphasis on 
engaging various stakeholders and the need for intangible asset management are found to 
be significant predictors for the disclosure quality of Italian companies, while no 
significant relationship is found for US firms. 
2.7.3 Voluntary Disclosure by Category of Information 
Earlier studies treat voluntary disclosure as a whole. On the other hand, more recent 
studies, starting with the work by Gray et al. (1995) and Meek et al. (1995) try to 
investigate disclosure behaviour of companies in different categories of voluntary 
disclosure. Gray et al. (1995) and Meek et al. (1995) find that there is empirical evidence 
that different types of information result in different disclosure behaviour and can be 
explained by different factors. Differences in disclosure behaviour in each type of 
information may result from the intention of management or a wide variety of demands 
from information users; and each type of information has different characteristics. 
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When looking at each type of characteristic in turn, financial information is considered to 
be highly related to investment decisions. It is important for both existing and potential 
investors, as it reveals the performance of a company. Future growth of a company could 
also be estimated from financial information. Financial information includes segmental 
information, financial review, financial history, and market related information. On the 
other hand, strategic information could be relevant to a broader set of users. It contains 
information about general corporate information, specific corporate information, economic 
environment, corporate strategies, and future prospects of the company. Management tends 
to use strategic information to enhance a company image or to supply certain corporate 
issues to stakeholders. Finally, non-financial information is an extension of the financial 
reporting system, which is more related to corporate social responsibility and directed at a 
wide range of stakeholders. In recent years, companies have paid more attention to the 
existence of other parties in society, not only shareholders and creditors as in the past. 
Corporate social responsibility is an area of growing interest and concern, as it involves a 
variety of issues such as environmental contribution, community involvement and human 
resources. 
Similar to studies on overall disclosure, company size is found to be significant in almost 
all information categories and seems to be the most powerful factor in explaining variation 
in corporate disclosure. Other variables that most studies have in common, like 
profitability, leverage, and industry type, seem to have low explanatory power and also 
show conflicting results. Gray et al. (1995), Meek et al. (1995), and Leventis and Weetman 
(2004) find that listing status is significant in explaining some types of voluntary 
disclosure. On the contrary, Ferguson et al. (2002) finds no significant relationship 
between listing status and voluntary disclosure. In terms of ownership structure, Chau and 
Gray (2002) find that outside ownership is consistently significant in influencing disclosure 
of information types for Hong Kong and Singaporean companies. Mohd Ghazali and 
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Weetman (2006) report a significant negative association between ratio of shares held by 
executive and non-independent directors and disclosure of all types of information, 
including overall disclosure. However, ownership concentration and government 
ownership are not found to be significantly associated to any type of information. 
Multinationality measured by percentage of foreign sales is found not to be a significant 
factor influencing disclosure of all three types of information including overall disclosure 
in studies by Gray et al. (1995), Meek et al. (1995) and Chau and Gray (2002). 
Some studies categorise voluntary disclosure in different ways, such as studies by 
Suwaidan (1997) and Patelli and Prencipe (2007). Suwaidan (1997) categorises voluntary 
disclosure into seven types (general information, balance sheet information, income 
statement/other statements, projection/future information, financial history, ratios statistics, 
and market-based information). Patelli and Prencipe (2007) apply six categories of 
information in their study (background information, summary of historical results, segment 
information, key non-financial statistics, projected information, and management 
discussion and analysis). Similar to other studies, Suwaidan (1997) and Patelli and 
Prencipe (2007) also find that disclosure behaviour varies amorg types of information. 
2.8 Thailand as an Object of Study 
Thailand has been included in several cross-national studies with variations on central 
themes including accounting and economic development (Holzer and Tremblay, 1973), 
comparability and harmonisation of accounting standards (Saudagaran and Diga, 1997; 
Craig and Diga, 1998; Ball et al., 2003), informativeness of accounting information (Fan 
and Wong, 2002), relationship between accounting information and stock prices (Graham 
and King, 2000), corporate social disclosures (Williams, 1999), and corporate governance 
(Suphakasem, 2008). Although cross-national study enables direct comparison between 
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countries with less bias than comparing between different single national studies, it has 
limitation in providing in-depth information of each country included in the study. 
There has been an increase in accounting research on Thailand as a single case since the 
1990s, when the country was regarded as one of the world's fastest growing economies. In 
addition, the outbreak of financial crisis in 1997 results in the need for more in-depth 
studies in the Thai context. Therefore, many areas of accounting have been investigated. 
MacDonald (1998) examines the role of transparency and disclosure in Thailand's 1997 
economic crisis and concludes that transparency and disclosure are key contributory factors 
for recovery from the crisis. Graham et al., (2000) investigate the value relevance of 
accounting information during the 1997 financial crisis. They find that Thai book values 
and earnings prior to the 1997 decline and Baht devaluation are positively and significantly 
related to Thai security prices. Wiwattanakar$ang (2001) investigates the effects of 
controlling shareholders on corporate performance of Thai listed companies and finds that 
the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with higher corporate performance; 
however, the controlling shareholder involvement in management has a negative effect on 
the performance. Jaikengkit (2002) reviews Thai financial reporting and its environment 
from 1974 to 2002 and predicts that transparency and high quality disclosure will be 
recognised and practiced by Thai companies. Suehiro and Wailerdsak (2004) examine 
corporate management and governance restructuring in Thai business after the 1997 
financial crisis and find that Thai family business still strongly persists in post-crisis. 
Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004) evaluate corporate social and environmental practices in 
Thailand. They conclude that the inconsistent and irregular social and environmental 
disclosure of Thai company annual reports suggest the need for this type of disclosure to be 
regulated to allow more meaningful assessment of corporate social and environmental 
performance. 
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There are limited empirical studies on corporate disclosure practices in the Thai context. 
Among the few exceptions are Priebjrivat (1991) and Sutthachai and Cooke (2009). 
Priebjrivat (1991) investigates mandatory and voluntary disclosures of 63 non-financial 
listed companies, and relates them to cost of capital and specific company characteristics 
(size, leverage, audit firm, ownership control status, and capital structure). A disclosure 
index consisting of 27 items of mandatory, semi-voluntary, and voluntary items which 
were broken down into 68 sub-elements was used. The results of a regression analysis 
reveal that size, ownership control status, capital structure, and the choice of auditor are 
related to disclosure of Thai listed companies in the same way as they are in mature capital 
markets. Priebjrivat (1991) finds that there is limited evidence of the linkage between level 
of disclosure and cost of capital. She concludes that Thai listed companies disclose 
additional information when they perceive benefit to be gained from such disclosure. As a 
result, greater enforcement of disclosure is needed. In a more recent study, Sutthachai and 
Cooke (2009) examine the financial reporting practices of Thai companies between 1993 
and 2002. They try to ascertain whether the 1997 Asian financial crisis had an impact on 
financial reporting practices by considering the changes in measurement and disclosure 
practices. Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find that there were significant increases in 
disclosure levels over the ten year period but no substantial changes in measurement 
methods. 
Given the underlying issue of lack of empirical studies on corporate disclosure practices in 
Thailand, especially for studies that have voluntary disclosure as a main focus; there are 
gaps in prior studies. Firstly, previous studies in this area in Thailand apply quantitative 
analysis to examine corporate disclosure practices. This leaves room for research on 
voluntary disclosure to include qualitative analysis to investigate the perception of persons 
positioned to influence voluntary disclosure. Personal interviews with market participants 
could provide further insight into factors influencing voluntary disclosure and other factors 
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not so easily captured from quantitative analysis. Information obtained from the interviews 
should help to validate and enhance findings from quantitative analysis. Secondly, 
voluntary disclosure at the disaggregated level had not been investigated thoroughly in the 
Thai context. The investigation of factors affecting specific information disclosure may 
help to determine whether factors which explain overall disclosure prove the same in 
specific information disclosure. Thirdly, although Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) include 
data up to 2002 in their study, 2002 is only the first year that the corporate governance 
reformation taking effect in Thailand. In order to investigate the response of listed 
companies to several government measures and also to examine the continuity of the 
implementation, this study includes data up to 2005. 
Finally, there is a lack of studies regarding the impact of some specific characteristics of 
Thai business including ownership structure (ownership concentration and foreign 
ownership) and corporate governance characteristics (CEO/Chairman role duality and 
independent non-executive directors) on corporate voluntary disclosure. By including these 
factors in the study, ' a better understanding of voluntary disclosure practices in Thai 
companies may be created. Although Priebjrivat (1991), Suphakasem (2008), and 
Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) included ownership concentration in their studies, the results 
seem to be in conflict. Therefore, ownership concentration is also included in this study in 
order to verify the mixed results reported in previous studies. In addition, this study 
includes foreign ownership, which is another important ownership structure related 
variable that has not been included in previous studies on corporate disclosure in Thailand. 
Proportion of non-executive directors on the board and CEO/Chairman role duality were 
included in a study by Suphakasem (2008). However, the focus of Suphakasem's study is 
only on corporate governance disclosure. Therefore, these two variables have not been 
examined thoroughly in the context of corporate voluntary disclosure in Thailand. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed relevant theories and empirical studies in relation to corporate 
voluntary disclosure in order to establish a basis for developing the research questions, 
research methods and hypotheses in subsequent chapters. 
Financial reporting plays a crucial role in capital markets. A good understanding of 
corporate disclosure is beneficial to all market participants. However, there are still several 
unanswered questions in this area. Empirical studies on the extent and factors influencing 
disclosures can provide better understanding of the corporate reporting system and further 
insight into how companies respond to demands for enhancing corporate information. The 
review of theoretical framework shows that there are many theories that could explain 
voluntary disclosure practices. Although some theories can be applied to explain the same 
phenomenon, the underlying motivations are different. Each theory is based on specific 
assumptions and explains voluntary disclosure through a particular perspective. 
Gaps in prior studies can be identified in four areas. Firstly, the review of prior literature 
reveals that the majority of prior studies applied quantitative techniques to identify factors 
influencing voluntary disclosure. This leaves room for research on voluntary disclosure to 
include qualitative analysis to investigate the perception of persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure. Personal interviews with market participants could provide further 
insight into factors influencing voluntary disclosure and other factors not so easily captured 
from quantitative analysis. Information obtained from the interviews should help to 
validate and enhance findings from quantitative analysis. 
Secondly, the literature review has shown that voluntary disclosure at the disaggregated 
level had not been investigated thoroughly in the Thai context. The investigation of factors 
affecting specific information disclosure may help in determining whether factors which 
explain overall disclosure prove the same in specific information disclosure. 
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Thirdly, there is a lack of studies regarding the impact of some specific characteristics of 
Thai business, including ownership structure (ownership concentration and foreign 
ownership) and corporate governance characteristics (CEO/Chairman role duality and 
independent non-executive directors) on corporate voluntary disclosure. By including these 
factors in the study, a better understanding of voluntary disclosure practices in Thai 
companies maybe created 
Finally, the literature review suggests that there is a lack of longitudinal studies on 
voluntary disclosure. Most prior studies are based on voluntary disclosure made in a single 
year. As a result, changes in disclosure practices remain largely unexplored. In addition, 
some previous studies capture changes in the levels of disclosure by comparing with other 
research. Comparability of results from different studies that measured disclosures by 
employing different indices is likely to be reduced. Therefore, incorporating data from 
different periods may provide a better picture regarding change in voluntary practices over 
time, especially in the case of Thailand, which is the country that was seriously affected by 
the 1997 financial crisis. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the Thai business environment, which helps in 
understanding the Thai characteristics that are expected to have an impact on corporate 
disclosure policies and practices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Thai Financial Reporting Environment 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a background on the financial reporting environment in Thailand. It 
helps in understanding the Thai characteristics that are expected to have an impact on 
corporate disclosure policies and practices. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 
gives an overview of Thailand including the culture, people and political system. Section 
3.3 discusses the Thai economic systems, which are divided into three periods: before, 
during, and after the 1997 financial crisis. Section 3.4 covers the Thai financial system 
which includes the business enterprise structure, banking system and capital system. 
Section 3.5 provides the regulatory framework of Thai financial reporting. Corporate 
governance reform after the 1997 financial crisis and the role of the accounting profession 
are discussed in section 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. Finally, a summary is provided in section 
3.8. 
3.2 The Country 
Thailand is located in Southeast Asia and has a total landmass of approximately 513,120 
square kilometres. It shares borders with the Union of Myanmar, Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Kingdom of Cambodia and Malaysia. The capital city, Bangkok, is most 
important in both economic and political terms. Thailand's population is approximately 
66.72 million (CIA, 2011). 'Thai' is the official language that is used in most schools 
(National Statistical Office Thailand, 2007). Even though English is compulsory at every 
educational level, it is not used widely. 
The political system of Thailand is democratic with a constitutional monarchy. The Prime 
Minister acts as the head of government and the King as the head of state. The power of 
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government comes from three institutions, namely the National Assembly, Council of 
Ministers and Court (National Statistical Office Thailand, 2007). 
The major economic sectors of Thailand are agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and 
natural resources. Rice is the most important agricultural product for exports. Important 
industrial products are agro-industry, textiles and electronics. There are many tourist 
attractions at locations such as Bangkok, Phuket, and Chiang Mai, where a large number of 
foreigners visit Thailand each year. The important natural resources of Thailand are 
limestone, gypsum, glass sand, marble, tin and natural gas (National Statistical Office 
Thailand, 2007). 
Ethnic groups in Thailand consist of Thai (75%), Chinese (14%) and other minorities 
(11%) (CIA, 2011). The first generation of Chinese immigrants dates back many centuries. 
With extensive intermarriages with Thais, people of Chinese descent regard themselves as 
Thai. As a result, Thailand can be considered as having a homogenous society, as most 
Thai people share the same culture, language, religion and ethical behaviour. 
Thai people are gentle and group-oriented. They tend to avoid confrontation, criticism, and 
controversy. As a result, problems are sometimes ignored to avoid conflict. Decisions are 
usually made based on a group of people rather than individually, which may lead to a 
lengthy decision-making process. However, this is becoming less true with modernisation. 
Thai people have become more argumentative and do not follow traditional Thai values as 
much as they did before (Klausner, 2002). 
3.3 The Thai Economy 
This section gives an overview of the Thai economy. A summary of the Thai economy 
from the 19`h Century to 1997 is provided in section 3.3.1. Next, section 3.3.2 describes the 
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1997 financial crisis, which had a large impact on the Thai economy. The Thai economy 
from the end of the financial crisis to the present is summarised in section 3.3.3. 
3.3.1 Thai Economy before the 1997 Financial Crisis 
Prior to 1885, the Thai economy was controlled by the King, royal family and nobility. 
Society was divided into two classes, namely, the upper class and commoners. The 
commoners provided labour and service to the upper class. The Rights to own land were 
preserved only for the King and civil servants (Hewison, 1989). International trade, mainly 
with the Chinese and Europeans, was controlled also by royal families. However, this 
system changed significantly after the Bowring Treaty was signed between Thailand and 
Britain in 1855. 
The 1855 Bowring Treaty led to the development of modern capitalism in Thailand. Thai 
administration was reformed to support the treaty allowing free trade with foreigners. The 
export of rice, timber, rubber and tin expanded significantly (Hewison, 2002). Since then, 
agriculture has played a significant role in the Thai economy. The first national 
development plan was introduced in 1961 to cover the period of 1961-1966. The plan 
emphasised the development of a manufacturing sector together with an agricultural sector. 
Since then manufacturing has become a significant part of the Thai economy. 
In order to stimulate foreign investment, the Board of Investment (BOI) was established in 
1972. It offers a range of incentives and privileges to eligible companies, including tax 
exemption. In the late 1970s, Thailand experienced an economic downturn, due to the 
decline in export prices of agricultural products, an increase in the Thai Baht currency 
value, and the oil crisis (Hewison, 2001). In an attempt to stimulate the economy, the 
government devalued the Baht and shifted its economic policy to export-oriented 
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industrialisation. Thus, main exports changed from agricultural commodities to labour 
intensive manufacturing products. 
During the 1980s, the industrial sector grew extensively. Thailand was regarded as one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world (Talemgsri and Vonkhorporn, 2005). External 
trade was liberalised continually by reducing tariffs and abolishing other restrictions. Many 
East Asian companies, Japanese ones in particular, took advantage of incentives provided 
by the BOI, and transferred their manufacturing operations to Thailand. As a consequence, 
the amount of foreign investment increased significantly, and contributed to the fast growth 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP reached a growth rate of 13.2% in 1988 (see 
Table 3-1). Thailand was regarded as the second generation of the Asian Newly 
Industrialising Economy (NIE) and one of the World Bank's seven Highly Performing 
Asian Economies (HPAEs) (Dixon, 1999). However, in 1997 Thailand's economy changed 
drastically. 
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3.3.2 The 1997 Financial Crisis 
The Thai economy experienced rapid growth during the late 1980s until the mid 1990s. 
Massive flows of foreign capital came into the country. Financial liberalisation attracted by 
the Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBF) boosted the use of offshore funding. 
This resulted in an oversupply of funds. Short-term private debts grew to 60 percent of the 
GDP in 1997. Prior to mid-1997, the Bank of Thailand pegged the value of the Thai Baht 
to a basket of currencies, of which an estimated 80% was weighted to the US dollar. On the 
2"a July 1997 the government announced the float of currency exchange rate system. The 
Baht value dropped from 25 Baht per one US dollar (under the fixed exchange rate system) 
to 41 Baht per one US dollar by the end of that year. The Baht value continued to fall 
significantly. Money borrowed from overseas without foreign exchange hedging increased 
in value tremendously. Therefore, Thailand became the first country to experience the 
economic crisis, which soon spread to other Asian countries. Soon after the crisis became 
apparent, the entire Thai corporate sector was seriously affected. Many companies suffered 
from devaluation of the Baht and its instability. The number of bankruptcy cases and 
company closures reached its highest level, and the number of newly registered companies 
dropped in 1997 by almost 10,000 from the previous year (Limpaphayom, 2001). 
In August 1997, the Thai government accepted a loan worth 17 billion US Dollars from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF's rescue programme required Thai 
government to undertake significant reformation in order to restore and strengthen stability 
of its financial systems. As a result, a Range of policies and recovery plans, including 
liberalisation of regulations relating to foreign business ownership were put into place. 
Restrictions on foreign investment also were reduced. Privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises was another condition imposed by the IMF. The target was the communication, 
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transport, and energy sectors. However, privatisation was rather unsuccessful due to strong 
opposition from social movements and trade unions (Kesboonchoo-Mead and Wanasathop, 
2009). 
3.3.3 Thai Economy after the 1997 Financial Crisis 
The 1997 economic crisis had a confounding impact on the East Asian economy. Among 
East Asian countries, Thailand was hit harder than others. However, it managed to 
overcome the damage caused by the crisis and has regained its position as a fast growing 
economy (Menkhoff and Suwanaporn, 2007). Although the Thai economy has recovered, 
its growth has become narrower. The real average annual growth of GDP fell by over 40%. 
Park et al., (2009) believe that this was due mainly to competitive pressures from the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), and heightened risks and uncertainties. However, the 
PRC is not only seen as a threat, but also provider of opportunities with a potentially huge 
market. 
Watanagase (2007), then the governor of the Bank of Thailand, seemed to agree with Park 
et al., (2009) when in her speech; 'Ten year After the Asian Currency Crisis' at the 2007 
International Symposium2, she stated that the key driver behind Thailand's economic 
expansion had been a combination of domestic demand and exports. Thailand's export 
structure has become more diversified in terms of both product and destination. Its exports 
to ASEAN countries and China, as a percentage of total exports have increased from 25 to 
30 percent. Thailand now benefits from growing intra-regional trade, particularly that 
which is China-related. As for the Thai Banking sector, being the centre of the 1997 crisis, 
aggressive lending by commercial banks was a major factor that caused a massive currency 
2 Watanagase, T. 2007. "Changes in Thailand's economic dynamism after the 1997 crisis ", speech given 
at The International Symposium "Ten Years After the Asian Currency Crisis: Future Challenges for the 
Asian Economies and Financial Markets", 22 January 2007. 
Available at: http: //www. bis. org/reviewtr07O511 d. pdf [Accessed 28th September 2010]. 
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mismatch in the real sector. Ten years after the crisis, significant improvement in 
profitability, asset quality, and risk management could be observed in this sector. 
Watanagase (2007) also added that non performing loans had been reduced from a peak in 
1998 to eight percent approximately in the third quarter of 2006. The BIS capital adequacy 
ratio in the same quarter of that year was nearly 15%, which suggested a cushion for 
unexpected shocks in the banking system. 
Overall, since the 1997 economic crisis, the Thai Economy has gone through an extensive 
change. In 1999 and 2000, the economy started to recover, but this was interrupted by the 
global economic slowdown in 2001, when the GDP growth of that year was 2.2%. 
However, things began to change in 2002, when the growth rose to 5.3%, despite the 
continued global economic downturn. During 2003 and 2004 the growth rate increased to 
7.1 and 6.3 % respectively. The rate steadied from 2005 to 2007 at approximately 5% per 
year. 
However, there have been ongoing political crises in Thailand since 2008, including the 
protests against the government from the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which 
forced Somchai Wongsawat, Prime Minister at that time, to resign. PAD members seized 
control of terminal buildings at Suvarnabhumi International Airport and Don Mueang 
Airport in Bangkok. Both airports were closed for weeks, which caused a loss of 
approximately three billion Baht (approximately 100 million US dollars) a day in lost 
shipments and trade opportunities. This political crisis caused severe damage to the Thai 
economy, and resulted in a sharp drop in GDP growth rate to 2.5%. Even with a new 
government formed from the opposition party, and led by Abhisit Vejjajiva, the situation 
remained volatile. The National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) 
formed another protest against the new government. The protest became violent in April 
2009, when death, injuries and damage were reported. Then, Thailand's GDP dropped even 
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further to a negative value at 
-2.2%. Political unrest continued in 2010, with a series of 
events that reached a critical point again in April, when the protesters took control of a 
television station and areas around Ratchaprasong intersection at the heart of Bangkok city. 
Police and troops were used to dissolve the situation. The UDD surrendered in May and a 
normal political situation was resumed. The political unrest had strong impact on the 
tourism sector. Nevertheless, the GDP reached a growth rate of 7.8% in 2010. For 2011, 
the Thai economy is expected to expand at a normal rate of 4.1 % (BOT, 2010). 
3.4 Thai Financial System 
The following sections describe the Thai financial system, which comprises the business 
enterprise (section 3.4.1), the banking system (section 3.4.2), and the capital system 
(section 3.4.3). 
3.4.1 The Thai Business Enterprise 
Hierarchy and seniority are important in Thai culture. Hierarchical relationships also play 
an important role in Thai business. The management structure of Thai firms is based 
strongly on rank and hierarchy (Frost and Watkins, 2009). Thai culture is relationship 
oriented, where personal ties and trust are important. Personal relationships within the 
social connections of family, friends, classmates, and colleagues are the foundation of 
many business associations (Nimanandh and Andrews, 2009). As in most developing 
countries, traditional Thai firms are closely held and managed by majority family interests. 
Major business groups are family firms founded by Chinese immigrants, who arrived in the 
country between the 1880s and 1930s (Wailerdsak, 2008). The industrialisation process in 
Thailand has been driven by family firms, which started their business in textiles, trading, 
and commerce. These businesses were later diversified into other activities, while still 
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maintaining their original family controlled and managed characteristics (Suehiro and 
Wailerdsak, 2004). 
The characteristics of family control and management in Thai business are similar to those 
in other Asian countries. The eldest son tends to inherit control of the family business. 
However, gender barriers are disappearing progressively. A relatively large number of Thai 
women are holding executive positions in the business sector. Highly concentrated 
ownership results in a poor management structure. Generally, top management is recruited 
from owner-family members rather than professional groups. Non-family members barely 
reach senior executive positions in a company. Therefore, the real management power and 
decision making remains with the owning family (Frost and Watkins, 2009). 
In the past the main financial resources for Thai companies were bank loans and their own 
retained earnings in order to preserve family ownership. The loan approval from financial 
institutions was based heavily on personal relationships and a business network rather than 
feasibility of the proposed project (Thanapornpun, 2002). After the financial crisis, many 
Thai companies were forced to change their ownership structure into widely-held groups, 
institution-owned, or foreign-owned, in order to sustain their business. Nevertheless, the 
ownership pattern of Thai companies remains highly concentrated. Several large family 
firms continue listing on the SET (see Table 3-2). According to Suehiro and Wailerdsak 
(2004), there are three major reasons for supporting continuous dominance of family- 
owned companies. Firstly, most members of an extended family are well educated abroad. 
Therefore, it is easy for owner families to recruit persons from their own family. Secondly, 
the government has not introduced any regulations regarding the ownership of private 
firms. In addition, revision of the Public Limited Company Act enables owner family 
members to maintain their control of ownership. Thirdly, Thai family business groups are 
78 
able to adjust their corporate activities to fit with the government's policies for economic 
liberalisation. 
Table 3-2: Listed companies by ownership 
Type of shareholders 1996 2000 2006 
No. of 
companies % 
No. of 
companies 
% No. of 
companies 
° _0 
Family-owned 150 33.5 131 30.3 139 33.2 
Semi-family-owned 66 14.7 52 12.0 72 17.2 
Widely-held 160 35.7 145 33.5 127 30.3 
Foreigners-owned 59 13.2 90 20.8 63 15.0 
State or state enterprise 13 2.9 15 3.5 18 4.3 
Total listed firms 448 100.0 433 100.0 419 100.0 
Source: Wailerdsak, 2008 p. 44 
Throughout Thai history, several types of business enterprises have operated in the country. 
Generally, Thai business organisation is divided into four types: sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, private limited companies and public limited companies. Sole proprietorships 
are owned by an individual with unlimited liability; while in partnerships all partners are 
liable jointly for all obligations. In private limited companies, shares are subscribed, of 
which at least 25 percent must be paid up. This type of organisation is governed by the 
Civil and Commercial Code. Public limited companies, on the other hand, are governed by 
the Public Limited Company Act. 
3.4.2 The Thai Banking System 
In 1888, during the reign of King Rama V, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation established the first bank in Thailand, followed by the Chartered Bank of 
India, Australia and China in 1894 and Banque de L'Indochine in 1897 (Chaiyasoot, 1993). 
The Siam Commercial Bank, the first local bank, was established in 1906. Later, other 
domestic commercial banks, primarily Chinese owned, (Wang Lee Bank in 1933, Tan Peng 
Chun Bank in 1934, Bank of Asia in 1939, and Bangkok Bank in 1944) were founded. The 
Thai-Chinese commercial banks were founded mainly for support of Thai-Chinese family 
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business. Therefore, the association between bank and business was very close so that loan 
approvals were based mainly on personal relationship. Although a number of Thai-Chinese 
commercial banks had been founded, western ones continued to dominate the market until 
the 1940s, when the Second World War had begun. 
During the Second World War, Thailand was occupied by Japan and foreign bank 
operations were forced into suspension, except for Japanese ones. This put an end to the 
operation of western banks in Thailand (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1996). In order to control 
all banking activities, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) was founded in 1942. It had a 
significant impact on Thai banking institutions. Laws and regulations to control banking 
activities were issued, and in 1955, the government passed a decree to restrain the approval 
of new banks. The regulations caused a threat to new entrants in the banking business and 
provided opportunities for existing banks to grow. As a result, existing banks, mostly Thai- 
Chinese owned, expanded their business substantially. 
From the late 1960s, Thailand began the process of reforming and developing the financial 
system. This was support for a rapid growth of the Thai Economy to become the financial 
centre of the region. In order to support this scheme further, the Bangkok International 
Banking Facility (BIBF) was established in 1993. The BIBF enabled domestic and foreign 
banks to provide international banking services, and it became the major means for foreign 
funding to flow into the country (Dixon, 2001). In general, the government emphasised on 
reducing its role in economic development from the early 1980s by cutting restrictions on 
private sector operations (Dixon, 1999). 
During the 1997 financial crisis, non-performing loans increased substantially. As a result, 
banks and financial institutions were in a very difficult position. The government applied 
several measures to reform and restructure the financial system, including suspension of 
two domestic banks and fifty-seven financial institutions. In order to cope with problems 
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arising from the suspension of financial institutions, organisations such as the Financial 
Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA), Asset Management Corporation (AMC), and Thai 
Asset Management Corporation (TAMC) were set up. In addition, banks were required to 
recapitalise in order to meet the new standards that were consistent with international best 
practices (Phuvanatnaranubala, 2005). In addition, the restrictions on foreign ownership of 
Thai financial institutions were relaxed temporarily, thus allowing foreign investors to 
acquire major shareholdings for up to ten years (ibid. ). As a consequence, the proportion of 
foreign ownership increased significantly in the banks that remained. The relationship 
between banks and businesses became less personal. Loans were no longer approved based 
solely on personal relationship. In addition, tighter supervision from the shareholders was 
anticipated. 
After the 1997 financial crisis, the government has issued several policies to transform Thai 
financial markets from a credit-based system to a capital market-based system. Three 
capital market development master plans were launched in 2000,2003, and 2006; the latest 
'Thailand's capital market development master plan 2006-2010' targets both corporate 
bond and equity markets with a preparation for full liberalisation of the entire securities 
industry (Nakornthab, 2007). Therefore, public loans and capital market have increased 
their role in funding Thai business. Nevertheless, increased use of public loans and the 
capital market were still rot comparable to bank loans. 
The Thai financial sector is regulated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of 
Thailand (BOT). The MOF sets out a fiscal policy, economic and financial system policy, 
and economic policy, and oversees public finances, taxation, treasury, government 
property, operations of state enterprises and government monopolies. The BOT is the 
central bank, which has responsibilities that include setting monetary policies, managing 
the foreign exchange rate and controlling foreign exchange, supervising and examining of 
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financial institutions, providing banking facilities to the government and financial 
institutions, as well as printing and issuing banknotes and other security documents. 
Banking is regulated by the Financial Institution Act B. E. 2551 (2008), which defines a 
commercial bank and sets out the types of businesses a bank may undertake. This law 
covers commercial banks for small businesses, and banks that are subsidiaries or branches 
of a foreign commercial bank. 
3.4.3 The Thai Capital System 
The Thai capital market can be traced back to 1962, when a private group established a 
stock exchange as a limited partnership. It was in 1963 that the group became a limited 
company under the name 'Bangkok Stock Exchange Co., Ltd (BSE)'. However, the BSE 
did not perform well and terminated its operations in the early 1970s (SET, 2010). 
Although the Thai capital market can be traced back to the early 1960s, it did not play a 
significant role until 1975. In May 1974, the Securities Exchange of Thailand was 
legislated under the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act B. E. 2517 (1974) and began to 
trade on 10`h April 1975. The Securities Exchange of Thailand officially became the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 1991 (Limpaphayom, 2001). 
At present, Listing on the SET requires a minimum registered capital of 300 million Baht 
(SET, 2011). As of May 2011, the SET had 475 listed companies with a total market value 
of 8.74 trillion Baht3. 
The Securities and Exchange Act (SEA) B. E. 2535 (1992) defines the primary roles of the 
SET as follows: 
3 Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 
Available at: http: //www. set. or. th/en/market/market statistics. html [accessed: 1' June 2011]. 
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" 1. To serve as a center for the trading of listed securities, and to provide the 
essential systems needed to facilitate securities trading. 
2. To undertake any business relating to the Securities Exchange, such as a 
clearing house, securities depository center, securities registrar, or similar 
activities. 
3. To undertake any other business approved by the SEC. "4 
Under the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA) B. E. 2535 (1992), the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) was established in 1992 to supervise the Thai capital market. SEC is an 
independent agency responsible for supervising and developing the capital market. The 
main roles of the SEC are 
"To formulate policies, rules and regulations regarding the supervision, 
promotion, and development of securities businesses as well as other activities 
pertaining to the securities businesses; such as issuance and offer of securities for 
sale to the public; securities exchange, the Over-the-Counter Centre, and entities 
related to securities businesses: acquisition of securities for business take-overs; 
and prevention of unfair securities trading practices i5. 
4 Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 
Available at: http: //www. set. or. th/en/about/overview/history p1. html [accessed: I' October 2010]. 
s Source: The Securities and Exchange Commission Thailand, 
Available at: h=: //www. sec. or. thisec/Content 0000000105. jsp? categorvlD=CAT0000021 &lang=en 
[accessed: 3° October 2010]. 
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The regulatory framework of the Thai capital market is sown in Figure 3-l. 
Figure 3-1: Regulatory framework of the Thai capital market 
Ministry of Finance 
The Securities and Exchange Commission 
( SEC) 
Primary 
Secondary 
Other Related 
Maýlcet ä Market Organization 
IRW 
SET Group 
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Available at: http: //www. set. or. th/en/about/overview/historypl. html [accessed: l$` October 2010]. 
Figure 3-2 shows the performance of the SET in terms of market capitalisation, the SET 
index and MAI Index (Market for Alternative Investment). As can be seen, the market 
capitalisation increased significantly in 2003 and has been quite stable since. The number 
of listed companies, which has shown an increasing trend since 2002, is shown in Figure 3- 
3. 
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Figure 3-2: The performance of the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Figure 3-3: Number of listed companies 
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After the 1997 economic crisis, the role of the Thai capital market has changed. The capital 
market has received a high priority in the reformation of the financial system (Nakornthab, 
2007). The 'Capital market development master plan' was set up in order to upgrade 
financial institutions and make the capital market more attractive to investors. Even though 
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the capital market has played a significant role in the Thai financial system, it did not 
perform well enough to consider as a capital-based system. Thai financial system is more a 
credit-based dominated by banks and financial institutions but with ongoing development 
towards a strong capital-based system. 
3.5 Regulatory Framework for Financial Reporting 
The provisions of Book III of the Civil and Commercial Code B. E. 2467 (1924) is the first 
legislation related to financial reporting. This legislation set up rules for both trading and 
manufacturing companies. It was later replaced by the provisions of Book III of the Civil 
and Commercial Code B. E. 2472 (1929), which has remained in use until now. It requires 
all limited companies to prepare and file balance sheets and profit and loss statements to 
the Ministry of Commerce. These financial reports must be also audited by a certified 
auditor. 
While the Civil and Commercial Code B. E. 2472 (1929) covers only limited companies, 
the Accounting Act B. E. 2482 (1939) was enacted to control not only limited companies, 
but also partnerships and persons in the business to file financial reports to the Ministry of 
Commerce. This legislation was replaced by the Accounting Act B. E. 2515 (1972) and then 
the Accounting Act B. E. 2543 (2000). The latter legislation was enacted to enforce 
compliance with the Thai Accounting Standards (TASs). 
Apart from the Civil and Commercial Code and the Accounting Act, financial reports of 
listed companies were controlled also by the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act B. E. 
2517 (1974) and the Public Companies Act B. E. 2520 (1977), which were enacted to 
regulate listed companies when the capital market was developed. These Acts were later 
replaced by the Securities Exchange of Thailand Act. B. E. 2535 (1992) and the Public 
Companies Act B. E. 2535 (1992) to promote the development of public companies, as 
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some rules and regulations in the previous Acts were believed to be too restrictive 
(Limpaphayom, 2001). Under the new law, the roles of the SET, SEC, and Ministry of 
Commerce are more clearly defined. A large number of ministerial regulations have been 
announced and a range of notifications issued by the SET and SEC (Connelly, 2004). More 
financial information is required for disclosure under the 1992 Acts. For instance, under the 
Securities Exchange of Thailand Act, section 56, listed companies are required to prepare a 
quarterly statement, financial statement for any accounting period, annual report and any 
other reports specified by the SEC. The new Public Company Act B. E. 2535 (1992) was 
criticised for some deficiencies. For instance, the protection of minority shareholders was 
inadequate. Also, the external monitoring and control of corporations were weak 
(Limpaphayom, 2001). 
Rigorous disclosure requirements have been assigned for Thai listed companies. Apart 
from compliance with Thai accounting standards, financial statements have to be reviewed 
by external auditors and disclosed to the public on a quarterly basis. The auditors 
themselves have to be licensed by the Federation of Accounting Professions and also 
registered with the SEC. The strict criteria for eligibility of an audit firm have been set by 
the SEC. In addition to issuing annual reports, listed companies are required by the SEC to 
file their disclosure statement annually. This statement contains extensive information on 
risk factors that companies are facing, highlights of financial information from financial 
statements, management discussion and analysis of company performance, and information 
on related-party transactions that occurred during the year. In cases where there are any 
negative effects on company performance, a detailed description of plans to resolve the 
problems must be provided. In addition, an audit committee has to include discussions on 
the level of internal control and management control in the statement. The SEC conducts 
random inspections of approximately a quarter of annual disclosure statements submitted 
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by listed companies, and those that fail to comply with the requirement are subjected to 
sanctions from the SEC (SET 2004). 
3.6 Corporate Governance Reform 
Prior to the 1997 financial crisis, a majority of the Thai general public did not recognise the 
concept of corporate governance; even significant players like management, shareholders, 
investors and other stakeholders were not aware of it. However, the awareness of good 
corporate governance practice has increased substantially since the crisis. 
It is claimed that weak corporate governance was the main cause of overinvestment and 
poor financing policies that contributed to the financial crisis. A policy study on Thailand's 
corporate financing and governance structure was conducted by Alba et al., (1998) for the 
World Bank. They identify five interrelated problems of corporate governance practices in 
Thailand: concentrated ownership, inadequate protection of minority shareholders, high 
levels of diversification, weak market incentives, and weak accounting standard and 
practices. However, Alba et al., (1998) comment that these problems are no more severe in 
Thailand than in the rest of East Asia and many other developing countries. 
Since the crisis of 1997, Thailand has attempted to improve corporate governance practice 
of listed companies through various approaches. The Government's reform strategy has 
focused on restructuring institutional arrangements, enhancing the reliability of financial 
information and disclosures, improving corporate board oversight, and increasing 
shareholder rights (Connelly, 2004). It has focused also on improving the efficiency of the 
legal and regulatory framework related to public companies (ibid. ). Corporate governance 
reforms were a joint effort between governing entities, including the SET, SEC, and BOT. 
In early 1998, the SET issued a listing requirement indicating that all listed companies 
must have an audit committee, which has to consist of at least three outside independent 
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directors. In this setting, the responsibility of auditing, internal control, and financial 
disclosures is transferred to the audit committee. The adequacy of companies' financial and 
non-financial disclosures has to be verified by the audit committee. The establishment of an 
audit committee is expected to help minimise the influence of management, which 
typically represents owning families who are major shareholders of companies. 
The Thai government designated 2002 as `the year of good governance'. The Cabinet put 
the corporate governance issue into the national agenda and set up the National Corporate 
Governance Committee (NCGC). The NCGC is chaired by the Prime Minister and 
committee members, including the Minister of Finance, Minister of Commerce, Governor 
of the Bank of Thailand, Secretary-General of the SEC, and President of the SET. The 
responsibilities of the NCGC are as follows: 
" 1. Establish policies, measures, and schemes to upgrade the level of corporate 
governance among institutions, associations, corporations and government 
agencies in the capital market. 
2. Order the related agencies and persons, both in the private and government 
sectors to testy any information to the NCGC. 
3. Suggest related agencies to improve their policy schemes and operating 
processes including legal reforms, ministerial regulations, rules and enactment 
to achieve good corporate governance. 
4. Promote the guidelines of good corporate governance to the public and 
related parties to raise confidence from international investors. 
5. Appoint subcommittees and working groups to study and assist any operations 
by using their authority. 
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6. Monitor the progress and evaluate the performance of subcommittee. "4 
The SET and SEC focus on three main aspects of corporate governance: quality of 
corporate disclosures, maintaining of audit committees, and instituting framework for good 
governance. The responsibility of ensuring that good corporate governance standards are 
followed by listed companies has been assigned to the board of investment and the good 
governance supervisory committee (Connelly, 2004). In 2002, the SET proposed the 
fifteen principles of good corporate governance as guidelines for Thai companies (see 
Appendix 3-A). The principles are related to the issue about the rights of shareholders, 
equitable treatment of shareholders, role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and 
responsibilities of the board. In their annual registration statement and annual reports, Thai 
listed companies are required to demonstrate how they apply the fifteen principles. If they 
choose not to apply any principle, they need to provide justification. This requirement has 
been effective from the accounting period ended 31 December 2002. 
The SET and SEC participated in an attempt to set a standard for corporate governance by 
establishing the Thai Rating and Information Service (TRIS) as part of the corporate 
governance development programme. The TRIS is Thailand's first rating agency chosen by 
the SET to give a corporate governance (CG) rating for Thai companies. The CG Rating 
Project aims to acknowledge listed companies the importance of good corporate 
governance and to provide information about corporate governance ranking for investment 
decision making. The SEC and SET collaborate in providing support to listed companies 
with satisfactory CG rating by offering privileges such as reduced enactment of tender 
6 Source: National Corporate Governance Committee, Thailand, 2011, 
Available at: http: //www. cglhailand. or-/SetCG/about/ncjzc en. html [accessed 2"d March 2011] 
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offering, reduced annual and securities issuing fee. The SET has initiated a series of 
educational programmes for investors, directors and company management. 
A Range of activities such as the 'Board of the Year awards', conferences, seminars, and 
studies to benchmark governance practices has been launched by the Thai Institute of 
Directors Association (IOD), professional associations for accountants, auditors and 
internal auditors, and investors' associations. All these practices are geared toward the 
promotion of transparency and disclosure of information to improve the quality of Thai 
capital for market participants and foreign investment. 
3.7 Accounting Profession 
The first professional accountancy body in Thailand was the Institute of Certified 
Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT) established in 1948. The objective of this 
organisation was to monitor accountants and auditors who were not considered as 
professional, but mainly facilitated the purposes of taxable legislation. In 1962, when the 
Auditor Act B. E. 2505 (1962) was passed, the Board of Supervision of Auditing Practices 
(BSAP) was established in the same year. The BSAP, under the Ministry of Commerce, 
was responsible for organising examination of auditors, monitoring the quality of auditors, 
and regulating accounting practices. After accounting was recognised as professional, the 
role of the ICAAT has increased. It was responsible for issuing Thai accounting and 
auditing standards and improving accounting professions. 
In 2004, the structure of the two accountancy bodies has changed by the Accounting 
Profession Act BE. 2547 (2004). Under this act, the ICAAT was replaced by the 
Federation of Accounting Professions of Thailand (FAPT), and the BSAP was replaced by 
the Board of Supervision of Accounting Professions (BSAccP). The FAPT is responsible 
Source: National Corporate Governance Committee, Thailand, 2010, 
Available at: httl2: //www. cjzthailand. org/SetCG/award/disclosure en. html [accessed 2nd October 2010] 
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for controlling accounting professions, while the BSAccP supervises and approves the the 
FAPT tasks. This restructure is expected to strengthen the Thai professional accountancy 
and raise the standard of Thai financial reporting. 
The ICAAT started to publish Thai accounting standards (TASs) in the 1970s. The early 
TASs were influenced by western standards including IASs, the US and UK standards. 
Gray et al. (1984a) comment that Thai accounting standards reflect 'moderate' UK 
influence but 'significant' IASC influence. In response to the 1997 financial crisis, the 
government has a policy to reduce the gap between Thai and international accounting 
standards. Therefore, the ICAAT has made a great deal of effort in adopting the IASs. 
After the transformation of the ICAAT to the FAPT, the policy of converting the TAS to 
the international standard is still ongoing. All new standards issued by the FAPT are 
committed to be in line with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Up to 
now, several new and revised TASs have been issued. There are also a number of exposure 
drafts of proposed new and revised TASs pending for approval. The FAPT and SEC have 
indicated that large enterprises in Thailand (companies in the SET50 index) should adopt 
new TASs based on the IFRSs from 2011 onward. The SEC targets full compliance with 
the IFRSs for all Thai listed companies by 2013 (Ernst&Young, 2009). 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on explaining the financial reporting environment of Thailand. It has 
provided information about the development of the Thai economy and financial systems. 
This is essential for a better understanding of the factors influencing voluntary disclosure 
practices, which will be discussed in following chapters. This chapter has also discussed 
features of Thai institutional settings and the regulatory framework governing financial 
reporting in the country. 
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The long and unique history of Thailand has influenced the development of its institutions 
and environment significantly, and it therefore plays an important role in shaping the Thai 
financial reporting system. The Thai economy experienced rapid growth during the 1980s 
and the early 1990s. There were major developments in the financial and capital systems in 
order to compete in the global economy. However, the economic growth was disrupted by 
the financial crisis, which hit Thailand in 1997. The financial crisis can be seen as the 
major turning point of the Thai economy. A range of policies and recovery plans have been 
put into place since then, leading to significant changes in the regulatory environment. In 
addition, the awareness of good corporate governance practice has increased substantially. 
At present, despite the political instability, the Thai economy continues to grow steadily. 
The next chapter explains the research methodology and research methods employed in this 
study. Research hypotheses are formulated based on relevant theoretical frameworks, prior 
empirical evidence, and the Thai financial reporting environment that has been discussed in 
this chapter. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 3-A: The 15 Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
Principle 1: Policy of Corporate Governance 
The board of directors should identify and approve a written corporate governance policy. The board 
should disclose that policy for acknowledgment of shareholders and every group of stakeholders. 
Principle 2: Shareholders: Rights and Equitable Treatment 
The board of directors should facilitate shareholders' meeting in such a way that they encourage equal 
treatment for all shareholders. There should not be any difficult procedures, excessive expenses, or denial 
that would lessen the access to studying company information, as well as attending shareholders' 
meeting. 
Principle 3: Rights of Various Groups of Stakeholders 
The board of directors should perceive about stakeholders' legally rights and ensure that those rights are 
protected and treated with care. The board should support cooperation between the company and the 
various groups of stakeholders in order to secure the business wealth and stability. 
Principle 4: Shareholders' Meeting 
Chairman of the meeting should allocate appropriate time and encourage equal opportunities for 
shareholders to express their opinions and raise any question at the meeting. Every director, particularly 
chairpersons of the committees should attend the shareholders' meeting to respond to questions. 
Principle 5: Leadership and Vision 
The board of directors should possess leadership, vision, and decision-making independence for the best 
interests of the company and the shareholders at large. There should be a system in which roles and 
responsibilities are clearly separated between the board and the management, as well as between the 
board and the shareholders. 
Principle 6: Conflict of Interests 
The board, the management, and shareholders should consider to remove the issues of conflict of interest 
carefully, honestly, reasonably, and independently on a virtuous ground for the best interests of the 
company. 
Principle 7: Business Ethics 
The board of directors should provide code of ethics or statement of business conduct for all directors 
and employees to ensure that they are aware of, understands, and would keep monitoring the code of 
conduct as expected by the company and shareholders 
Principle 8: Balance of Power for Non-Executive Directors 
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It is proposed that one-third of the total directors on the board should be independent, with three as the 
minimum. In case where a company has significant shareholders with dominating power, there should be 
a certain number of directors representing a fair proportion of each group's investment. 
Principle 9: Aggregation or Segregation of Positions 
Companies may combine the titles of chairman of the board and president into one position, or keep 
them as two separate positions. Whichever way companies choose, there should be a clear separation of 
power and authorities so that no one would be granted unlimited power. 
Principle 10: Remuneration of Directors and the Management 
Remuneration setting needs to be carried out with transparency and obtain an approval from the 
shareholders. The board of directors should disclose its remuneration policy and the amounts set for 
directors and top executives in accordance with the SEC's rule. 
Principle 11: Board of Directors' Meeting 
Board of directors' meeting should be regularly scheduled in advance. It is a duty of directors to attend 
every board meeting. The board of directors should disclose the total attendance of each director. 
Principle 12: Committee 
The board should provide for committees, especially for audit committee and remuneration committee. 
All or most members of the committees should be non-executive directors, while chairmen of the 
committees should be independent non executive directors. 
Principle 13: Controlling System and Internal Audit 
The board of directors should provide, maintain, and review a controlling system in which financial, 
operations, and compliance controls are incorporated. The board should commence internal audit 
activities by setting up a separate unit within the company to handle them. 
Principle 14: Directors' Reporting 
The board should provide a report indicating its responsibility on financial information, and be exhibited 
alongside auditor's report. The board of directors' report should cover important topics of Code of Best 
Practice for Directors' of Listed Companies as prescribed by the SET. 
Principle 15: Relations with Investors 
The board of directors should ensure that the company discloses important information correctly, timely, 
and transparently. The board should provide an Investor Relations Unit to represent the company in 
communication with institutional and individual investors, stock analysts in general, and state agencies. 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand (2002), The Principle of Good Corporate Governance, The Stock 
Exchange of Thailand 
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CHAPTER4 
Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the methodology adopted and research methods 
employed in this study. The following section discusses the research approach taken for 
the empirical work. The quantitative (univariate and multivariate analyses) and 
qualitative (interviews) methods are applied in order to provide the best understanding of 
research problems. Section 4.3 provides the data collection procedures. Section 4.4 
explains the research instruments and procedures, with particular reference to 
construction of the voluntary disclosure index, scoring method, and interview structure 
and process. Section 4.5 presents the formulation of the hypotheses. The statistical 
techniques applied in this study are presented in section 4.6. Finally, a conclusion is 
provided in section 4.7. 
4.2 Research Approach 
While some would believe that adoption of one paradigm unavoidably requires one to 
choose one methodology over the other, Baker (2003) argues that most researchers would 
see quantitative and qualitative methods as complementary. Quantitative researchers 
acknowledge that qualitative data can play an important role in quantitative research, 
while qualitative researchers believe that reporting qualitative views of a few participants 
may lead to limitations in generalising the findings (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007). By 
using a multi-method strategy, the results would be better clarified (Saunders et al., 
2003). Furthermore, contradictory findings from using different research methods are 
valuable, as they lead to re-examination of the conceptual frameworks and assumptions 
underlying quantitative and qualitative components (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). 
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Quantitative and qualitative methods have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
Quantitative research has the weakness of being unable to capture the perceptions of 
participants. On the other hand, qualitative research may involve personal interpretations 
by the researcher and difficulty in generalising findings (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 
2007). In addition, quantitative and qualitative research can answer different types of 
questions. Qualitative research questions are exploratory, while quantitative research 
questions are confirmatory (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). Voluntary disclosure is a 
sensitive issue, as it is a matter of managerial judgement. It may create extensive 
understandings of corporate disclosure motives by including qualitative analysis from 
interviews with persons positioned to influence voluntary disclosure. Quantitative 
analysis in this study has the limitation of only using information from annual reports as 
the data source. In order to enhance the interpretation of the results from the quantitative 
analysis, semi-structured interviews are included in the study. By using interviews, a 
wider aspect of voluntary disclosure can be obtained. Interview questions cover the 
influence of private voluntary disclosure and other channels of disclosure such as 
company websites, press releases, or company newsletters. 
In order to provide the best understanding of research problems, this study apply 
quantitative (univariate and multivariate analyses) and qualitative (interviews) methods. 
Therefore, the data are obtained from both primary (interview findings) and secondary 
sources (annual reports). Quantitative and qualitative data collections are conducted 
separately from examination of annual reports using the voluntary disclosure checklist 
and semi-structured interviews. Results from the qualitative analysis are used to confirm 
the results and enhance the interpretation of the results from the quantitative analysis. 
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4.3 Data Collection 
The data for this study are obtained from company annual reports and interviews with 
persons positioned to influence voluntary disclosure. The following sections discuss the 
process for selecting companies and interview respondents. 
4.3.1 Selection of Companies 
Companies included in this study are selected from the SET100 Index. The Stock 
Exchange of Thailand issues the SET100 Index to provide a benchmark of investment. 
The Index is calculated from stock prices of the top 100 listed companies in the SET, 
reckoned in terms of market capitalisation, high liquidity and compliance with the 
requirement regarding the distribution of shares to minor shareholdersa. The main 
objective of the SET100 index is to help promote good quality medium to large sized 
companies. The SET100 represents approximately 80 percent of total market 
capitalisation and 86 percent of the total share trading value 9. The SET100 index is 
selected for the purpose of the analysis in this study because it represents the most 
actively traded stocks on the SET. SET100 companies are likely to be the companies that 
most investors are interested in. These companies also have a tendency to disclose 
additional information perhaps as a result; they tend to attract the interest of analysts. 
Therefore, SET100 companies are expected to act as a benchmark for the best practice of 
voluntary disclosure for Thai listed companies. 
Companies listed in the banking, finance, securities and insurance sectors are excluded 
from the study because they report under different or specific regulations. In addition, the 
nature of business and activities of these companies are not quite comparable to others. 
This approach has been taken by a number of previous accounting disclosure studies 
® Source: The Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2010, 
Available at: http: //www. set. or. th/en/products/index/setindexp3. html [accessed: 1St October 2010]. 
9 Source: Seamico Securities PLC, 2009, Available at: 
http: //www. seamico. com/Th/news/Xress detail. asp? id=5684 [accessed: 14`s February 2009]. 
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(McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain 
et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Owusu- 
Ansah, 1998b; Depoers, 2000; Ferguson et al., 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et 
al., 2002; Hassan et al., 2006; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). 
Annual reports from 1995,1996,2002, and 2005 from the selected companies are chosen 
for statistical analysis. The reason for choosing these four years for the study is the 
intention to capture the period before and after the 1997 Asian economic crisis, taking 
into account the availability of annual reports. The years 1995 and 1996 represent the 
period before the crisis. Then afterwards, it might take time to see changes in voluntary 
disclosure practices after a financial crisis, especially changes affected by corporate 
governance initiatives (see Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006 p. 244). The year right 
after the crisis might be too early to examine changes in voluntary disclosure. Therefore, 
the years 2002 and 2005 were chosen to represent the period after the crisis. The year 
2002 represents the recovery period. It is also the year when the corporate governance 
reformation took effect in Thailand (see section 3.6). The most recent year that the annual 
reports were available at the time of data collection is 2005; therefore, it was chosen for 
the analysis. As previously mentioned in this section that the SET100 companies suit the 
purpose of this research; however, the SET launched the first SET100 index in 2005. 
Therefore, sample companies are based on the 2005 index. The intention of having a 
dataset from the same population for all four years is also the reason for choosing the 
2005 index. 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand library is the main source of company annual reports. 
At the time of data collection it provided the annual reports from 1995 to 2005. However, 
some annual reports of selected companies were not available, particularly those of 1995 
and 1996. For the annual reports that were not available, a search was made from 
company websites and other libraries (the SEC library and university libraries). Letters 
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requesting the annual reports were sent to each company for the annual reports that were 
not available from the sources mentioned, however, only five companies responded and 
provided their reports. Table 4-1 summarises the data collected for each year categorised 
by sector. 
Table 4-1: Sector representation of selected companies 
Sector Number of companies 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Population 
Agro/Food Industry 1 22 2 2 
Industrials 5 67 8 10 
Property/Construction 13 22 25 32 33 
Resources 4 56 6 7 
Services 6 9 11 13 13 
Technology 4 11 11 14 14 
Total 33 55 62 75 79 
Table 4-2 shows the percentage of selected companies to total companies listed in the 
SET. Companies selected in this study may not represent the whole market, especially for 
the years before the 1997 financial crisis, when availability of annual reports was limited. 
However, the selected companies may represent Thai listed companies better in terms of 
market capitalisation. The high proportion of market capitalisation of the selected 
companies also indicates that the sample is relatively skewed to the largest companies. 
These larger companies are expected to act as a benchmark for Thai listed companies. 
Table 4-2: Percentage of selected companies to total listed companies 
No. of companies 
selected 
Total listed 
companies 
% of companies % of market 
capitalisation 
1995 33 416 7.93% 25.25% 
1996 55 454 12.11% 39.57% 
2002 62 389 15.94% 50.97% 
2005 73 468 15.60% 69.79% 
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4.3.2 Selection of Interviewees 
Interview respondents are persons in positioned to influence voluntary disclosure in 
Thailand. Five groups of interviewees were approached, namely company management 
(corporate executives, financial controllers, and investor relation manages), investment 
analysts, external auditors (local firms and Big Four firms), regulators, and bankers. 
Twenty five individuals were initially targeted as potential interviewees. Twenty of them 
agreed to be interviewed. The main reason for those declining was time constraint. Table 
4-3 compares the number of targeted with actual interviews. Although the interviewees 
were not randomly selected, all of them were experienced professionals with diverse 
backgrounds. Familiarity with the Thai business environment is also an important issue in 
choosing interviewees for this study. 
Table 4-3: Interview Respondents 
Interviewees Number targeted Number interviewed 
Listed companies 10 7 
Investment analysts 43 
External auditors 55 
Regulators 33 
Bankers 32 
Total 25 20 
4.4 Research Instrument and Procedure 
The research instruments of this study are reported in this section. Section 4.4.1 explains 
the procedure for constructing the voluntary disclosure index. The interview structure and 
approach are discussed in section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1 Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Cooke and Wallace (1989, p. 51) state that "Financial disclosure is an abstract concept 
that cannot be measured directly". The difficulty in measuring the extent of voluntary 
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disclosure is a major limitation for studies in this area. In order to understand and be able 
to analyse and compare voluntary disclosure practices of different companies, a 
quantifiable measure is needed. 
Lord Kelvin: "I often say that when you can measure what you are 
speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it, but 
when you cannot measure it, your knowledge is of a meagre and 
unsatisfactory kind. " (quoted in Sterling, 1970, p. 71). 
To evaluate voluntary disclosure practices, a voluntary disclosure index is applied to the 
annual reports of selected companies. A disclosure index was first developed by Cerf 
(1961) and has been used by a large number of studies. Despite limitations associated 
with subjectivity from the selection of disclosure items and measurement process, the use 
of a disclosure index in measuring the extent of disclosure is widely accepted in the 
financial disclosure research area. It has been used repeatedly by numerous studies in 
different countries over various periods of time (see section 2.7). 
Previous studies in Thailand that apply a disclosure index to measure the level of 
disclosure in annual reports are Priebjrivat (1991), Suphakasem (2008), and Sutthachai 
and Cooke (2009). Researcher-construct disclosure indices are used in all three studies; 
therefore, dissimilarities exist in the way disclosures are measured. Priebjrivat (1991) 
constructs a disclosure index consisting of 27 mandatory, 15 semi-voluntary, and 26 
purely voluntary disclosure items with 'importance weighting' attached to each item. 
Suphakasem (2008) develops a disclosure index of 191 items containing both mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure items, all items are related to corporate governance disclosure. 
A disclosure index created by Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) consist of 219 mandatory 
items and 47 voluntary items. The 219 mandatory items contain 49 items that changed 
from voluntary to mandatory during the period of their study (1993 - 2002). Therefore, 
these 49 items were finally excluded to ensure that levels of disclosure in different years 
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are comparable. Disclosure indices developed in previous studies in Thailand provide a 
basis for constructing a disclosure checklist in this study. However, only voluntary 
disclosure items are taken into consideration. In addition, this study applies different 
criteria in categorising disclosure items. Disclosure items are categorised according to the 
type of information (strategic, financial, non-financial and social responsibility) to enable 
the analysis of voluntary disclosure at the disaggregated level. 
The following sections explain the reasons for choosing annual reports as a data source, 
construction, and scoring method of the voluntary disclosure index. 
4.4.1.1 Reasons for Choosing Annual Reports 
There are various channels through which companies can disseminate their information 
to the public such as annual reports, press releases, websites, company newsletters, and 
analysts' meetings. Among these different channels of disclosure, the annual report is 
regarded as one of the most important sources of information. Knutson (1992, p. 7) states 
that "At the top of every analyst's list (of company financial reports) is the annual report 
to shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in 
some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it '. 
The importance of annual reports as a source of corporate information has been 
acknowledged by a number of studies in both developed (e. g. Lee and Tweedie, 1975; 
Anderson, 1981; Chang et al., 1983; Vergoossen, 1993; Hossain and Adams, 1995; 
Botosan, 1997) and emerging capital markets (e. g. Firer and Meth, 1986; Abdelsalam, 
1990; Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1995; Ho and Wong 2001 b). 
In the case of developed countries, there are a number of alternative sources of corporate 
information; therefore, the importance of annual reports might be reduced. For example, 
Eccles and Mavrinac (1995) find that corporate managers, financial analysts and portfolio 
managers in the USA consider individual meetings and press releases as more important 
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than annual reports. On the other hand, alternative sources of corporate information are 
quite limited in developing countries, which may suggest that annual reports play a more 
important role there than in developed countries. 
The annual report is chosen as the data source for the statistical analysis of this study 
because it is a credible attested corporate document, which has been produced regularly; 
therefore this could help minimise the possible bias arising from comparison of voluntary 
disclosures among different companies. In addition, annual reports are prepared by 
companies themselves, which means that the information is not affected by the 
interpretations of third parties. 
Availability and accessibility are also important factors that need to be considered when 
choosing the data source. There are limitations in the availability of other sources of 
information, for example, the absence of a disclosure index from reliable rating 
institutions, lack of management forecasts in Thailand, and restriction in use of Internet 
for corporate disclosure during the period before the 1997 financial crisis. Therefore, the 
methodology employed in this study is the examination of corporate annual reports to 
determine the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
4.4.1.2 Construction of the Voluntary Disclosure Checklist 
The main task in construction of a disclosure index is selecting items of voluntary 
disclosure that could be presented in corporate annual reports. The disclosure items 
should be significant information that corporate management is expected to disclose in 
annual reports. 
Marston and Shrives (1991) criticise the use of researcher-constructed disclosure indices, 
resulting in a loss in advantage of direct comparison with prior studies. However, a 
uniform or universal disclosure checklist might not be developed easily, as there are 
diversities in the economic, social, and political systems between different countries 
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(Cooke and Wallace, 1989). Therefore, most studies construct disclosure indices based on 
prior studies with modifications to suit their research context, while taking into account 
the reporting environment. This study also applies a researcher-constructed disclosure 
index with support from prior empirical studies. 
To ensure that the procedure of constructing the voluntary disclosure checklist in this 
study is reliable, certain criteria in selecting disclosure items are developed. The criteria 
are as follows: 
a) There should be theoretical or empirical support for including such items. 
b) Items have to be applicable to voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies. 
c) Items are not specified for disclosure in corporate annual reports by any 
regulatory bodies. 
d) Items are not associated to any specific group of users. 
e) There should be acceptable variability in disclosure of such items among different 
companies. 
f) Items are not biased by difference in periods of time in the dataset. 
After the criteria in selection of disclosure items were established, construction of the 
voluntary disclosure checklist began. The process started with a review of prior studies in 
corporate disclosure in both developed and developing countries in order to obtain 
theoretical and empirical support for the checklist. Then, the initial voluntary disclosure 
checklist based on the list constructed by Meek et al. (1995), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), 
and Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) was created. The main reason for following the 
checklist originated by Meek et al., (1995) is that it was constructed "Based on an 
analysis of international trends and observations of standard reporting practices, taking 
into account relevant research studies and comprehensive international surveys of 
accounting and reporting" (Meek et a1., 1995, p. 561). Some items in the checklist derived 
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from Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Eng and Mak (2003) and Mohd 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) which are recent studies conducted in Asia (Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore). 
All disclosure items in the initial voluntary checklist were checked with the Thai 
Accounting Standards and the Notification of the Security and Exchange Commission 
(Kor Chor. 40/2540 entitled rules, conditions and procedures for the disclosure 
-of 
financial status and operating result of listed companies). The items that are mandatory 
under Thai regulations were eliminated. 
The voluntary items which are not relevant to the Thai environment or items that are 
associated to a specific group of users were also eliminated. The reason for excluding 
items associated to specific user groups is because this study does not focus on any 
particular group of users. All types of users: shareholders, financial analysts, investors, 
creditors, employees, and governing entities are considered to have equal rights in access 
of information disclosed by companies. 
As the sample contains data from 1995 to 2005, the SEC updated the list of mandatory 
disclosure items for listed companies during this period. As a result, 7 items in the 
original voluntary disclosure checklist became mandatory. In order to be able to compare 
levels of disclosure in different years with the same index, these items were excluded. 
Although elimination of disclosure items could create downward bias to the companies 
that voluntarily disclosed such information, its effect is not expected to be large. The 
elimination of the disclosure items that changed from voluntary to mandatory during the 
period of study is the same as that of Sutthachai and Cooke (2009). 
The preliminary list was sent to financial analysts, external auditors and accounting 
lecturers for verifying validity of the disclosure items and reducing personal subjectivity 
arising from researcher judgement in the selection of disclosure items. Their feedback 
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was used to refine the list. The refined list was then pilot-tested on a sample of 20 
company annual reports from every industry sector to ensure that the checklist was 
relevant and able to differentiate disclosure practices among Thai listed companies. 
Applicability and suitability of the disclosure items to companies in different industry 
sectors were taken into account. In addition, pilot testing was performed to ensure that 
there is acceptable variability in voluntary disclosure among different companies. The 
items that were not disclosed by any companies were eliminated, as they were considered 
to be irrelevant. Also, the items that all companies disclosed in the pilot testing were 
taken into consideration, as the absolute disclosure might not generate meaningful results. 
The final voluntary disclosure checklist contains 60 items, which can be divided into 
three main categories: strategic, financial, and non-financial and corporate social 
responsibility information and ten sub-categories (Appendix 4-A). This way of 
categorising disclosure information was originated by Gray et al. (1995) and Meek et al. 
(1995) and followed by a number of studies (see section 2.7.3). When looking at each 
type of characteristics in turn, financial information is considered as highly related to 
investment decisions. It is important for both existing and potential investors, as it reveals 
company performance. Future growth of the company could also be estimated from 
financial information. Financial information includes segmental information, financial 
review, financial history, and market related information. On the other hand, strategic 
information could be relevant to a broader set of users. It contains information about 
general corporate information, specific corporate information, economic environment, 
corporate strategies, and future prospects of the company. Management tends to use 
strategic information to enhance a company's image or to supply certain corporate issues 
to stakeholders. Finally, non-financial information is an extension of the financial 
reporting system, which is more related to corporate social responsibility and directed at a 
wide range of stakeholders. In recent years, companies have paid more attention to the 
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existence of other parties in society, not only shareholders and creditors as in the past. 
Corporate social responsibility is an area of growing interest and concern. It involves a 
variety of issues such as environmental contribution, community involvement and human 
resources. 
4.4.1.3 Scoring Method 
Once the voluntary disclosure checklist has been constructed, the next important step is 
the measurement process. This section is concerned with the approach and strategies 
employed in the measuring process, including discussion on the weighting scheme and 
the way to treat non-applicable items. 
In order to evaluate the extent of voluntary disclosure in company annual reports, a 
scoring sheet was prepared. There has been extensive debate on weighting of the 
disclosure index. The rationale for this approach is that different information might not be 
equally important or relevant. Some prior studies apply a disclosure index weighted by 
reference to opinions of groups of users, mainly comprising financial analysts (Cerf, 
1961; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Buzby, 1975; Malone et al., 1993). However, having 
financial analysts assigning weight to the disclosure index means that the information 
needs of analysts alone are considered, ignoring the needs of other user groups. 
The subjectivity associated with weighting is a major limitation of this approach. 
Assigning weights might create a certain degree of subjectivity, as stated by Ashton 
(1974, p. 728): 
"Generally, individuals overestimate the extent to which they utilize the 
less important cues and underestimate the extent to which they utilize the 
more important cues, i. e., 'subjective' weights are much more evenly 
distributed across cues than are statistically-derived weights. " 
108 
Also, weighting is the perception of a specific group of users, which may not be 
applicable to all users of corporate annual report. Perceptions are inclined to be selective, 
adaptive, ordinarily veridical, controlled by patterns and active (McBurney and Collins, 
1984). Firer and Meth (1986) comment that there are external factors which cause 
constantly changing in perceptions. They also find that perceptions of financial analysts, 
who assign weight to disclosure indices, also differ according to institutional 
characteristics and countries. In addition, weights are assigned by respondents in a non- 
decisive situation. Therefore, the results are hypothetical and may not reflect the 
significance of the items in actual decision-making. 
Arguments have been made in the literature concerning subjectivity of the weighting 
approach. Cooke and Wallace (1989) state that there are other factors that affect the 
importance level of information including the entities, transaction/event, user, industry, 
country, and time of the study. Therefore, assigning weight to individual disclosure items 
may be misleading. Cooke (1989a) comments that an approach endeavouring to 
encapsulate the subjective weights of various user groups would be `unwieldy' and 
probably futile'. Raffournier (1995) agrees with Cooke (1989a) in that using erroneous 
weights may result in higher bias than applying equal weights. In addition, Marston and 
Shrives (1991) criticise the idea that the weighing approach cannot achieve the level of 
measurement of an interval scale. They comment that an item rated as a four has no 
reason to be four times as important as an item rated as a one. The judgement of persons 
who assign weight may affect the validity of weighted indices. Dhaliwal (1980) provides 
evidence of significantly different weights assigned by financial analysts to some items of 
information. Different user groups may have different views on the importance of 
disclosure items. Cooke (1989b, P. 115) states that "clearly one class of user will attach 
different weights to an item of disclosure than another class of user ". 
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Due to the reasons mentioned above, the unweighted scheme is considered to be an 
appropriate approach for this study. The focus of this study is not on any particular group 
of user, but rather all users of corporate annual reports, who have equal rights to the 
information. Therefore, every item in the disclosure checklist is assumed to be equally 
important. This approach has been employed and supported in several prior studies. It 
focuses on the relative extent of the disclosure rather than bringing in additional 
subjectivity by means of a weighting scheme. (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). 
A number of prior studies have tested a weighted index together with unweighted index 
and found no significant difference in the results (Spero, 1979; Firth, 1980; Robbins and 
Austin, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1995; 
Zarzeski, 1996; Barako et al., 2006). Cooke (1989b) gives the reason for applying an 
unweighted index that the subjective weights of different user groups would average each 
other out; therefore, it is unnecessary to attach weights into the index. 
A dichotomous procedure was applied in order to compare the items on the disclosure 
checklist with the contents of the annual reports. Companies are awarded 1 if they 
disclose a certain item and 0 if they do not disclose it when that item is applicable to such 
companies. Companies were not penalised for items that are irrelevant to them. 
Therefore, there are two different scores for the case of non-disclosure, either 0 if the 
item is relevant to that company or no score in the case of non-applicable (N/A). The 
applicability of the item concerned is an important issue in applying the dichotomous 
procedure (Meek et al., 1995). The decision to assign N/A to the disclosure score might 
create a judgemental element in the scoring procedure; however, it can provide a more 
realistic assessment of corporate disclosure than a strict dichotomous approach (Cooke, 
1992). In order to determine the non-applicable items correctly, Cooke (1989b; 1992) 
suggests that a review of the entire annual report is necessary. Therefore, a disclosure 
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item was coded as N/A only after the entire annual report had been examined and no 
similar information found in any part of the report. 
The total score is calculated from addition of all scores each company received, 
according to the following formula: 
nJ 
Tscorej 
=1 Xi j 
i=1 
where 
Tscorej = total score for company j 
m= number of items applicable for company j 
Xj =1 if the item i of company j is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. 
After receiving the total score, the voluntary disclosure index (VDI) was calculated by 
computing the ratio of actual scores awarded to the number of items applicable for each 
company. The number of items applicable (nj) can be also viewed as a maximum possible 
score attainable for a company. The value of a disclosure index can range from zero to 
one. The higher value of a disclosure score shows the greater extent of disclosure. 
Tscorej 
VDI = 
nj 
where 
VDI = voluntary disclosure index for company j, 0< VDI 51 
4.4.2 Interview Structure and Process 
Apart from the statistical analysis from the voluntary disclosure index, this study includes 
semi-structured personal interviews. Interviewees are persons positioned to influence 
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voluntary disclosure, including company management, auditors, regulators, bankers and 
investment analysts. 
The objectives of the interviews are as follows: 
Objective 1: To obtain additional insightful information on factors influencing 
voluntary disclosure of the companies. 
Objective 2: To investigate other factors not easily captured from quantitative analysis 
that could affect voluntary disclosure practices. 
Objective 3: To apply the information obtained from the interview to confirm the 
results and enhance the interpretation of results from the statistical analysis part. 
Objective 4: To apply the information obtained from the interview to support 
the analysis of the applicability of the theoretical frameworks to the voluntary 
disclosure practice of Thai listed companies. 
Semi-structured interview is considered appropriate for this study. It not only helps the 
researcher to reveal and understand `what' and `how', but also place more emphasis on 
`why' questions (Saunders et al., 2003, p. 248). Semi-structured interview combines the 
advantage of the fixed response and open-ended interviews by establishing a main idea to 
be covered, while allowing the sequence and the content of the interview to be adaptable 
(Freebody, 2003). It also provides more opportunities for interviewees to express their 
thoughts and views. By using less-structured interviews, researchers can decide which 
lines of questioning they should explore further, and which lines to discard (Easterby- 
Smith et al., 2008). More in-depth information can be obtained because the replies of the 
interviewees tend to be more personal in nature. Non-verbal clues from the interviewees 
such as inflection of the voice and facial expression can be used to develop further 
questions (ibid. ). 
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The interviews were carried out after the statistical analysis so that the results could be 
discussed in the interview. The statistical results also help the researcher gain prior 
knowledge about the companies and assist in construction of the interview questionnaire. 
In order to ensure that the interview questions were understood by the interviewees, the 
questions were pre-tested with two Thai academics. The questions that have the potential 
to be misinterpreted were then revised. 
The first part of the interview questionnaire contains questions related to each group of 
interviewees. Therefore, some of the questions in this part are different according to the 
type of interviewees (company management, investment analysts, external auditors, 
regulators, and bankers). The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the issues 
related to findings from the quantitative analysis. (see Appendix 4-B for the interview 
questionnaire). 
The interview questionnaire was used as a topic guide for the interview. In order to 
follow interesting lines of inquiry, the sequence of the questions was not necessarily 
followed. Interviewees were also invited to provide additional information or comment 
on other issues that may not be included in the interview questions. All interviews were 
transcribed based on notes and recordings taken during the interviews (all interviewees 
allowed voice recordings). 
The interview transcripts were analysed using content analysis. In the content analysis, 
words of the text are classified into fewer categories, where each category may consist of 
one or several words. Words or phrases classified in the same category are presumed to 
have similar meanings (Weber, 1990, p. 12). Key phrases or words are counted, and then 
the frequencies are analysed (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p. 173). The richness of 
answers from the interviewees might be lost in the process of coding the interview 
transcripts. To prevent this problem, Oppenheim (1992, p. 112) suggests that it would be 
useful to report some of the answers in full to provide the reader with `some of the 
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flavour of the replies'. Therefore, the interview results are reported in both coding words 
and quotations of the interviewees' answer. 
4.5 Formulation of the Hypotheses 
This section reports the hypotheses formulated for testing relationships of voluntary 
disclosure with company specific characteristics. Theoretical frameworks and prior 
empirical literature suggest a number of variables that may explain variation in voluntary 
disclosure practices. Applicability to the Thai financial reporting environment is also an 
important factor when choosing variables to be included in the analysis. Variables 
applied in this study contain financial attributes (profitability and leverage), firm-specific 
characteristics (company size, industry type, and auditor type), variables related to 
corporate governance (ownership control status, board composition and role duality), and 
time factor. The following are criteria for selecting variables: 
Criterion 1: Relevance to research objectives. 
Criterion 2: Support from theoretical frameworks/ empirical studies. 
Criterion 3: Particular relevance to emerging economies, specifically to Thailand. 
Criterion 4: Reliability of the variables/sources of variables. 
4.5.1 Company Specific Characteristics 
4.5.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Company Size and Voluntary Disclosure 
A number of prior studies find that firm size is associated with the extent of corporate 
voluntary disclosure. Agency theory suggests that large firms tend to have higher agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Leftwich et al., 1981), which according to Hossain et 
al. (1995), arise from a high proportion of outside capital. In addition, larger companies 
are inclined to have lower information production costs and possibly own information for 
internal purposes (Buzby, 1975). Meek et al. (1995) comment that large firms may have 
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lower costs of competitive disadvantage related to disclosures. Berglöf and Pajuste 
(2005) find that voluntary disclosure is positively associated with resource availability. 
Large firms, firms with less leverage, firms with high cash balance and slow growth firms 
tend to disclose more. Market pressures and greater demand for information from 
institutional shareholders, international capital providers, and financial analysts might 
also be the reason for a higher disclosure level from larger companies. According to the 
capital need theory, responses to the need for information could attract potential investors 
and at the same time fulfil the demands of existing investors. 
Results from several empirical studies support the theoretical hypothesis on the 
relationship between firm size and extent of voluntary disclosure in both developed 
capital markets (for example, Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; 
Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007) and 
emerging capital markets (for example, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 
1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007). 
Company size has been included in prior studies of corporate disclosure in Thailand. 
However, conflicting results are reported. Priebjrivat (1991) finds a positive association 
between size (market capitalisation) and corporate disclosures of Thai listed companies 
but the results are not statistically significant. In more recent studies, while Sutthachai 
and Cooke (2009) find significant positive association between size (total sales) and level 
of disclosures (mandatory and voluntary), while Suphakasem (2008) finds no association 
between size (market capitalisation) and corporate governance disclosure of Thai listed 
companies. 
Companies included in this study are from the SETIOO index, which consists of larger 
companies in terms of market capitalisation. However, even within the SET100 index, 
there is still a significant variation in size of companies (see Appendix 6-A). Based on 
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clear evidence from theoretical and empirical studies, size is expected in this study to be 
positively associated with voluntary disclosures. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between company size and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Type of Industry and Voluntary Disclosure 
Proprietary costs vary across industries. Legitimising activities may relate to a motivation 
in voluntary disclosure in certain industries. However, there is no strong evidence to 
support the legitimacy theory in explaining voluntary disclosure. According to Cooke 
(1992), the relationship between disclosure and type of industry are different in each 
country due to historical background and environment. 
There are predictions for a higher level of disclosure in highly regulated companies (NG 
and Koh, 1994) and also companies in politically sensitive industries such as the energy 
sector (Whittred and Zimmer, 1990). Meek et al., (1995) find that companies in oil, 
chemicals and mining industry disclose more non-financial information. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) find that there is a high level of voluntary disclosure in the construction 
sector, but a low level of voluntary disclosure in the consumer sector. Wallace et al. 
(1994), Naser et al. (2002), and Eng and Mak (2003) find no evidence that industry type 
is related to corporate disclosure. 
With regard to disclosures of specific categories of information, Chau and Gray (2002) 
find no association between type of industry and voluntary disclosure of Hong Kong and 
Singaporean listed companies (overall, strategic, financial, and financial information). 
Ferguson et al., (2002) find that industry type is not significantly related to overall, 
strategic, and non-financial disclosure, but it is marginally related (at the 10% level) to 
the disclosure of financial information. 
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In Thailand, there are differences in accounting standards and disclosure regulations for 
certain types of industry such as property and construction companies, which are under 
additional disclosure requirements. This might have a certain amount of influence on 
management incentives on voluntary disclosures. The 1997 financial crisis is expected to 
be another important factor that contributes to divergence in level of disclosure across 
industry types. There are differences in the impact of the financial crisis on each industry. 
Apart from bank and finance companies, which are excluded from the study, real estate 
companies seem to be the worst affected industry. Management might handle the 
situation differently due to dissimilarity in the impact of the financial crisis on business. 
Therefore, the impact of industry type on voluntary disclosure is expected to be different 
in the period before and after the financial crisis. 
There is no clear evidence on the impact of industry type on the level of disclosure of 
Thai companies. Suphakasem (2008) finds weak and insignificant influence of industry 
type on corporate governance disclosure of Thai listed companies. On the other hand, 
Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) report a mixture of positive and negative impact of each 
industry type over the years studied. 
In the light of the contradictory evidence of previous studies, no expectation is formed in 
relation to the direction of the relationship between industry type and voluntary 
disclosure. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between type of industry and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Type of Auditor and Voluntary Disclosure 
External auditors could be one way of alleviating the conflict of interest between 
principals and agents (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Big audit firms are likely to ensure 
transparency and eliminate mistakes in company financial statements because they have 
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to maintain a high reputation, because they may be more independent than local firms, or 
because they face higher legal liability for making errors (Mitton, 2002). The choice of 
external auditor may signal the firm's value (Morris, 1987). Management is likely to 
choose a big audit firm to signal the investors of the expectation of high cash flow (Bar- 
Yosef and Livnat, 1984) or the quality of a firm's disclosure (Datar et al., 1991). In 
addition, the contents of annual reports could be influenced by auditors because big audit 
firms might demand their clients to disclose more information (Wallace et al., 1994). 
Watts and Zimmerman (1981) argue that auditors tend to act in the interest of the 
managers who hire them, more willingly than in the interest of investors. Healy and 
Palepu (2001) also mention the difficulty for auditors in providing timely signals to 
capital markets, as the auditors provide formal assurance only on annual reports. There is 
also a tendency for auditors to be more concerned with minimising their legal liability, 
rather than boosting the credibility of financial reports. 
Craswell and Taylor (1992), Wallace and Naser (1995), Inchausti (1997), Archambault 
and Archambault (2003), and Hossain and Taylor (2007) find a positive relationship 
between big audit firms and corporate disclosure. Nonetheless, a number of empirical 
studies find no relation between type of auditor and corporate disclosure in both 
developed capital markets (for example, McNally et al., 1982; Malone et al., 1993, 
Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1995; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002) and emerging 
capital markets (for example, Hossain et al., 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; Barako et al., 2006). Chau 
and Gray (2002) find no association between type of auditor and voluntary disclosure of 
specific information (strategic, non-financial, financial, and total disclosure) for 
Singaporean and Hong Kong listed companies. 
In the context of Thai studies, Priebjrivat (1991) finds that type of auditor is significantly 
associated with semi-voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies. However, the results 
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are not significant in the case of mandatory and purely-voluntary disclosure. In more 
recent study, Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find the significant association between type 
of auditor and mandatory disclosure but the results are not consistent among all models 
included in their study. No significant relationship between type of auditor and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure is reported by Sutthachai and Cooke (2009). 
Fan and Wong (2005) find that East Asian firms with agency problems embedded in the 
ownership structures are more likely to employ Big Four auditors, especially firms that 
frequently raise equity capital. They conclude that big audit firms play an important role 
in the emerging market. Big audit firms ordinarily take their clients' agency problems 
into consideration when deciding the audit fee and when giving audit opinion. 
In Thailand, auditors play an important role in influencing corporate reporting. They have 
to be licensed by the Federation of Accounting Professions and also registered with the 
SEC. The strict criteria for eligibility of an audit firm to audit listed companies have been 
set by the SEC. Although strong regulations might lessen the gap between local and Big 
Four auditors, it is expected that type of auditor influences voluntary disclosure. The 
1997 financial crisis is also expected to be an important factor affecting the role of 
auditors. According to Haley (2000), the crisis created a requirement for transparency and 
symbolic adoption of best managerial practices, which increased the visibility and reach 
of Big Four accounting firms. 
In view of the arguments, it is likely that there will be a positive relationship between Big 
Four auditors and voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between large audit firms and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
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4.5.2 Financial Attributes 
4.5.2.1 Hypothesis 4: Profitability and Voluntary Disclosure 
Signalling theory suggests that well-run firms have incentives to voluntarily disclose 
additional information in order to distinguish themselves from lower performing 
companies. This can help to ease capital raising (Akerlof, 1970). Managers of firms with 
good performance are motivated to disclose additional information in order to signal 
quality of management and to support continuance of appointment and remuneration 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Courtis, 1978). 
Empirical evidence indicates mixed results in the relationship between the extent of 
disclosure in company annual reports and profitability. While some studies (for example, 
Tauringana, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et al., 2002) 
find a positive relationship, other studies (for example, Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chen 
and Jaggi, 2000; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002) report a negative association. A number 
of studies find that profitability is not related to the level of voluntary disclosure 
(McNally et al., 1982; Meek et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Ho and Wong, 2001a; Chau 
and Gray, 2002; End and Mak, 2003; Leventis and Weetman, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; 
Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). 
According to the capital market theoretical proposition, an inconsistent relationship 
between profitability and extent of voluntary disclosure is possible. Companies may 
disclose more information either when they have good news in order to attract investors 
or when they have bad news in order to inform investors of their financial status. It is also 
possible that companies voluntarily disclose other types of information as a way of 
drawing attention to a bad performance away from the press and investors. 
Previous studies on disclosures in annual reports of Thai companies report a weak 
association between profitability and the extent of disclosure. Sutthachai and Cooke 
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(2009) find a weak and inconsistent relationship between profitability and the extent of 
disclosure. Priebjrivat (1991) and Suphakasem (2008) find profitability as having no 
explanatory power on the disclosure of Thai listed companies. 
Due to conflicting arguments and lack of evidence in prior studies, no expectation is 
formed in relation to the direction of the relationship between profitability and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between profitability and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.2.2 Hypothesis 5: Leverage and Voluntary Disclosure 
Agency theory suggests that the extent of voluntary disclosure tends to increase in higher 
geared companies, with leverage, potential wealth transfers from debt holders to 
shareholders and managers. Consequently, there are higher agency costs for firms with 
more debt in their capital structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A number of previous 
studies predict that highly leveraged firms disclose more information to reduce the 
agency costs of debt (Meek et al., 1995; Wallace et al., 1994; Lakhal, 2005). Highly 
leveraged firms may disclose more information to ensure creditors that shareholders and 
management are unlikely to bypass covenants in debt (Myers, 1977; Schipper, 1981). 
More disclosure from highly leveraged firms may also result from the need of lenders 
(Cooke, 1996). 
However, there are also predictions for inverse relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and leverage. As creditors may be able to obtain private information, Zarzeski (1996) 
predicts that disclosure will decrease with leverage. Eng and Mak (2003) use the well- 
known free cash flow problem to explain the inverse relationship. They find that a need 
for disclosure decreases with leverage because debt is used as a mechanism for 
controlling free cash flow problems. 
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Empirical studies report conflicting results in the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and leverage. Hossain et at. (1995) and Barako et al. (2006) find a positive 
relationship between level of voluntary disclosure and leverage. Meek et al. (1995) and 
Eng and Mak (2003) find an inverse relation between level of voluntary disclosure and 
leverage. Hanifa and Cooke (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), and Leventis and Weetman 
(2006) find no evidence of voluntary disclosure relating to leverage. 
Excessive private debt, especially foreign currency loans, is an important factor that 
contributed to the 1997 financial crisis in Thailand. After the crisis, the relationships 
among banks and businesses became less personal. Approval of loans is no longer based 
solely on personal relationship. In addition, the government has issued several policies to 
transform Thai financial markets from a credit-based to capital market-based system. 
These changes are expected to have an impact on the financial reporting environment, 
which might contribute to changes in voluntary disclosure practices. Although previous 
studies in Thailand (Priebjrivat, 1991; Suphakasem, 2008; Sutthachai and Cooke, 2009) 
find no association between leverage and extent of disclosures in annual reports, leverage 
is expected in this study to be associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
However, in the absence of a clear direction in the empirical literature, no expectation is 
formed in relation to the direction of the relationship. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H5: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between leverage and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.3 Corporate Governance 
4.5.3.1 Hypothesis 6: Ownership Control Status and Voluntary Disclosure 
Ownership concentration could bring considerable benefits to a company, as it might 
enhance its operational efficiency and investment; however, it may also lead controlling 
owners to expropriate other investors and stakeholders and pursue personal non-profit 
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maximising objectives (World Bank, 1998). Agency theory suggests that potential for 
high agency costs exist in a widely held company, due to conflicts of interest between the 
contracting parties (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As a result, there should be greater 
information disclosure in widely held companies, in which additional information 
disclosed by management tends to signal that they act in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Chau and Gray, 2002). Companies with concentrated ownership are less 
reliant on outside shareholders. Large block owners have the potential to obtain 
information directly from the company. Therefore, the need for additional disclosure may 
be decreased (LaPorta et al., 1998; Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998). 
Claessens and Fan (2002) find that the company ownership structure can affect the nature 
of agency problems. Normally in the US and UK, where ownership is dispersed, agency 
problems are the conflicts of interest between outside shareholders and managers who 
own an insignificant equity in a company. Conversely, in most Asian companies with 
concentrated ownership, the nature of agency problems are typically conflicts between 
the controlling owner and minority shareholders. Exceptional ownership structures such 
as inside ownership, outside ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership and government ownership are found to be significantly associated with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure in developing countries (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Suwaidan, 1997). In the Thai context, Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find 
that ownership concentration is not significantly related with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. In contrast, Priebjrivat (1991) finds significant negative association between 
ownership concentration and the level of voluntary disclosure. 
As in most developing countries, traditional Thai firms are closely held and managed by 
majority family interests. Highly concentrated ownership results in a poor management 
structure. Generally, top management is recruited from owner-family members rather 
than professional groups. Therefore, the real management power and decision making 
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remains with the owning family (Frost and Watkins, 2009). After the financial crisis, 
many Thai companies were forced to change their ownership structure into widely-held 
groups, institution-owned, or foreign-owned, in order to sustain their business. 
Nevertheless, the ownership pattern of Thai companies remains highly concentrated. The 
change of ownership structure from family-owned business to widely-held companies, as 
a result of the financial crisis, is expected to influence Thai financial reporting practices. 
Although foreign ownership is an important characteristic of Thai business, especially 
after the 1997 financial crisis, it has not been included in prior corporate disclosure 
studies. Therefore, it might be of interest to investigate this factor further in the Thai 
context in order to obtain more insightful information on the effect of foreign ownership 
on voluntary disclosure practices. 
Previous studies report mixed results regarding foreign ownership. Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Barako et al. (2006), and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find significant positive 
association between voluntary disclosure and foreign ownership. This finding supports 
the argument that obtaining foreign funds results in a higher need for disclosure in order 
to monitor actions by management (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Generally, foreign 
shareholders would expect that the disclosure level of companies in which they have 
invested to be at least comparable to the standard in their home country. On the contrary, 
Naser et al, (2002) find no significant association between foreign ownership and 
corporate information disclosures. The probable reason that could help explain the non- 
significant association between foreign ownership and level of disclosures is that foreign 
shareholders, who are mostly institutional investors, might obtain the information directly 
from the companies. Another possible reason might be the fact that foreign investors do 
not pay much attention to disclosures in annual reports, which are generally historical and 
untimely for decision making purposes. 
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In view of the arguments, it is likely that a negative relationship exists between 
ownership concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Foreign ownership is 
expected in this study to be positively associated with voluntary disclosure. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H6A: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between ownership concentration 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
H68: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between foreign ownership and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.3.2 Hypothesis 7: Board Composition and Voluntary Disclosure 
There are two different views regarding the influence of outside (independent) non- 
executive directors: the complementary relationship and the substitute relationship. The 
complementary relationship indicates positive association between the proportion of non- 
executive directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. On the other 
hand, the substitute relationship views non-executive directors as a substitute for public 
disclosure, which implies a negative relationship (Eng and Mak, 2003). Based on the 
agency theory and resource dependency theory, independent directors play an important 
role in monitoring management behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). 
Dechow et al. (1996), Beasley (1996), and Fama and Jensen (1983) agree that 
independent directors are more willing to provide effective supervision and disclosure, 
due to the necessity of maintaining their reputations. Conversely, boards comprising 
executive directors are more likely to hide negative information to gain private benefits 
or to limit stakeholder intervention. Anderson and Reeb (2004) find that outside 
shareholders usually look for independent director representation, while founding- 
families make an attempt to minimise the presence of independent directors. They find 
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that the most valuable public firms are those in which independent directors balance 
family board representation. 
Tricker (1984) comments that outside directors can provide `additional windows on the 
world ; as implied by the resource dependence theory. Outside directors can use their 
expertise, prestige and contacts to provide a firm with connection to the external 
environment. However, there is also evidence to indicate negative consequences from the 
high proportion of outside directors, such as excessive monitoring (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985), insufficient business knowledge (Patton and Baker, 1987), and lack of real 
independence (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). 
Empirical evidence that supports the substitute relationship between voluntary 
disclosures in annual reports and independent director is found in Eng and Mak (2003), 
Gul and Leung (2004), Barako et al. (2006). On the other hand, the complementary 
relationship is supported by Adams and Hossain (1998), Huafang and Jianguo (2007), 
and Patelli and Prencipe (2007). Ho and Wong (2001a), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and 
Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find no relationship between voluntary disclosures 
and the existence of independent directors. In the Thai context, there is limited empirical 
evidence on the impact of board independence in explaining corporate disclosures. One 
exception is the study by Suphakasem (2008), who finds a significant positive 
relationship between board independence and corporate governance disclosure of Thai 
listed companies. 
In Thailand, there are many listed companies in which directors and management have 
come from families who owned these businesses before they were listed on the SET. 
Therefore, the role of monitoring activities by an independent, non-executive director is 
crucial. Furthermore, after the 1997 financial crisis, independent, non-executive directors 
played an important role in regaining confidence from shareholders and investors. The 
importance of independent directors is emphasised in the 15 principles of good corporate 
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governance issued by the SET. Nevertheless, Thai culture, which is relationship oriented, 
could affect the 'real' independence of non-executive directors. There is the possibility 
that controlling owners would appoint persons within their social or family connections, 
friends, classmates, and colleagues as non-executive directors. 
In view of the arguments, the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board is expected in this study to be positively associated with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H7: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.3.3 Hypothesis 8: Role Duality and Voluntary Disclosure 
Role duality can be explained in a different way by agency theory or stewardship theory. 
Agency theory suggests that a CEO, who is also the chairman, tends to be more 
managerially dominated (Molt, 1988). Separation between the roles of CEO and 
chairman could provide checks and balances over management performance (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). Stewardship theory suggests that managements are inclined to act in the 
best interests of the company and shareholders. Role duality enables a CEO to easily lead 
a company to achieving its goals with less interference (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). 
There is empirical evidence that support agency theory based hypothesis regarding CEO 
duality. A significant negative association between CEO duality and voluntary 
disclosures is documented in studies by Gul and Leung (2004) and Huafang and Jianguo 
(2007). This finding supports the idea that role separation of CEOs and Chairmen helps 
to enhance monitoring quality, which may result in improvements in disclosure. Forker 
(1992) finds a negative association between the quality of share-option disclosure and 
CEO duality. Ho and Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that CEO duality 
is not related to the level of voluntary disclosure. 
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In the Thai context, CEO/Chairman role duality is quite common among listed 
companies. Due to a family business background, many Chairmen and CEOs are family 
members who owned such companies before they were listed on the SET. The 15 
principles of good corporate governance, issued by the SET in 2002, give listed 
companies freedom to combine or separate the roles of Chairmen and CEOs. In this 
study, CEO/Chairman role duality exists in the samples both before and after the 1997 
financial crisis. Although Suphakasem (2008) finds no significant association between 
corporate governance disclosure of Thai listed companies and CEO duality, there is 
limited empirical evidence on the impact of CEO duality on corporate disclosures of Thai 
companies, especially in the case of voluntary disclosures. 
Based on theoretical and empirical studies, a negative association between the existence 
of CEO/Chairman role duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure is expected. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H8: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between CEO/Chairman role duality 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
4.5.4 The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
4.5.4.1 Hypothesis 9: Period Before/After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 
Voluntary Disclosure 
One of the research questions is to find if there have been changes in the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. During the four years selected, the business environment in 
Thailand has changed dramatically, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
Therefore, the period before and after the 1997 Asian financial crisis was included as a 
variable. The data of the year 1995 and 1996 represent the period before the crisis. The 
data of the year 2002 and 2005 represent the period after the crisis. 
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Jaikengkit (2002) reviews Thai financial reporting and its environment from 1974 to 
2002 and predicts that transparency and high quality disclosure would be recognised and 
practiced by Thai companies. A higher level of voluntary disclosures after the financial 
crisis is also expected in this study because of two major factors. Firstly, in order to 
sustain company business after the crisis, companies themselves could use voluntary 
disclosure as a way of communicating to the public and regaining confidence from the 
investors. Secondly, apart from economic disturbance, which might have an impact on 
disclosure practices, improvement in voluntary disclosure is expected in this study as a 
response from Thai companies to several government initiatives that promote good 
corporate governance (see section 3.6). 
Based on the discussion, the extent of voluntary disclosure after the 1997 financial crisis 
is expected to be higher than before the crisis. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
H9: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the period after the 1997 
financial crisis and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
4.6 Statistical Technique 
This study applies both univariate and multivariate analyses. Univariate analysis explains 
the relationship between a single explanatory variable and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Multivariate analysis simultaneously takes into account the relative 
importance of each variable in relation to other variables by providing the contribution of 
each explanatory variable in explaining variability in the dependent variable. 
4.6.1 Univariate Analysis 
Before statistical tests are undertaken, it is important to check the underlying distribution 
of the dataset first. The distribution of dependent and independent variables were tested 
based on skewness and kurtosis. All variables (dependent and independent variables) 
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were examined by box-plots, histograms, stem-and-leaf plots, normal Q-Q plots and 
detrended normal Q-Q plots. The findings reveal that the distribution of the data deviates 
significantly from normality. In addition, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors (K-S) test 
was also undertaken. The K-S test is significant (p<. 01), confirming that the distribution 
is significantly different from a normal distribution. In order to use parametric statistical 
methods, the following assumptions must be met: (1) data should be normally distributed 
(2) variances are homogeneous (3) data should be measured at least at the interval scale 
(4) data from different participants are independent (Field, 2009, p. 133). Data in this 
study do not meet the conditions of parametric tests; therefore, non-parametric statistical 
methods were applied. Continuous independent variables were tested by Kendall's rank 
correlation coefficient (tau). Kendall's rank correlation measures the degree of agreement 
between two sets of ranks. The Kendall test was chosen because it has been claimed to be 
superior to the Spearman rank correlation coefficient (Hays, 1973; Griffiths, 1980; 
Noether, 1981). It has also been applied in numerous studies in financial disclosure 
(Buzby 1974a, 1975; Belkaoui and Kahl, 1978, Firth, 1979; Suwaidan, 1997, Leventis, 
2001). In the case of categorical (dummy) variables, Mann-Whitney U tests (for two- 
category variables) and Kruskal-Wallis tests (for more than two-category variables) were 
performed in order to determine whether associations between voluntary disclosure and 
the nominal independent variables exist. 
4.6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Univariate analysis indicates the associations between dependent variable and each of 
independent variables. It can only measure the relationship between dependent variable 
and one independent variable at a time. On the other hand, multivariate analysis can take 
this process a step further, as it is capable of handling several explanatory variables 
simultaneously. In the multivariate analysis, the existence of other factors that might 
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influence the outcome variable is taken into account. Different variables, which have 
been measured on different scales, can be included in the model. 
In this study, multiple regression models were applied in order to find how the voluntary 
disclosure could be explained by a set of independent variables. The multiple regression 
analysis was conducted at two levels: aggregated and disaggregated levels. At the 
aggregated level, the total voluntary disclosure score was applied as the dependent 
variable in order to investigate the collective relationship between the independent 
variables and overall voluntary disclosure. This relationship was then investigated for 
each type of information at the disaggregated level. Therefore, the variables which 
explain variation of voluntary disclosure at the aggregated level were tested if they are 
also able to explain variation of voluntary disclosure at the disaggregated level. 
The distribution of the data in this study deviates significantly from normality, as 
discussed earlier in section 4.6.1. Therefore, regressions were run based on the normal 
scores of both dependent and continuous independent variables. Normal score 
transformation based on van der Waerden approach is a method proposed by Cooke 
(1998) and has been applied in prior research in accounting disclosure (for example, Abd- 
Elsalam, 1999; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004; Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Sutthachai and Cooke, 2009). This 
method helps to mitigate the problems of skewness, kurtosis, outliers and 
heteroscedasticity (Cooke, 1998). The transformation from actual observations to the 
normal distribution is achieved by dividing the distribution into the number of 
observations plus one region; on the basis that each region has equal probability (ibid. ). 
Cooke (1998) suggests that both dependent and independent variables should be 
transformed. Transforming only dependent variable could result in changing the 
relationship between dependent variable and all independent variables (ibid. ). 
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methodology adopted and research method employed to 
answer the research questions of this study. The research approach taken and the methods 
(quantitative and qualitative) applied to carry out the empirical work were discussed. The 
data collection procedures were explained. The construction of the research instrument: 
the voluntary disclosure index and the interview questionnaires were also discussed. This 
covered the construction of the voluntary disclosure checklist, reasons for choosing 
annual reports, measurement approach, and interview structure and process. The 
formulation of the hypotheses was also presented. The statistical techniques used to 
analyse quantitative data were presented at the end of the chapter. The reasons for 
choosing the non-parametric tests were explained. Univariate and multivariate analyses 
were briefly described. The details of how these techniques were applied will be reported 
in Chapter 6. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 4-A: Voluntary Disclosure Checklist 
Strategic Information 
1. General information about the economic environment 
1.1 Information about the economy 
1.2 Information about the industry 
1.3 Specific factors influencing business 
2. General Corporate information 
2.1 Brief history of company 
2.2 Corporate vision and mission 
23 Organisational structure 
2.4 Financial highlight statement 
2.5 Discussion on last year performance 
2.6 Contact details of investor relations 
3. Specific corporate information 
3.1 Statement of corporate goals or objectives 
3.2 General statement of corporate strategy 
3.3 Specific statement of strategy (financial) 
3.4 Specific statement of strategy (marketing) 
3.5 Specific statement of strategy (social) 
3.6 Discussion about acquisition and expansion 
3.7 Discussion about disposals and cessation 
3.8 Corporate policy on research and development 
3.9 Significant events during the year 
3.10 Overview of the major subsidiaries 
3.11 Analysis of subsidiaries 
3.12 Analysis of products 
3.13 Improvement in product/ service quality 
3.14 Analysis of capital projects 
4. Future prospects 
4.1 Discussion of future industry trend 
4.2 New developments 
4.3 Forecast of earnings/profits 
4.4 Forecast of cash flows 
4.5 Future risks/ Opportunities for the company 
Non-financial and social responsibility information 
5. Information about directors/ management 
5.1 Other positions held by the directors in the company/affiliated companies 
5.2 Other positions held by the directors outside the company 
5.3 Shares held by directors 
5.4 Family connection between directors or between directors and senior management) 
5.5 Function of operational managers 
6. Employee Information 
6.1 Employees' appreciation 
6.2 Discussion of employee welfare 
6.3 Corporate policy on human resources 
6.4 Staff training 
6.5 Information about employee workplace safety 
7. Corporate social responsibility information 
7.1 Statement of social responsibility 
7.2 Product safety 
7.3 Environmental policies 
7.4 Environmental protection programmes (Qualitative) 
7.5 Environmental protection programmes (Quantitative) 
7.6 Charitable donations/sponsorships 
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7.7 Participation in government campaigns/community programmes 
7.8 Social rewards/achievements 
Financial Information 
S. Financial review 
8.1 Review of current financial results and discussion of major factors underlying 
performance 
8.2 Financial history or summary (5+ years) 
8.3 Profitability ratios (4+ years) 
8.4 Gearing ratios (4+ years) 
8.5 Liquidity ratios (4+ years) 
8.7 Dividend payout / Dividend per share (4+ years) 
8.6 Other ratios (4+ years) 
9. Segment information 
9.1 Market share analysis 
9.2 Competitor analysis 
10. Market related information 
10.1 Market capitalisation at year end 
10.2 Share price information 
10.3 Share price trend 
10.4 Distribution of shareholdings 
10.5 Domestic and foreign shareholdings 
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Appendix 4-B: Interview Questionnaire 
Part One: General interview questions 
1. Company management 
1.1 What are the objectives of the annual report produced by your company? Do 
you think the annual report meets the information needs of receivers? 
1.2 What are the motivations/constraints of your company to voluntarily disclose 
information in the annual report? Are there any other factors that may 
influence relevant decisions? 
1.3 How much importance do you place on voluntary disclosure in the annual 
report? 
1.4 Can you explain the procedure you undertake to prepare the annual report? In 
this process are there any internal reasons that influence the decision on 
voluntary disclosure? 
1.5 Considering costs and benefits, what types of information (or themes) does 
your company prefer to emphasise and why? 
1.6 How do you treat the credibility issues for voluntary disclosure in the annual 
report? 
1.7 Apart from the annual report, does your company voluntarily disclose 
information through other media? What motivates your company to use other 
media for voluntary disclosure? 
2. External Auditors 
2.1 What are the main objectives of the annual report of companies listed on 
the SET? Do you think the objectives have been achieved? 
2.2 In your opinion, what are the motivations/constraints for companies to 
voluntarily disclose information in the annual report? Are there any other 
factors that may influence relevant decisions? 
2.3 In your opinion, how reliable and credible is the annual report? 
2.4 In your opinion, how important is the annual report compared with other 
media? 
2.5 In the audit process, how much do you emphasise voluntary disclosure in 
the annual report? Do you discuss with your clients about the benefits and 
risks of additional disclosure in the annual report? 
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2.6 Do you think that there are shortcomings in the current financial reporting 
system? What changes in the regulatory framework do you anticipate in the 
future? 
2.7 Do you think that information provided in annual reports satisfy user 
needs? If not, do you think that additional information should be mandated 
or voluntarily provided? 
3. Regulators 
3.1 What is your opinion of the quality of information provided from annual 
reports? 
3.2 In your opinion, how important is the annual report compared with other 
media? 
3.3 Do you think that the current financial reporting requirements satisfy the 
information needs of users? If not, do you think that additional information 
should be mandated or voluntarily provided? 
3.4 What are the key themes of information that should be disclosed to enhance 
the quality of annual reports? 
3.5 What are the motivations/constraints for companies to voluntarily disclose 
information in the annual report? Are there any other factors that may 
influence relevant decisions? 
3.6 In your opinion, how reliable and credible is the annual report? 
3.7 In your opinion, are there shortcomings in the current financial reporting 
system? What changes in the regulatory framework do you anticipate in the 
future? 
4. Investment Analysts 
4.1 How much do you rely on information from annual reports in order to make 
investment decisions? 
4.2 What types or themes of voluntary disclosure in annual reports do you 
consider most important? 
4.3 What do you think are the main reasons for companies to voluntarily 
disclose information? What are the major constraints? 
4.4 In your opinion, how reliable and credible is the annual report? 
4.5 Do you think that information provided in annual reports meets your needs 
for making investment decisions? If not, do you think that the additional 
information you require should be mandated or voluntarily provided? 
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4.6 Apart from the annual report, do you rely on other corporate media? If so, 
what are they and how do you obtain them? 
5. Bankers 
5.1 How much do you rely on information from annual reports in order to make 
financial decisions? 
5.2 What types or themes of voluntary disclosure in annual reports do you 
consider most important? 
5.3 What do you think are the main reasons for companies to voluntarily 
disclose information? What are the major constraints? 
5.4 In your opinion, how reliable and credible is the annual report? 
5.5 Do you think that information provided in annual report meets your needs 
for making decisions? If not, do you think that the additional information 
you require should be mandated or voluntarily provided? 
5.6 Apart from the annual report, do you rely on other corporate media? If so, 
what are they and how do you obtain them? 
Part Two: Questions relating to findings from quantitative analysis 
1. What type of voluntary information do Thai companies tend to pay most 
attention to among strategic information, financial information and 
nonfinancial & CSR information? 
2. In your opinion, have there been any changes in corporate voluntary 
disclosure in response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis? If yes, what are the 
reasons for the changes? 
3. In your opinion, to what extent does each of these factors impact on 
information voluntarily disclosed in annual reports? 
a. Company size 
b. Profitability 
c. Leverage 
d. Type of industry 
C. Type of auditor (Big4 / Non-Big 4) 
f. Ownership structure 
g. CEO/Chairman role duality 
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h. Ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the 
board 
i. Foreign shareholding 
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CHAPTER 5 
Extent of Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Thai 
listed companies is measured by a researcher-constructed disclosure index. A 
dichotomous procedure is applied in order to compare the items on the disclosure 
checklist with the contents of the annual reports. This chapter analyses and evaluates the 
results obtained from the measurement of voluntary disclosure applied in this study. 
This chapter answers research question 1,2 and 3 which are as follows: 
Research Question 1: What is the extent of voluntary disclosure of Thai listed 
companies? 
Research, Question 2: To what extent do voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies 
change over the period 1995 to 2005? 
Research question 3: To what extent are aspects of company characteristics, financial 
attributes, and corporate governance related factors significant in 
explaining the extent of voluntary of Thai listed companies? 
Research question 1 and 2 are answered by analysing and evaluating voluntary disclosure 
scores. The findings of extremely high or low disclosure scores and disclosure items that 
received particular attention in prior studies or in the real practices are discussed. The 
analysis of company characteristics that disclose certain items under each category is 
presented. To answer research question 2, comparisons of the extent of voluntary 
disclosures in different time period are included in order to find if there were changes in 
voluntary disclosure practices over the period 1995 to 2005. 
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In order to answer research question 3, further analysis of the association between items 
disclosed and the explanatory variables is performed based on Kendall's rank correlation 
coefficient (tau). The disaggregated analysis of voluntary disclosure provides an 
opportunity to obtain better insight into voluntary disclosure practices of the companies 
included in this study. 
The extent of overall voluntary disclosure is discussed in section 5.2, followed by a 
detailed analysis of the disaggregated voluntary disclosure in section 5.3. Finally, a 
conclusion is provided in section 5.4. 
5.2 Extent of Voluntary Disclosure: Overall Disclosure 
Table 5-1 provides the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure scores. The voluntary 
disclosure scores range from 0.00 to 81.03%, with a mean score of 37.02%. Skewness 
and kurtosis indicate that the disclosure scores deviate from normality. The positive 
skewness values indicate that the scores are clustered towards the lower-end, except for 
those in 2005, which have a negative value of skewness. The disclosure score for each 
year has a positive kurtosis value, which indicates that the distributions are relatively 
peaked, rather than flat, as in the case with negative kurtosis values. 
It can be seen from the percentage change of scores over the four periods that there is a 
significant positive trend of voluntary disclosure. The biggest increase in the level of 
voluntary disclosure occurred in 2002; from 1996 to 2002 the average disclosure scores 
increased by 75.99%. The scores imply that the level of voluntary disclosure increased 
markedly after the financial crisis. 
Out of the total 225 cases, there was one company in 1996 that did not disclose any 
information in the checklist at all. This company is in the technology sector (electronic 
components). The non-disclosure of this company in 1996 is quite unexpected because in 
1995 it disclosed 6.67% (4 items). This implies that inconsistency in voluntary disclosure 
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occurred within a company and there is a chance that a company decrease its disclosure 
level over the period studied. It can be seen from Table 5-1 that the highest disclosure 
score in the sample set is 81.03% which occurred in 2005. There are two companies that 
achieved this maximum score, both of them are in the resources sector. This seems to 
imply that companies in this sector have a higher level of voluntary disclosure. 
Table 5-1: Descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure scores 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
Mean (%) 21.26% 22.91% 40.32% 51.57% 37.02% 
% change +7.76% +75.99% +27.90% 
Median (%) 16.67% 19.30% 40.17% 50.00% 37.93% 
% change +15.78% +108.13% +24.47% 
Min(%) 1.67% 0.00% 10.34% 6.78% 0.00% 
Max(%) 53.33% 67.24% 79.66% 81.03% 81.03% 
SD 
. 
118 
. 
145 
. 
133 
. 
150 
. 
188 
Skewness 
. 
932 
. 
955 
. 
374 
-. 
298 
. 
185 
SE skewness 
. 
409 
. 
322 
. 
304 
. 
277 
. 
162 
Kurtosis 
. 
452 
. 
564 
. 
473 
. 
101 
-. 
751 
SE kurtosis 
. 
798 
. 
634 
. 
599 
. 
548 
. 
323 
z-score skewness 2.279 2.966 1.230 -1.076 1.142 
z-score kurtosis 
. 
566 
. 
890 
. 
790 
. 
184 
-2.325 
K-S 
. 
234 
. 
132 
. 
072 
. 
065 
. 
079 
K-S Sig. 
. 
000 
. 
019 
. 
200 
. 
200 
. 
002 
5.3 Disaggregated Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure 
This section focuses on the disaggregated analysis of voluntary disclosure in order to gain 
a better insight into voluntary disclosure practices of the companies included in this 
study. Voluntary disclosures by three main information categories and ten sub- 
categories, as developed in section 4.4.1.2 are discussed. This section also includes the 
analysis of individual voluntary disclosure items. 
5.3.1 The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure by Main Information Categories 
Table 5-2 presents the descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure by main information 
categories (strategic, non-financial, and financial). It can be seen that the mean score of 
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strategic information is considerably higher than non-financial and financial information. 
The positive skewness value of non-financial and financial information indicates that the 
scores are clustered towards the lower-end. Skewness and kurtosis indicate that the 
disclosure scores of all information types deviate from normality. This is supported 
further by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. 
Table 5-2: Descriptive statistics of voluntary disclosure scores by main information categories 
Strategic Non-Financial Financial 
Mean (%) 45.11% 29.62% 30.95% 
Median (%) 46.15% 27.78% 28.57% 
Min(%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Max(%) 100.00% 83.33% 92.86% 
SD 
. 
212 
. 
221 
. 
214 
Skewness 
-. 
009 
. 
564 
. 
260 
SE skewness 
. 
162 
. 
162 
. 
162 
Kurtosis 
-. 
615 
-. 
607 
-. 
858 
SE kurtosis 
. 
323 
. 
323 
. 
323 
z-score skewness 
-. 
056 3.481 1.605 
z-score kurtosis 
-1.904 -1.879 -2.656 
K-S 
. 
062 
. 
111 
. 
130 
K-S Sig. 
. 
036 
. 
000 
. 
000 
Table 5-3 presents the descriptive statistics of disclosure scores by main information 
categories separated by year. It can be seen that over the period studied, the average 
voluntary disclosure scores increased in all kinds of information (except for the 
disclosure of non-financial information in 1996, where the average score is lower than in 
1995). Similar to the result of the overall voluntary disclosure discussed earlier in section 
5.2, the biggest increase in voluntary disclosures of specific information occurred in 
2002. The disclosure scores imply that the extent of voluntary disclosures of specific 
information increased significantly after the financial crisis. 
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5.3.2 The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure by Individual Disclosure Item 
In order to gain a better insight into the voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed 
companies, the percentage of companies disclosing each item of information in the 
disclosure checklist is investigated. Table 5-4 displays voluntary disclosure frequency of 
each individual item separated by year, as well as the whole dataset. The table shows a 
range of percentages of disclosure from as low as 0.00% to a maximum of 93.55%. 
Therefore, considerable variation in voluntary disclosure exists across the 60 items in the 
225 annual reports. Table 5-4 also reveals that: 
- 
No item was fully disclosed by 100% of companies. 
- 
The item that most companies disclosed is a general statement of corporate 
strategy (76.44%). 
- 
The item that least companies disclosed is employees' appreciation (1.33%). 
- 
Forty-three items (71.67%) were disclosed by less than 50% of the sample. 
- 
Eight items (7.47%) were disclosed by less than 10% of the sample. 
- 
Eight items were not disclosed by any company in1995. 
- 
Four items were not disclosed by any company in1996. 
- 
One item was not disclosed by any company in 2002. 
- 
There were no non-disclosed items in 2005. 
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Table 5-5 categorises the disclosure of individual items fron Table 5-4 into the frequency 
distribution. It can be seen that there seem to be an improvement in voluntary disclosure 
in 2002 and 2005. The number of items with a low percentage of disclosure dropped 
significantly and the number of items with a high percentage of disclosure increased 
considerably. Some items achieved a high percentage of disclosure of over 80 percent in 
2002 and 2005. In 2002, two items (General statement of strategy and Profitability ratios) 
were disclosed by more than 90 percent of companies. In addition, six items in 2002 and 
eleven items in 2005 were disclosed by more than 80 percent of companies. This 
indicates a very high level of disclosure for these items. On the other hand, no item has 
percentage of disclosure above 70 percent in 1995 and only one item (Discussion about 
acquisition and expansion) has the percentage of disclosure above 70 percent in 1996. 
Table 5-5: Frequency distribution of the disclosure of individual items 
Number of items in the Checklist Percentage of 
disclosure 1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
Above 90% 
- - 
2 0 
- 
80%-90% 
- - 
6 11 
- 
70%-80% 
- 
1 2 5 6 
60%-70% 2 2 3 12 5 
50%-60% 3 6 11 5 6 
40%-50% 4 3 5 9 10 
30%-40% 10 11 7 5 11 
20%-30% 12 8 6 4 7 
10%-20% 9 13 8 3 7 
0 
-10% 20 16 10 6 8 
Total items 60 60 60 60 60 
5.3.3 The Extent of Voluntary Disclosure by Sub-categories of Information 
Table 5-6 presents the average scores of voluntary disclosure under each sub-category. 
There is a wide variation in the range of the scores in each category. The highest score 
was Information about economic environment (66.07%), followed by General corporate 
information (59.73%). In contrast, the lowest were Segmental information and Market 
related information (11.78% and 19.64% respectively). The average scores separated by 
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year are also presented in this table. The scores show signs of improvement for all 
categories in 2002 and 2005; however, the level of improvement is varied among 
different categories. 
Table 5-6: The extent of voluntary disclosure by sub-category of information 
Information category 1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
Mean Mean SD 
Information about economic environment 35.35 40.00 84.95 83.11 66.07 0.42 
General corporate information 40.61 45.82 61.29 77.07 59.73 0.28 
Specific corporate information 26.20 26.96 46.64 56.39 42.08 0.23 
Future prospects 20.00 17.82 21.29 38.93 26.13 0.24 
Information about directors/ management 15.76 14.18 53.55 69.87 43.82 0.32 
Employee information 15.15 14.18 26.13 36.40 25.02 0.25 
Corporate social responsibility information 13.26 11.88 21.60 37.69 23.37 0.28 
Financial review 25.11 32.47 50.00 57.33 44.51 0.30 
Segmental information 0.00 6.36 15.32 18.00 11.78 0.27 
Market related information 7.27 11.64 20.97 29.87 19.64 0.23 
The following sections discuss the disclosure of voluntary information for each sub- 
category in more detail. Further analysis of the association between individual disclosure 
items and the explanatory variables is based on Kendall's rank correlation coefficient 
(tau) at the 5% significance level. The reason for choosing Kendall's rank correlation is 
discussed earlier in section 4.6.1. The results are presented in Appendix 5-A. 
5.3.3.1 General Information about the Economic Environment 
A significant number of companies provided information regarding general information 
about the economic environment. The average disclosure score for this category is 
66.07%, which is the highest among all categories. Specific factors influencing business 
item appears to be the item most disclosed (73.78%) in this category. This implies that 
companies tend to be more cautious about specific factors that directly influence their 
own business rather than information about the industry or the economy, which may 
affect them in wider aspects. The frequency distribution of number of items disclosed by 
149 
each company under this category (Table 5-7) shows that the percentage of companies 
that disclosed all three items substantially increased in 2002 and 2005 (from 15.15% in 
1995 and 23.64% in 1996, to 80.65% in 2002 and 73.33% in 2005). The percentage of 
companies that did not disclose any item at all under this category also significantly 
decreased (from 42.42% in 1995 and 43.64% in 1996, to 9.68% in 2002 and 10.67% in 
2005). 
Table 5-7: Frequency distribution of general information about the economic environment items 
disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 42.42 43.64 9.68 10.67 23.11 
1 24.24 16.36 6.45 2.67 10.22 
2 18.18 16.36 3.23 13.33 12.00 
Maximum 3 15.15 23.64 80.65 73.33 54.67 
Table 5-4 presents the percentage of the disclosure of individual items in terms of 
ranking. High ranking could imply that companies gave more importance to the 
disclosure of such items. All three items in this category are top ten ranked in the highest 
disclosures. It can be seen that the ranking of the disclosure of information about the 
economy improved significantly (from 29`h in 1995 and 21s` in 1996, to 4th in 2002 and 7 `h 
in 2005). This could be due to response of the companies to the financial crisis. It 
suggests that companies were aware of the economic situation, which could affect their 
operation. 
Further analysis on the association between the disclosure of items in this category and 
explanatory variables indicates that all three items are related to the ratio of non- 
executive directors on the board with a positive sign (at the 1% significance level). This 
may suggest that non-executive directors could play an important role in deciding to 
disclose information about the economic environment. Profitability is also found to be 
positively related to the disclosure of all three items under this category. The reason for 
less profitable companies not disclosing this information may be due to limited resources 
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for engaging in such activities. Company size is found to be positively related to the 
disclosure of Information about the economy and Information about the industry, but not 
for the disclosure of specific factors influencing business. Foreign ownership is found to 
be positively related (at the 1% significance level) only to the disclosure of Information 
about the economy. This information is necessary for foreign investors, who may have 
less knowledge of the Thai economy. 
5.3.3.2 General Corporate Information 
General corporate information seems to be the type of information that has a relatively 
high level of disclosure in 1995 and 1996. This type of information is still the commonly 
disclosed information in 2002 and 2005. The relatively higher disclosure level of general 
corporate information is not surprising given that this kind of information, being basic 
information that most companies already have, is easily obtained. Therefore, the cost of 
processing the information is considerably low. Also, the nature of this information is not 
very sensitive and companies would not lose their competitive advantages by disclosing 
such information. 
The average disclosure score of this of information type is 59.73%, which is the second 
highest score among all ten categories (see Table 5-6). The most popular item disclosed 
was Brief history of company (73.33%), followed by Organisational structure (69.78%). 
This information is easily obtained and quite static in nature. This may suggest that the 
ease in obtaining and processing the information affects company decision on voluntary 
disclosure. Companies seemed to give less importance to the disclosure of corporate 
vision and mission in 2002 and 2005, as seen in Table 5-4, where a substantial change in 
ranking of this item can be observed (from 11`h in 1995 and 13`h in 1996, to 38th in 2002 
and 34`h in 2005). This might be due to the fact that companies paid more attention to 
other types of disclosure after the financial crisis, for example, the disclosure of 
information about the economy, which received much higher ranking in 2002 and 2005. 
In spite of the lower ranking for disclosure of corporate vision and mission after the 
financial crisis, the percentage of companies that disclosed this item in 2005 was 
considerably higher than in 1995,1996, and 2002. 
The majority of companies that did not disclose any items under this category in 1995, 
1996, and 2002 came from the technology sector, one of them did not disclose any items 
in all three years. It can be seen from table 5-8 that there were changes in the number of 
items disclosed in 2002 and 2005. While the majority of companies disclosed one to two 
items out of total six items in 1995 and 1996, they disclosed three to five items in 2002 
and 2005. More interestingly, it was found that the proportion of companies disclosing 
the maximum six items under this category sharply increased in 2005. 
Table 5-8: Frequency distribution of general corporate information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 6.06 10.91 1.61 0.00 4.00 
1-2 69.69 47.27 25.80 6.67 31.11 
3-5 15.15 29.09 66.13 65.33 49.33 
Maximum 6 9.09 12.73 6.45 28.00 15.56 
The proportion of non-executive directors on the board and company size seem to 
influence the disclosure of information inthis category. Further analysis indicates that the 
disclosure of every item under this category, except for corporate vision and mission, is 
related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board with a positive sign (at 
the 1% significance level). Every item, except Brief history of company, is also positively 
related to company size. Financial highlight statement and Discussion on last year 
performance are the only two items under this category that directly related to company 
performance. Both items were found to be related to foreign ownership with a positive 
sign (at the 1% significance level), which implies that foreign shareholders may influence 
the disclosure of this type of information 
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5.3.3.3 Specific Corporate Information 
The average disclosure score of specific corporate information is 42.08%. There is 
considerable variation in the percentage of companies that disclosed each item under this 
category. The most disclosed item was General statement of corporate strategies 
(76.44%), followed by Analysis of products (73.78%). However, fewer companies were 
found to disclose information about corporate policy on research and development 
(15.11%) and specific statement of strategy (marketing: 16.00% and social: 8.44%). 
It is found that most companies were more willing to disclose corporate strategy in 
general rather than the specific statement of strategy, especially for specific strategy in 
marketing and social where the disclosure rates were considerably low. It can also be 
seen from table 5-4 that 84.89% of the sample did not reveal any information regarding 
their policy on research and development, and 76.00% did not disclose information about 
their capital projects. The reason for this may probably be attributed to competitive 
disadvantages for companies if they provide too many facts and figures. 
Table 5-9: Frequency distribution of specific corporate information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.33 
1-3 36.36 27.27 6.45 1.33 14.22 
4-6 39.39 45.45 25.81 14.67 28.89 
7-9 12.12 20.00 37.10 41.33 30.67 
10-11 3.03 7.27 25.81 30.67 19.56 
12-13 0.00 0.00 3.23 9.33 4.00 
Maximum 14 0.00 0.00 1.61 2.67 1.33 
The frequency distribution of the number of items disclosed under this category (Table 5- 
9) shows that there are 9.09% of companies in 1995 that did not disclose any items under 
this category, one of them came from the technology sector, and the other two were 
property and construction companies. There is one company from industrial sector that 
achieved the maximum disclosure level of fourteen items in 2002. However, this 
company failed to attain this maximum disclosure level in 2005. Two companies that 
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achieved the maximum disclosure level under this category in 2005 are technology and 
agro companies. The majority of companies disclosed around four to nine out of fourteen 
items under this category. However, the number of items disclosed in 2002 and 2005 was 
considerably higher than that in 1995 and 1996. The percentage of companies disclosing 
more than ten items was significantly higher in 2002 and 2005. In addition, the number of 
disclosed items reached the maximum of fourteen items in 2002 and 2005, while no 
companies disclosed more than eleven items in 1995 and 1996. 
Again, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board seems to be an important 
determinant of the disclosure of information under this category. It is found to have a 
positive association with ten items under this category (nine items at the 1% significance 
level). However, there are four items that are not significantly associated with proportion 
of non-executive directors: Specific statement of marketing strategy, Specific statement 
of social strategy, Corporate policy on research and development, and Significant events 
during the year. The disclosure of all specific statements of strategies (financial, 
marketing, and social) is related to company size with a positive sign (at the 1% 
significance level) and foreign ownership (at the 5% significance level). This suggests 
that company size and foreign ownership may be particularly influential on the disclosure 
of specific statements of strategies. 
5.3.3.4 Future Prospects 
The average disclosure score of future prospects is 26.13%, which ranks sixth out of ten 
categories. Within this category, New development is the most widely disclosed item 
(42.22%). This information may inform users that companies are developing constantly 
and, as such, have the opportunity to grow and survive in their industries. This kind of 
information also enhances corporate image and shows that companies have the resources 
to create new developments. On the other hand, the least disclosed items were Forecast of 
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cash flow (1.78%) and Forecast of earnings (7.11%) which ranked 58 `h and 54`h out of 60 
disclosure items (see Table 5-4). 
For future prospects information, companies seem to prefer disclosing non-numerical 
descriptive information (Discussion of future industry trend, New developments, Future 
risks or opportunities for the company) rather than forecasted figures like earnings, 
profits or cash flows. The disclosure of forecasted figures remained at a low level even in 
2002 and 2005. This may indicate that management was more cautious about disclosing 
forecasted figures, which may have adverse effects on companies. Other reasons for not 
disclosing this information could be competitive disadvantages, fear of giving a wrong 
prediction, difficulties in obtaining information or cost of providing it. The low level in 
the disclosure of quantitative future prospects information is consistent with the finding 
of Haniffa (1999). 
Table 5-10: Frequency distribution of future prospects items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 30.30 41.82 48.39 17.33 33.78 
1-2 63.64 47.27 38.71 44.00 46.22 
3-4 6.06 10.91 11.29 38.67 19.56 
17 Maximum 5 0.00 0.00 1.61 0.00 0.44 
There is one company from industrial sector that achieved the maximum level of 
disclosure under this category in 2002. However, this company failed to attain this 
maximum disclosure level in 2005. Frequency distribution of number of items disclosed 
under this category (Table 5-10) shows that the numbers of items disclosed by the 
majority of the sample (80.00%) were no more than two items. This table also reveals an 
improvement in the percentage of companies that did not disclose any information 
regarding future prospects in 2005. Unlike other categories discussed earlier, the changes 
in number of items disclosed in 2002 and 2005are not very obvious. 
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5.3.3.5 Director and Management Information 
The average disclosure score under this category is 43.82%. The highest disclosed item is 
Function of operational managers (71.56%), which is the only item that seemed to have 
an acceptable level of disclosure in 1995 and 1996. This item is also in the top ten 
ranking every year (Table 5-4). On the contrary, the least disclosed item was Family 
connection between directors (16.89%). Overall, Thai listed companies did not seem to 
pay much attention to disclosure of this category of information. There was considerably 
low level of disclosure in 1995 and 1996. However, the disclosure of all items in this 
category showed extensive improvement in 2002 and 2005. This could possibly be the 
response of companies to the corporate governance campaigns carried out by Thai 
government after the 1997 financial crisis. A higher level of disclosure of director and 
management information also implies an improvement in corporate transparency. 
As seen in Table 5-11, the numbers of companies that did not disclose any item at all 
under this category decreased significantly in 2002 and 2005 (from 36.36% in 1995 and 
49.09% in 1996, to 4.84% in 2002 and 2.67% in 2005). While most companies disclosed 
two items or less in 1995 and 1996 (93.94% and 94.54% respectively), only 14.67% of 
companies disclosed two items or less in 2005 (41.94% in 2002). 
Table 5-11: Frequency distribution of directors and management information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 36.36 49.09 4.84 2.67 19.56 
1-2 57.58 45.45 37.10 12.00 33.78 
3-4 6.06 5.45 56.45 64.00 39.10 
Maximum 5 0.00 0.00 1.61 21.33 7.56 
Similar to most categories, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board tends 
to be the variable with the strongest association for the disclosure of director and senior 
management information. It is significantly correlated (at the 1% significance level) to all 
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five disclosure items. This confirms that non-executive directors influence the disclosure 
of director and management information. 
5.3.3.6 Employee Information 
The average disclosure score of employee information is 25.02%, which ranks seventh 
out of ten categories The highest disclosed item was Staff training (43.56%). The lowest 
disclosed item was Employees' appreciation (1.33%), which was also the lowest among 
all sixty disclosure items. There is only one company from the resources sector, which 
achieved the maximum disclosure level under this category in 2005. 
Table 5-12: Frequency distribution of employee information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 54.55 63.64 30.65 20.00 38.67 
1-2 36.36 25.45 53.23 49.33 42.67 
3-4 9.09 10.91 16.13 29.33 18.22 
Maximum 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.33 0.44 
Table 5-12 reveals that in 1995 and 1996, the majority of companies (54.55% and 
63.64% respectively) did not disclose any items at all under this category. However, the 
non-disclosure ratios show signs of improvement in 2002 and 2005. The proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board once again seems to be the variable with the 
strongest association with disclosure of employee information It is found to be positively 
related with all items under this category, except Employees' appreciation. The 
disclosure of corporate policy on human resources and information about employee 
workplace safety are positively related to company size. Bigger companies may have 
more employee information that they need to disclose due to a larger number of 
employees. Foreign ownership is found to be related to the disclosure of staff training, 
employee welfare, and information about employee workplace safety. Having Big Four 
audit firms as auditors is found to be positively related to the disclosure of employee 
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welfare and information about employee workplace safety. These findings suggest that 
the disclosure of employee information is influenced by various factors. 
5.3.3.7 Corporate Social Responsibility Information 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) information has its own unique characteristics that 
make it different from other categories of information. The motivation underlying the 
disclosure of CSR information could be influenced by corporate philosophy or 
managerial perception towards ethical issues. Therefore, the nature of CSR disclosure 
could be more sophisticated than other information. 
The average disclosure score of CSR is 23.37%, which ranks eighth out of ten categories. 
The highest disclosed item was Social reward or achievement (31.56%). The lowest 
disclosed item was Environmental protection programmes (quantitative, 1.78%). Thai 
companies seemed unready to disclose quantitative information about environmental 
protection programmes or they might not have seen the benefits from disclosing such 
information The ranked percentage of the disclosure of individual items shows that the 
companies did not seem to pay much attention to the disclosure of CSR information. 
None of the items under this category are ranked in the top thirty of disclosed items. 
It can be seen from table 5-13 that a number of companies did not disclose any CSR 
information in 1995 (63.64%) and 1996 (45.45%). The table also shows that the number 
of items disclosed tended to improve over time. The proportion of companies disclosing 
one to two items increased considerably in 1996 and 2002, and proportion of companies 
disclosing three to seven items also rose significantly in 2005. 
Table 5-13: Frequency distribution of corporate social responsibility information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 63.64 45.45 29.03 24.00 36.44 
1-2 18.18 38.18 43.55 17.33 29.78 
3-5 15.15 14.55 19.35 38.67 24.00 
6-7 3.03 1.82 8.06 20.00 9.78 
Maximum 8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
158 
Further analysis reveals that company size is significantly correlated (at the 1% 
significance level) with the disclosure of every item under this category (except 
quantitative environmental protection programmes). This finding is not surprising given 
that larger companies, which normally receive more attention, have the resources to 
provide this kind of information. Disclosing CSR information can also enhance corporate 
image and contribute to a competitive advantage. Proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board and the existence of role duality between chairman and CEO are also highly 
correlated with the disclosure of CSR information. They are found to be positively related 
to six out of eight items under this category. There are significant positive relationships 
between companies in the resources sector and the disclosure of six out of eight items 
under this category. The reason for the higher level of the disclosure of environmental 
information from resource companies may be due to their nature of business, which has a 
direct impact on the environment. Profitability is found to be significantly related to only 
one item (environmental policies) under this category. This is quite opposite to the 
expectation because highly profitable companies have the tendency to show that they 
have made a contribution to society, not just seeking their own profit. 
The low level of CSR disclosure is not surprising, and it is consistent with the finding of 
Kuasirikun (1998), who examines annual reports of 63 Thai listed companies and finds 
the limited disclosure of social and environmental information. There seems to be room 
for improvement in this area of disclosure in Thailand. However, it is possible that Thai 
companies have paid more attention to responding to the government's call for enhanced 
corporate transparency and issues related to the economic situation. Therefore, the 
corporate social responsibility issue has not been the first priority for voluntary disclosure 
of Thai listed companies. 
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5.3.3.8 Financial Review 
Most information in this category can be obtained easily from the financial statements, 
which make the processing cost of financial information considerably low. However, the 
decision to disclose the financial review might depend on other factors such as company 
performance, competitive disadvantage, or management perception. The average 
disclosure score for the financial review category is 44.51%, which is ranked third out of 
ten categories. The highest disclosed item was Profitability ratio (73.33%), and the lowest 
was Financial history (27.11%). 
The disclosure of financial review showed signs of significant improvement in 2002 and 
2005, as seen from Table 5-14, which shows that the percentage of companies that 
disclosed more than five items significantly improved in those years. The proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board may be particularly influential on the disclosure of 
the financial review. It is found to be significantly correlated (at the 1% significant level) 
with the disclosure of every item under this category, except for dividend payout 
information. None of the financial review items are related to profitability or leverage, 
which is quite opposite to the expectation. 
Table 5-14: Frequency distribution of financial review items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 27.27 21.82 6.45 8.00 13.78 
1-2 45.45 34.55 30.65 10.67 27.11 
3-4 15.15 32.73 27.42 37.33 30.22 
5-6 9.10 9.09 32.25 37.33 24.89 
Maximum 7 3.03 1.82 3.23 6.67 4.00 
5.3.3.9 Segmental Information 
Segmental related information is regarded as being particularly important for Thai listed 
companies; therefore, most segmental information items are mandatory. After excluding 
the mandatory items, this category contains only two voluntary disclosure items. The 
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voluntary disclosure score of segmental information is very low at an average of 11.78%, 
which is the lowest among all ten categories. The majority of companies did not disclose 
any items under this category in all four years. In addition, the disclosure scores did not 
improve much in 2002 and 2005. 
Further analysis finds that the disclosure of market share analysis is positively related to 
foreign ownership (at the 1% significant level) and profitability (at the 5% significance 
level). Companies in the agro and food industry tend to disclose more market share 
analysis information. This might be due to the nature of their business which is quite 
competitive. The proportion of non-executive directors on the board is found to be 
positively related to the disclosure of competitor analysis (at the 1% significant level). 
Table 5-15: Frequency distribution of segmental information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 100.00 90.91 77.42 72.00 82.22 
1 0.00 5.45 14.52 20.00 12.00 
Maximum 2 0.00 3.64 8.06 8.00 5.78 
5.3.3.10 Market Information 
The average disclosure score of marketing information is 19.64% which is the second 
lowest among all ten categories. The highest disclosed item was Distribution of 
shareholdings (49.33%). On the other hand, the three items least disclosed in this 
category were Share price trend (2.22%), Market capitalisation (3.56%), and Share price 
information (4.89%). These three disclosure items were ranked 551h, 56 `h, and 57th, 
respectively, from a total of sixty (see Table 5-4). 
The scores indicate that companies were more willing to disclose information about the 
shareholdings (Domestic and foreign shareholdings, and Distribution of shareholdings). 
On the contrary, none of the companies disclosed information about market 
capitalisation, share price information, and share price trend in 1995, and less than 8% of 
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companies disclose these items in later years. The low level of scores reinforces the view 
that these items were not considered as important as other types of information for 
disclosure in company annual reports. Also, the reason for not disclosing these items 
might be because such information can be obtained from alternative sources such as the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand website. 
The frequency distribution of the items disclosed (Table 5-16) shows that nearly half of 
the sample (49.78%) did not disclose any market information at all. It can also be seen 
that the percentage of companies that did not disclose any items decreased in 2002 and 
2005, with more companies disclosed one to two items. However, a very small number of 
companies disclosed more than three items in all four years. 
Table 5-16: Frequency distribution of market information items disclosed 
No. of item(s) disclosed % 
1995 1996 2002 2005 Total 
0 72.73 67.27 43.55 32.00 49.78 
1-2 27.27 27.27 54.84 60.00 45.77 
3-4 0.00 5.45 0.00 4.00 2.67 
Maximum 5 0.00 0.00 1.61 4.00 1.78 
Further analysis finds that company size is positively related to the disclosure of every 
market related items, except for the disclosure of market capitalisation. The proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board is also significantly correlated with the disclosure of 
share price trend, distribution of shareholdings and foreign shareholdings. Foreign 
ownership seems to influence the disclosure of shareholding information, it is found to be 
positively with the disclosure of both shareholding related items (distribution of 
shareholdings and foreign shareholdings). In addition, the existence of role duality 
between chairman and CEO was also found to be negatively associated (at the 1% 
significant level) with the disclosure of these two items. Companies in the resources 
sector tend to have a higher level of disclosure for every item under this category. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
Examination of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of companies selected for this 
study shows a range of disclosure levels from as low as 0.00 % to a maximum of 81.03 
%. Further investigation into sub-categories of information revealed that information 
about economic environment and general corporate information were the highest 
disclosed categories. On the other hand, segmental, market related, and corporate social 
responsibility information were the least disclosed categories. The results show a 
significant improvement in voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies in 2002 and 
2005, especially for items related to the economic situation and corporate governance. 
This could be due to the response of companies to government campaigns to improve 
corporate transparency after the 1997 financial crisis. The positive changes in voluntary 
disclosure found in this study may raise expectation for governing entities that there is an 
improvement in the quality of financial reporting practices of Thai listed companies. 
There seemed to be a substantial gap in the voluntary disclosure of each sub-category of 
information. Thai listed companies tend to provide information that is non-specific in 
nature. There is a relatively low level of quantitative information disclosure. Information 
associated with high cost, either information processing costs or competitive 
disadvantage cost, was not disclosed frequently. This may suggest that Thai listed 
companies are aware of the potential costs and benefits of making voluntary disclosure. 
Further analysis of the association between individual disclosure items and the 
explanatory variables indicates that voluntary disclosure of companies in the sample 
varied significantly according to company characteristics, which are mainly the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board and company size. 
The next chapter applies univariate and multivariate analyses to examine relationships 
between voluntary disclosure and company specific characteristics, financial attributes, 
corporate governance characteristics, and time factors. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Univariate and Multivariate Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to identify factors that are significantly associated with 
the variation in the level of voluntary information disclosed in corporate annual reports. 
The analysis is first conducted by examining the effect of each variable on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure (univariate analysis). Secondly, all the variables are incorporated in 
a regression model to determine their joint effect in explaining variation in the extent of 
voluntary disclosure among companies (multivariate analysis). In both types of analyses, 
a two-stage evaluation is carried out, the first to identify factors influencing overall 
voluntary disclosure. The investigation of factors affecting specific information 
disclosure (strategic, non-financial, and financial information) follows. The two-stage 
evaluation process helps in determining whether variables that are statistically significant 
or non-significant in the overall disclosure prove to be the same in specific information 
disclosures. 
This chapter answers research question 2,3, and 5 which are as follows: 
Research question 2: To what extent did voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies 
change over the period 1995 to 2005? 
Research question 3: To what extent are aspects of company characteristics, financial 
attributes, and corporate governance related factors significant in 
explaining the extent of voluntary of Thai listed companies? 
Research question 5: How are the variations in voluntary disclosure practices of Thai 
listed companies explained by relevant theoretical frameworks? 
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Research question 2 and 3 are answered by using the univariate and multivariate analyses 
to identify factors that are significantly associated with variation in the level of voluntary 
disclosure. In order to answer research question 2, time factors are included in the 
univariate and multivariate analyses. Research question 5 is answered by analysing and 
interpreting the outputs of the statistical results within the context of voluntary disclosure 
in Thailand and the relevant theoretical frameworks. The analysis is based on relevant 
theoretical frameworks and existing literature on corporate disclosure discussed in 
chapter 2 and the review of Thai financial reporting environment in Chapter 3. 
Univariate analysis is presented in section 6.2, followed by the multivariate analysis in 
section 6.3. Comparison of univariate and multivariate results is reported in section 6.4. 
Section 6.5 presents the interpretation of results. Finally, a conclusion is provided in 
section 6.6. 
6.2 Univariate Analysis 
This section presents the results of univariate non-parametric analysis. Results are 
presented by reference to overall voluntary disclosure and also according to specific 
categories of voluntary disclosure (strategic, non-financial, and financial information). 
6.2.1 Continuous Independent Variables 
As mentioned in Chapter 4 (section 4.6), Kendall's rank correlation coefficient (tau) is 
applied in order to measure the association between voluntary disclosure and the 
continuous independent variables. Table 6-1 presents the results by reference to overall 
voluntary disclosure and also according to specific categories of voluntary disclosure. 
The descriptive statistics for the continuous independent variables included in this study 
are shown in Appendix 6-A. 
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Table 6-1: Correlations between continuous independent variables and voluntary disclosure 
Measures Overall Strategic Non-Financial Financial 
Market capitalisation 
. 
242** 
. 
194** 
. 
259** 
. 
191** 
(1-tailed) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
Total assets 
. 
254** 
. 
181** 
. 
322** 
. 
165** 
(1-tailed) (. 000) (. 003) (. 000) (. 007) 
Return on equity 
. 
093* 
. 
114* 
. 
058 
. 
054 
(2-tailed) (. 038) (. 012) (. 211) (. 247) 
Debt to equity 
-. 
015 
-. 
038 
. 
002 
-. 
010 
(2-tailed) (. 746) (. 407) (. 957) (. 824) 
% of non-executive directors 
. 
356** 
. 
343** 
. 
368** 
. 
229** 
(2-tailed) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) (. 000) 
% of shares owned by top 
. 
075 
. 
051 
. 
118* 
. 
029 
ten shareholders (. 097) (. 263) (. 010) (. 540) 
(2-tailed) 
% of foreign shareholding 
. 
181** 
. 
181** 
. 
140** 
. 
157** 
(2-tailed) (. 000) (. 000) (. 002) (. 001) 
Statistically significant at the 1%"" or the 5%" level 
The bivariate statistical results for continuous independent variables and voluntary 
disclosure indices indicate that voluntary disclosure scores are significantly correlated 
with company size (measured by market capitalisation and total assets), proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board, and foreign ownership. These four 
variables provide a significant association at the 1% level for overall voluntary disclosure 
and also for all three information categories. 
The results of the test also indicate that there is a positive association between 
profitability (measured by the return on equity) and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
However, a significant association (at the 5% level) only exists in the case of overall and 
strategic information disclosure. There is a weak positive association between proportion 
of shares owned by the top ten shareholders and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Only 
non-financial information is found to be significantly related (at the 5% level) with the 
proportion of shares owned by the top ten shareholders. There seems to be no significant 
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association between leverage (measured by the debt to equity) and voluntary disclosure 
either on overall scores or on specific information categories 
Table 6-2 presents the correlations between continuous independent variables and overall 
voluntary disclosure separated by year. Company size seems to be the variable with the 
strongest association. It is significantly correlated (at the 1% level) with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in all four years selected in this study. The results also indicate the 
existence of a positive association between foreign ownership and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. However, the results are significant (at the 5% level) only in 2002 and 2005. 
Profitability provides a significant association at the 5% level in 2002 and 2005. 
However, while a negative association is seen in 2002, the result of 2005 shows a 
positive association. Leverage is significantly correlated (at the 5% level) with the extent 
of voluntary disclosure in 1996, but not in the other three years. The proportion of non- 
executive directors on the board and proportion of shares owned by the top ten 
shareholders are not significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
any year. 
Table 6-2: Correlations between continuous independent variables and overall voluntary 
disclosure separated by year 
Measures 1995 1996 2002 2005 
Market capitalisation 
. 
341** 
. 
247** 
. 
271** 
. 
286** 
(1-tailed) (. 003) (. 004) (. 001) (. 000) 
Return on equity -. 127 
. 
129 
-. 
175* 
. 
174* 
(2-tailed) (. 311) (. 168) (. 046) (. 028) 
Debt to equity 
. 
131 
. 
193* 
. 
103 
. 
029 
(2-tailed) (. 297) (. 039) (. 241) (. 711) 
% of non-executive directors 
. 
083 
. 
036 
-. 
165 
-. 
004 
(2-tailed) (. 547) (. 724) (. 068) (. 963) 
% of shares owned by top 
. 
216 
. 
125 
-. 
003 
. 
058 
ten shareholders (. 084) (. 181) (. 971) (. 467) 
(2-tailed) 
% of foreign shareholding 
. 
085 
. 
111 
. 
201 * 
. 
172* 
(2-tailed) (. 502) (. 236) (. 022) (. 030) 
Statistically significant at the 1%4" or the 31/ow level 
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6.2.2 Categorical Independent Variables 
The Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis test were performed to determine whether 
the categorical variables included in this study have an impact on voluntary disclosure. 
The results are provided in Table 6-3 and Table 6-4. 
Table 6-3: Mann-Whitney U test for categorical independent variables 
Measure N Overall Strategic Non- 
financial 
Financial 
Role duality With CEO duality 42 89.18 94.14 90.27 92.61 
(mean rank) 
Without CEO duality 183 118.47 117.33 118.22 117.68 
(mean rank) 
z-value 
-2.630 -2.082 -2.515 -2.264 
Significance 
. 
009** 
. 
037* 
. 
012* 
. 
024* 
Type of Big 4 145 116.02 115.78 116.17 114.76 
auditor (mean rank) 
Non-Big4 80 107.53 107.97 107.25 109.81 
(mean rank) 
z-value 
-. 
936 
-. 
861 
-. 
987 
-. 
550 
Significance 
. 
349 
. 
389 
. 
324 
. 
583 
Statistically significant at the 10/o** or the 5"/o* level 
It can be seen that companies with CEO/Chairman role duality disclosed significantly 
less (p<0.05) information than those without role duality in all categories of information, 
especially for overall voluntary disclosure where the result is significant at the 1% level. 
The results of Mann-Whiney U test show no statistically significant difference of 
voluntary disclosure between companies audited by the Big Four and non-Big Four audit 
firms. 
It can be seen from Table 6-4 that type of industry is a significant factor in explaining 
variation of voluntary disclosure. The results are significant at the 1% level for overall 
voluntary disclosure, strategic information, and non-financial information disclosure; and 
significant at the 5% level for financial information disclosure. The results show that 
there is a consistency between the findings of each type of disclosure. Companies in the 
agro and food industry seem to have a higher level of voluntary disclosure in all types of 
information. On the other hand, companies in property and construction industry tend to 
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disclose less voluntary information. The results for non-financial disclosure differ slightly 
from other types of disclosure in that companies in the resources sector seem to have the 
highest level of non-financial information disclosure. 
Table 6-4: Kruskal-Wallis test for categorical independent variables 
Measure N Overall Strategic Non- 
financial 
Financial 
Type of Agro/Food 7 175.57 172.93 135.07 188.50 
industry (mean rank) 
Industrials 26 116.13 115.19 130.42 94.98 
(mean rank) 
Property/Construction 92 93.97 94.93 89.99 105.26 
(mean rank) 
Resources 21 140.45 133.90 155.81 119.52 
(mean rank) 
Services 38 116.78 117.57 116.83 119.88 
(mean rank) 
Technology 41 125.46 126.98 124.33 119.20 
(mean rank) 
Significance 
. 
001** 
. 
004** 
. 
000** 
. 
016* 
Year 1995 33 56.91 61.38 65.76 63.97 
(mean rank) 
1996 55 63.39 67.28 60.28 83.07 
(mean rank) 
2002 62 125.96 125.12 126.02 125.39 
(mean rank) 
2005 75 163.35 159.22 161.68 146.28 
(mean rank) 
Significance 
. 
000** 
. 
000** 
. 
000** 
. 
000** 
Statistically significant at the miof f or the ro- level 
There is a highly significant difference (p=. 000) in the means of voluntary disclosure 
scores among the four years. The results suggest that variation in voluntary disclosure 
could be particularly influenced from difference in time periods. Disclosure scores seem 
to improve continuously, especially in 2002 and 2005. 
In summary, the univariate analysis shows a consistency in terms of direction of 
association between each variable and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The results 
indicate the existence of positive associations between company voluntary disclosure 
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scores and size, foreign ownership, and proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board. The existence of CEO/Chairman role duality is negatively 
associated with voluntary disclosure scores. Type of industry and year are also observed 
to be significantly associated with voluntary disclosure. Profitability and ownership 
concentration seem to have some association with the disclosure scores, whereas, 
leverage and type of auditor show no significant association of these two variables to the 
disclosure scores. 
6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The univariate analysis reported in the previous section only indicates the relationship 
between dependent variable and each of the independent variable; it cannot reflect the 
interrelationships among these variables in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure. 
On the other hand, multivariate analysis can take this process a step further, as it is 
capable of handling several explanatory variables simultaneously. In the multivariate 
analysis, the existence of other factors that might influence the outcome variable is taken 
into account. Different variables, which have been measured on different scales, can be 
included in the model. This allows variables that are best in explaining variations in the 
dependent variable be identified. 
This section reports the results of multivariate analysis, which determines the collective 
impact of the explanatory variables in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure. An 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was employed in this study. The multiple 
regression analysis was conducted at two levels: aggregated and disaggregated levels. At 
the aggregated level, the total voluntary disclosure score was applied as the dependent 
variable in order to investigate the collective relationship between the independent 
variables and overall voluntary disclosure. This relationship was then investigated for 
each type of information at the disaggregated level. Therefore, the variables that 
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explained variation of voluntary disclosure at the aggregated level were tested if they are 
also able to explain variation of voluntary disclosure at the disaggregated level. 
6.3.1 Assumptions in Multiple Regression Analysis 
An important part in using multiple regression analysis is that the assumptions are not 
violated. These assumptions involve no perfect multicollinearity between explanatory 
variables, uncorrelated residual terms, constant in the variance of the residual terms 
(homoscedasticity), normality of the residual terms, and linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
There are several techniques suggested by statisticians to detect multicollinearity. 
Therefore, four different multicollinearity tests were conducted in this study. Firstly, the 
correlations between all pairs of independent variables were examined through the 
correlation matrix (see Appendix 6-B). The rule of thumb for detecting multicollinearity 
problem is when the correlation coefficient exceeds 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003). Examination of 
the correlation matrix of the continuous independent variables indicates that the variables 
are not significantly correlated (the correlation coefficients are lower than 0.2 for all pairs 
of variables). However, a certain degree of multicollinearity may exist even when the 
correlation coefficient between independent variables is relatively low (Gujarati, 2003). 
Apart from the correlation matrix, multicollinearity was also assessed by using the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). A VIF value above 10 indicates the likelihood of a 
harmful degree of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). In this study, VIF values of all 
independent variables are below 4.0, thus giving further support to the potentially low 
degree of multicollinearity in the regression model. Furthermore, the eigenvalues and 
condition index also suggest that multicollinearity should not be a point of concern for 
the existing data. 
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Regarding the assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, and normality, an analysis of 
residuals was conducted by a visual inspection of the plots of the regression standardised 
residuals. If the plot of the regression standardised residual against the predicted value 
looks like a random array of dots evenly dispersed around zero, it is an indication that the 
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity have been met (Field, 2009, pp. 247-249). 
If the graph funnels out, there may be heteroscedasticity in the data, but if it is in the 
curve shape, there is a chance that the assumption of linearity might be broken (ibid. ). To 
test the normality of residuals, the histogram of regression standardised residual should 
look like a normal distribution. The points symmetrically distributed around a diagonal 
line in the normal probability plot of regression standardised residuals also represent the 
normality of residuals (ibid. ). 
Normal probability plot of regression standardised residuals and scatterplot of the 
regression standardised residual against the predicted value are presented in Appendix 6- 
C. The scatterplot shows that the residuals appear to be randomly scattered around a 
horizontal line through zero. The observations also cluster around a straight line in the 
normal probability plot. Therefore, the graphs reveal that homoscedasticity, linearity, and 
normality assumptions are not violated. 
Regarding the assumption of uncorrelated residual terms, the Durbin-Watson test for 
autocorrelation was undertaken. A Durbin-Watson value of 2 indicates that the residuals 
are uncorrelated (Field, 2009, p. 220). A value close to 2 indicates less correlation 
between residuals (ibid. ). The Durbin-Watson value for each model is shown in the 
regression result tables (Table 6-5 and Table 6-6). Generally, the figures are quite close to 
2. Therefore, autocorrelation should not be a point of concern. 
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6.3.2 The Regression Model 
The full regression model is shown as follows: 
VDI = ßo + (3I SIZ + (32 PRO + ß3 LEV + ß4 OWN + (35 BOA + ßb FRN + 
ß7AUD + ß8 CEO + ß9 INDI + ß, o 1ND2 + Oil IND3 + (312 IND4 + 
0131ND5 + 1314Y1996 + ß1s Y2002 + 016Y2005 +c 
Where: 
VDI = voluntary disclosure index 
SIZ = market capitalisation 
PRO = return on equity 
LEV = long term debt to equity 
OWN = ratio of total shares owned by the top ten shareholders to total number of shares issued 
BOA = ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board 
FRN = ratio of shares owned by foreigners to total number of shares issued 
AUD = dummy variable, 1 if a company is audited by a Big Four auditor, 0 otherwise 
CEO = dummy variable, 1 if the chief executive officer is also chairman of the board, 0 otherwise 
IND1 = dummy variables, I if industry type is agro/food, 0 otherwise 
IND2 = dummy variables, 1 if industry type is industrial, 0 otherwise 
IND3 = dummy variables, I if industry type is technology, 0 otherwise 
IND4 = dummy variables, 1 if industry type is resources, 0 otherwise 
IND5 = dummy variables, 1 if industry type is service, 0 otherwise 
Y1996 = dummy variable, 1 if the year is 1996,0 otherwise 
Y2002 = dummy variable, 1 if the year is 2002,0 otherwise 
Y2005 = dummy variable, I if the year is 2005,0 otherwise 
ß= regression coefficients 
s= error term 
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6.3.3 Regression Results 
In order to find whether time factor influences voluntary disclosure practices, regression 
models using pooled data for all four years were run. The results are reported in section 
6.3.3.1. In addition, separate multiple regressions for observations before (pooling data 
for years 1995 and 1996) and after (pooling data for years 2002 and 2005) the 1997 
financial crisis were undertaken to find whether independent variables had the same 
influence on voluntary disclosure before and after the crisis. The results of separate 
multiple regressions for observations before and after the crisis are reported in section 
6.3.3.2. 
6.3.3.1 Pooled Regressions 
Table 6-5 presents the pooled regression results for overall voluntary disclosure. The 
result based on untransformed data is also presented for comparison purposes. The model 
is significant (F = 23.043, p= 
. 
000) with an adjusted R squared of 61.2%. Therefore, 
approximately 61.2% of the variation in voluntary disclosure scores between companies 
can be explained by the variables included in this model. 
In order to assess the contribution of each independent variable, the BETA value under 
standardised coefficients is referred to. The standardised coefficients provide a better 
insight into the importance of a predictor in the model because the coefficients are all 
converted to the same scale and are thus directly comparable (field, 2009 p. 239). The 
dummy variables for years 2005 and 2002 tend to be the variables with the strongest 
association. They are not only significant at the 1% level, but also produce the highest 
BETA weight (BETA = 
. 
712 for 2005 and 
. 
459 for 2002). On the other hand, the dummy 
variable for 1996 is not significant in this model. With 1995 being used as baseline, the 
result indicates that the levels of voluntary disclosure in 2002 and 2005 are significantly 
higher than in 1995 and 1996. 
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Table 6-5 Pooled regression results for overall voluntary disclosure 
Untransformed data Normal scores' 
Adjusted R 62.2% 61.2% 
F statistic 24.011 23.043 
Significance 
. 
000 
. 
000 
Std. Error 
. 
115 
. 
611 
Durbin-Watson 1.855 1.849 
Variables BETA t Sig. ß BETA t Sig. 
Constant 
-. 
057 
-. 
937 
. 
350 
-. 
884 
-5.938 
. 
000** 
SIZ 
. 
023 
. 
189 4.066 
. 
000** 
. 
194 
. 
194 4.013 
. 
000" 
PRO 
-. 
007 
-. 
022 
-. 
295 
. 
768 
-. 
060 
-. 
060 
-1.318 
. 
189 
LEV 
. 
000 
. 
008 
. 
112 
. 
911 
. 
066 
. 
065 1.426 
. 
155 
OWN 
. 
014 
. 
012 
. 
269 
. 
788 
. 
039 
. 
039 
. 
852 
. 
395 
BOA 
. 
039 
. 
032 
. 
449 
. 
654 
. 
063 
. 
060 
. 
877 
. 
381 
FRN 
. 
079 
. 
076 1.644 
. 
102 
. 
087 
. 
086 1.829 
. 
069 
AUD 
. 
000 
. 
001 
. 
012 
. 
990 
-. 
023 
-. 
011 
-. 
246 
. 
806 
CEO 
-. 
101 
-. 
210 
-4.715 
. 
000*' 
-. 
507 
-. 
202 
-4.441 
. 
000*' 
IND 
=A o&Food 
. 
202 
. 
187 4.344 
. 
000** 1.068 
. 
190 4.308 
. 
000*' 
=Industrial 
. 
085 
. 
146 3.136 
. 
002** 
. 
394 
. 
129 2.740 
. 
007** 
= Technology 
. 
045 
. 
092 1.807 
. 
072 
. 
192 
. 
076 1.527 
. 
128 
= Resources 
. 
104 
. 
162 3.469 
. 
001** 
. 
492 
. 
146 3.086 
. 
002*' 
= Services 
. 
050 
. 
100 2.161 
. 
032* 
. 
221 
. 
085 1.789 
. 
075 
YEAR` 
= 1996 
. 
030 
. 
069 1.167 
. 
244 
. 
102 
. 
045 
. 
748 
. 
456 
= 2002 
. 
203 
. 
484 6.295 
. 
000" 1.004 
. 
459 6.135 
. 
000** 
= 2005 
. 
298 
. 
750 8.812 
. 
000** 1.479 
. 
712 8.608 
. 
000** 
** significant at the 1% level. 
* significant at the 5% level. 
' dependent and continuous independent variables were transformed into normal scores b property/construction industry is used as baseline 
`year 1995 is used as baseline 
The results also reveal that company size is associated with increase in voluntary 
disclosure. Company size measured by market capitalisation is significant at the 1% 
level. The dummy variable for the presence of CEO/Chairman role duality is significant 
at the 1% level with a negative coefficient. The negative signs imply that companies, in 
which the Chairmen and CEOs are the same person, disclose significantly less voluntary 
information in their annual reports. Using the property and construction industry as an 
omitted variable, all remaining types of industry have positive coefficients. This result 
implies that companies in the property and construction industry disclose less voluntary 
information than those in other industries, especially when compared with companies in 
agro and food, industrial, and resources industries, where the associations are found to be 
significant at the 1% level. 
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Foreign ownership is marginally significant (at the 10% level) with a positive coefficient 
in the normal scores regression, but it is not significant in the untransformed regression. 
Profitability, leverage, ownership structure, proportion of non-executive directors, and 
type of auditor are found to have no explanatory power in this model. 
In order to verify the reliability of the size measure, the alternative model was run. The 
results are reported in Appendix 6-E. This model incorporates total assets as the measure 
of size. Company size measured by total assets is still significant at the 1% level. The 
results from alternative model confirm the significance of company size in explaining 
variation in voluntary disclosure. 
The highest BETA weight of year dummy variables reported in Table 6-5 indicates that 
time factors might be important factors in explaining the variation in voluntary 
disclosures of Thai listed companies. Therefore, the effects of time have been 
investigated further by grouping the observations prior to (1995 and 1996) and after 
(2002 and 2005) the 1997 financial crisis. The model incorporating the crisis factor 
(dummy variable for the period of time before or after the 1997 financial crisis) as an 
independent variable is presented in Appendix 6-F. The results confirm the significance 
of time factors in explaining variation in voluntary disclosures; the crisis factor produces 
the highest BETA weight in this model. 
The explanatory power (adjusted R squared) of the regression models in this study seems 
to be higher than in prior studies. However, the adjusted R squared of these models may 
not be comparable to previous studies that selected data from the same time period 
because the regression models in this study contain the data of four different time periods 
and time factors seem to be the most influential factors in explaining variation in 
voluntary disclosures. As discussed above, the time factors (year dummy variables and 
crisis factor) provide the highest contribution to the model. By using stepwise as a 
method for selecting variables into the model in the model incorporating the crisis factor 
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as an independent variable, the crisis factor was selected at stage one of the stepwise 
regression. It is the most important variable, providing 67.1 % of the explanatory power of 
the significant independent variables (see Appendix 6-G). The crisis factor alone can 
explain 38.3% of variation in voluntary disclosure. Similarly, by using stepwise as a 
method for selecting variables into the model in the model incorporating year dummy 
variables as independent variables, the year 2005 was selected at stage one of the 
stepwise regression, followed by 2002. Dummy variables for 2005 and 2002 provide 
70.8% of the explanatory power of the significant independent variables. They can 
explain 42.9% of variation in voluntary disclosure. The high value of adjusted R squared 
of the regression model incorporating data from different time period is consistent with 
the finding of Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) who find a dramatic increase in the values of 
adjusted R squared after the year dummy variables were included in pooled regression 
models. 
Table 6-6 presents pooled multiple regression results for voluntary disclosures of specific 
information categories. The models are also statistically significant (p= 
. 
000) for all three 
information types. However, the amount of explained variation in voluntary disclosure 
(adjusted R2) ranges from 30.0% for financial information, to 48.0% for strategic 
information, to 63.0% for non-financial information. The results of voluntary disclosure 
of specific information tend to support those reported at the overall level. The regression 
models confirm size, industry type, year, and CEO/Chairman role duality as significant 
variables in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure across the information types. 
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Similar to the pooled regression results of overall disclosure, the findings of all specific 
information categories confirm the significance of time factors in explaining strategic, 
non-financial, and financial disclosures. Year dummy variables for 2002 and 2005 are not 
only significant at the 1% level, but they also produce the highest BETA weight for all 
three specific categories of voluntary disclosure. In addition, the results of the model 
incorporating crisis factor as an independent variable (Appendix 6-F) also confirm that 
there are higher levels of voluntary disclosures of strategic, non-financial, and financial 
information after the 1997 financial crisis. 
The explanatory power of company size in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure of 
specific information categories seems to be lower than that of overall disclosure. While 
company size measured by both market capitalisation and total assets is significant at the 
1% level for overall disclosure, only market capitalisation is significant for all three 
specific information categories (at the 1% level for non-financial information and at the 
5% level for strategic and financial information). It seems that company size measured by 
total assets is not significantly associated with strategic or financial disclosure (see 
Appendix 6-E). However, there is a significant association (at the 1% level) with non- 
financial disclosure. 
6.3.3.2 Separate Regressions for Observations before and after the 1997 Financial 
Crisis 
In order to test whether independent variables have the same influence on voluntary 
disclosure before and after the 1997 financial crisis, separate multiple regressions for the 
observations before and after the 1997 financial crisis are undertaken. The observations 
are segregated into two groups: before the crisis (pooling data for years 1995 and 1996), 
and after the crisis (pooling data for years 2002 and 2005). The results are presented in 
Table 6-7 and Table 6-8. The F values show the significance of the models for overall 
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and specific categories of disclosure in both time periods (except for the model of 
financial disclosure after the crisis). However, the explanatory power (adjusted R 
squared) of the separate regression models is much lower than those of the pooled 
regressions reported in 6.3.3.1. 
Similar to the pooled regressions, both before and after the crisis models confirm the 
significance of CEO/Chairman role duality in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure 
at both aggregated and disaggregated level. Company size, which was highly significant 
in the pooled regressions, is still significant in the models before the crisis (at the 1% 
level for overall and financial disclosure, at the 5% level for strategic disclosure, and 
marginally significant at the 10% level for non-financial disclosure). On the contrary, in 
the models after the crisis, size is only significant in the disclosure of non-financial 
information, but it is not significant in overall, strategic, and financial disclosures. Type 
of industry seems to have more influence on voluntary disclosure after the financial 
crisis. In the models after the crisis, more industry types tend to have significantly higher 
level of voluntary disclosures from the baseline industry (property and construction). 
Regarding the time factor, the year dummy variable is only significant with a positive 
coefficient (at the 5% level) for financial information disclosure, but not significant for 
overall, strategic, and non-financial disclosure in the models before the crisis. In contrast, 
the models after the crisis, year dummy variable is significant with positive coefficients 
(at the 1% level) for overall, strategic, and non-financial disclosures. This implies that the 
time factor still has influence on voluntary disclosure even in the separate analysis of the 
observations before and after the crisis. 
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6.4 Univariate and Multivariate Results 
Table 6-9 summarises the statistical results of univariate and multivariate analyses (based 
on pooled observations). Multivariate and univariate results, when compared, are not 
substantially different. Both univariate and multivariate results support year, 
CEO/Chairman role duality, company size, and industry type as significant factors in 
explaining variation in voluntary disclosure, and the results are also significant in all 
three specific information categories. There is also agreement between two analyses with 
respect to the non-significance of leverage, ownership structure, and type of auditor, 
except for the disclosure of non-financial information, where ownership structure is 
significant at the 5% level in the univariate analysis. 
Table 6-9: Univariate and Multivariate Results 
Sin observed /Significance level 
Variable Overall Strategic Non-Financial Financial 
Univanate Multivanate Univariate Multivanate Univanate Multivariate Umvariate Multivariate 
SIZ +** +*+ +** ++ +*+ +** +** +* 
PRO (+)+ x (+)* x x 
_* 
x x 
LEV x x x x x x 
O" x x x x (+)* x x x 
BOA + ** x + ** x + ** x + ** x 
FRN + ** x + ** x + ss x + ** x 
AUD x x x x x x x x 
CEO 
_s+ _"s _* _ss _s . 
s+ 
_* .* 
IND 
Agro/food 
Industrial 
Technology 
Resource 
Service 
(+). + 
(+)s" 
(+)"+ 
(+)"" 
(+)s" 
(+)"* 
(+).. 
x 
(+)"" 
(+)" 
(+)"" 
+).. 
(+)"s 
(+)*" 
(+)a 
(+)"" 
+).. 
(+)" 
(+)" 
x 
(+)ss 
+).. 
(+)"" 
(+)"" 
(+)ss 
(+)s 
(+).. 
x 
(+)" 
(+)" 
(+)" 
(+)s 
(+)* 
(+)* 
(+)" 
(+). s 
x 
x 
x 
x 
YEAR +*+ +*+ +*+ +** +** +** +*+ +** 
Statistically significant at the 1%* or the 5%* level 
x not statistically significant, + positive relationship, 
- 
negative relationship 
Disagreement occurs between univariate and multivariate results with respect to the 
variable for profitability, proportion of non-executive directors, and foreign ownership. 
Proportion of non-executive directors and foreign ownership are found to be significant at 
the 1% level for all types of disclosure in the univariate analysis, but they are found to be 
insignificant in the regression analysis (foreign ownership is marginally significant at the 
10% level in the regression analysis of overall and non-financial disclosures). This 
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suggests that other variables are more significant in influencing voluntary disclosures, 
when all variables are considered simultaneously in one regression run. The direction of 
association in respect of profitability is not consistent. It is significant at the 5% level 
with positive coefficients by the univariate test for overall and strategic information, but 
not significant by multivariate tests, except for non-financial disclosure, where it is 
significant at the 5% level with a negative coefficient. Given that the multivariate 
analysis takes into account the interrelationship among all variables in explaining 
variation in the dependent variable, it might be considered as providing more reliable 
results than the univariate analysis. 
6.5 Interpretation of Results 
This section interprets the results of statistical analysis within the context of the Thai 
business environment. Comparison is made to prior studies and the theoretical framework 
previously discussed in Chapter 2. 
6.5.1 Company Specific Characteristics 
The univariate and multivariate results indicate that company specific characteristics, 
which are significantly associated with voluntary disclosure in the case of Thai listed 
companies, are size and industry type. Type of auditor is not significant in either 
univariate or multivariate analyses. 
6.5.1.1 Size 
The univariate results indicate existence of a positive association between company size 
and voluntary disclosures at both aggregated and disaggregated level. In the multivariate 
analysis, size is also found to be an important factor in explaining variation in voluntary 
disclosures, especially in the pooled regressions, where it is significant in explaining 
overall disclosure and all three specific information categories. 
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In order to investigate the consistency between different measures of size, total assets 
were applied in the univariate and multivariate analyses. Company size measured by total 
assets is also significant in the univariate analysis for overall and all three specific 
information categories. However, while being significant in explaining overall and non- 
financial disclosures, it is not significant in explaining strategic and financial information 
disclosures in the multivariate analysis. Therefore, market capitalisation is better able to 
capture variation in voluntary disclosure when compared to total assets. 
In the separate regressions for observations before the 1997 financial crisis, size is found 
to be significant in explaining variation in voluntary disclosures at both aggregated and 
disaggregated level (except for non-financial information, where size is marginally 
significant at the 10% level). However, after the crisis, size is no longer a significant 
determinant of the variation in strategic and financial information disclosure, and it only 
marginally associates (at the 10% level) with overall voluntary disclosure. Nevertheless, 
it is found to be one of the most important factors in explaining variation in non-financial 
information disclosure. The results imply that the significance of size in explaining non- 
financial disclosure seems to occur after the crisis. This is different from before the crisis, 
where a majority of companies, including large companies, did not pay much attention to 
the disclosure of non-financial information, as can be seen from relatively low disclosure 
scores under this category (see section 5.3.1). The non-significance of company size in 
explaining variation in strategic and financial information after the crisis is probably due 
to the fact that a majority of companies, no matter what their size, tend to enhance their 
disclosures under these two categories in response to the financial crisis. This results in 
less dissimilarity between large and small companies in the disclosure of strategic and 
financial information. However, this change does not occur in the case of non-financial 
information disclosure, where the disclosure still depends largely on the size of 
companies. 
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The significance of company size as a determinant of voluntary disclosure is consistent 
with the vast majority of prior research in both developed capital market (for example, 
Firth, 1979; McNally et al., 1982; Cooke, 1989a, 1991; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 
1995; Depoers, 2000; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007) and emerging capital market (for 
example, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et al., 2006; Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Prior studies in 
Thailand reported conflicting results with regard to company size. Priebjrivat (1991) 
finds positive association between size and corporate disclosures of Thai listed 
companies, but the results are not statistically significant. In more recent studies, while 
Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find significant positive association between size and level 
of disclosures (mandatory and voluntary), Suphakasem (2008) finds no association 
between size and corporate governance disclosure of Thai listed companies. 
The significance of company size in explaining variability in voluntary disclosure for 
specific types of information (strategic, non-financial, and financial information) is 
consistent to the findings of Ferguson et al., (2002) and Leventis and Weetman (2004). 
However, other studies (for example Meek et al., 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Mohd 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) found that size is only significant in some specific types of 
information. 
The results indicated the relative applicability of several theoretical propositions, 
including agency, capital need, political cost, and information costs. Larger companies 
with greater need for external capital may use additional disclosure as a way to reduce 
agency costs arising from information asymmetry. Lower cost factors could also be the 
reason for the higher level of disclosure from larger companies. Larger companies tend to 
have lower information production costs, due to the economies of scale and possibly own 
information for their internal purposes. In addition, they may have lower costs of 
competitive disadvantage and opportunity costs related to disclosure (Meek et al., 1995). 
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Market pressures and greater demand for information from institutional shareholders, 
international capital providers, and financial analysts might also be the reason for a 
higher disclosure level from larger companies. Consistent with the capital need theory, 
responses to the need for information could attract potential investors and at the same 
time fulfil the demands of existing investors. 
The results imply that disclosure of non-financial and corporate social responsibility 
information of Thai listed companies still depends largely on the size of companies. The 
impact of operations, together with social position and public image, may influence large 
companies in the decision to disclose additional information. The significant positive 
association between company size and social responsibility information has been reported 
in prior studies (for example, Meek et al., 1995; Ferguson et al., 2002; Leventis and 
Weetman, 2004). 
6.5.1.2 Type of Industry 
Results concerning the impact of industry type on voluntary disclosure suggest that 
differences exist among the six industry types in the extent to which each industry 
disclosing its information. Industry type was identified by both univariate and 
multivariate analyses as a significant variable in explaining variation in the extent of 
voluntary disclosure in overall as well as specific information categories. The results 
indicate that the property and construction industry is significantly associated with a 
lower level of disclosure. Using the property and construction industry as an omitted 
variable in the multiple regressions, the remaining types of industry are significant with 
positive coefficients. A possible explanation for this finding is that companies in the 
property and construction industry are obliged by Thai accounting standards to disclose a 
great deal of specific information. Legal obligation to disclose very detail of their 
operation might discourage property and construction companies to disclose additional 
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information. In addition, the majority of companies in this sector were severely damaged 
from the financial crisis. The main focus of these companies might be on survival rather 
than improvement in disclosures. 
The univariate and multivariate results also reveal that type of industry is related to 
variability in the disclosure of specific categories of information. However, there is less 
variation in the disclosure of financial information across industry groups. This might be 
due to the nature of financial information which has a similar format that companies from 
every industry tend to disclose their information in the same way. In the separate 
regressions for observations before and after the 1997 financial crisis, type of industry 
seems to have more influence on voluntary disclosures after the crisis. In the post crisis 
models, more industry types tend to have a significantly higher level of voluntary 
disclosures than the baseline industry (property and construction). 
The significance of industry type in explaining variation in disclosure found in this study 
seems to contradict previous studies in Thailand. Suphakasem (2008) finds weak and 
insignificant influence of industry type on corporate governance disclosure of Thai listed 
companies. Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) report a mixture of positive and negative impact 
of each industry type over the years studied. 
The finding of lower level of voluntary disclosure from property and construction 
companies contradicts Haniffa and Cooke (2002), who find that Malaysian companies in 
all sectors have a lower level of voluntary disclosure than property and construction 
companies. The significance of industry type in explaining specific categories of 
information is in contrast to the finding in a study by Chau and Gray (2002) and 
Ferguson et al., (2002). Chau and Gray (2002) find no association between type of 
industry and voluntary disclosure of Hong Kong and Singaporean listed companies 
(overall, strategic, financial, and financial information). Ferguson et al., (2002) find that 
the industry type is not significantly related to overall, strategic, and non-financial 
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disclosure, but it is marginally related (at the 10% level) to the disclosure of financial 
information. 
The results suggest that companies in the resources sector provide more non-financial 
information. The dummy variable for the resources sector in the disclosure of non- 
financial information is significant with the highest coefficient in the regression (see 
Table 6-6). The mean score of resources sector for non-financial information disclosure 
in the univariate analysis is also the highest among the six industry types (see Table 6-4). 
The higher level of disclosure of non-financial information for companies in resources 
sector suggests that these companies tend to be more sensitive to social accountability 
issues. This might be due to their nature of business, which has a direct impact on the 
environment and society. Most of the companies in this sector operate under government 
concessions with the close monitoring. Therefore, companies in the resources sector are 
more politically sensitive than other sectors. Voluntary disclosure could be a solution for 
reducing potential political costs or government intervention (Gray and Roberts, 1989; 
Lim and McKinnon, 1993). Voluntary disclosure may also help companies to discharge 
their social accountability (Elliott and Jacobson, 1994). The significant positive 
association between resources companies and disclosure of non-financial information is 
consistent with Meek et al. (1995). This is also in line with political cost and legitimacy 
theoretic framework (see section 2.6.4 and 2.6.5). 
In summary, the impact of industry type on voluntary disclosure found in this study is 
relatively stronger and more consistent across information types when compared to 
previous studies. Type of industry seems to be a significant determinant of variation in 
the voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies, especially in the period after the 1997 
financial crisis. 
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6.5.1.3 Type of auditor 
The results from both univariate and multivariate analyses show no association between 
type of auditor and voluntary disclosure. Type of auditor is found to have no explanatory 
power, for either overall or subcategories of disclosure. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that voluntary disclosure is an arbitrary decision of the company itself. 
Therefore, auditors tend to have little or no influence on it, as it is beyond the scope of 
their responsibility. In addition, strict criteria from the SEC for the eligibility of audit 
firms to audit listed companies could lessen the gap between local and Big Four auditors. 
The non-significance of auditor type in explaining variation in corporate disclosure is 
consistent with the vast majority of prior studies in both developed capital markets (for 
example, McNally et al., 1982; Malone et al., 1993, Wallace et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 
1995; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002) and emerging capital markets (for example, 
Hossain et al., 1994; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; Barako et al., 2006). Chau and Gray (2002) find no 
association between type of auditor and voluntary disclosure of specific information 
(strategic, non-financial, financial, and total disclosure) for Singaporean and Hong Kong 
listed companies. However, the lack of significance of auditor type is opposite to the 
findings of Inchausti (1997), Wallace and Naser (1995), and Hossain and Taylor (2007), 
Who find that type of auditor is significantly associated with the extent of corporate 
disclosure. 
In the context of Thai studies, Priebjrivat (1991) finds that type of auditor is significantly 
associated with the semi-voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies. However, the 
results are not significant in the case of mandatory and purely-voluntary disclosure. In a 
more recent study, Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find a significant association between 
type of auditor and mandatory disclosure, but the results are not consistent among all 
models included in their study. Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find no significant 
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relationship between type of auditor and the extent of voluntary disclosure. Therefore, 
non-significance of type of auditor in explaining voluntary disclosure in this study is 
consistent with prior studies in Thailand. This finding supports the idea that voluntary 
disclosures of Thai listed companies do not differ between companies that use services of 
local or Big Four auditors. 
6.5.2 Financial Attributes 
The results from univariate and multivariate analyses show some association between 
profitability and the voluntary disclosure level. However, the sign of the coefficients 
associated with this variable did not provide a clear indication of the direction of the 
relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure. There seems to be no 
significant association between leverage and voluntary disclosure. 
6.5.2.1 Profitability 
Prior studies report mixed results for the relationships between profitability and corporate 
disclosure. Therefore, no expectation was formed regarding the direction of the 
association. The univariate and multivariate results show that there is some association of 
profitability with the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, the level of association 
tends to be small and the sign of the coefficients associated with this variable did not 
provide a clear indication of the direction of the relationship between profitability and 
voluntary disclosure. 
According to the capital market theoretical proposition, the inconsistent relationship 
between profitability and the extent of voluntary disclosure is possible. Companies may 
disclose more information voluntarily either when they have good news in order to attract 
investors or when they have bad news in order to inform investors of their financial 
status. It is also possible that companies voluntarily disclose other types of information as 
a way to draw attention from press and investors away from their bad performances. This 
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might explain the significant negative association (at the 5% level) between profitability 
and non-financial information disclosure in the pooled regression and the model after the 
financial crisis. 
The weak association between profitability and the level of disclosure, especially for 
financial information, is opposite to the expectation. This seems to contradict the 
signalling theory based hypothesis that companies with better performance are inclined to 
disclose additional information in order to signal their superior performance. 
Nonetheless, a number of prior studies also find that profitability is not significantly 
associated with the extent of disclosure in company annual reports (for example, Mcnally 
et al., 1982; Meek et al., 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Ho and Wong, 2001 a; Chau and Gray, 
2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Leventis and Weetman, 2006; Hossain and Taylor, 2007). 
With regard to the direction of the association between profitability and level of 
disclosure, previous studies show conflicting results. While some studies (for example, 
Tauringana, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998b; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Naser et al., 2002) 
find a positive relation, other studies (for example, Wallace and Naser, 1995; Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002) report a negative association. 
The finding of weak association between profitability and voluntary disclosure is 
consistent with prior studies on Thai listed companies. Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find 
a weak and inconsistent relationship between profitability and the extent of disclosure. 
Priebjrivat (1991) and Suphakasem (2008) find profitability as having no explanatory 
power on the disclosure of Thai listed companies. 
6.5.2.2 Leverage 
The results from both univariate and multivariate analyses indicate that there is no 
association between leverage and voluntary disclosure levels. Leverage is found to have 
no explanatory power, for either overall or specific categories of disclosure. This suggests 
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that gearing level is unlikely to influence company disclosure policy. A possible 
explanation for this finding could be the vital role of financial institutions, particularly 
banks, as the source of funding for business. Most Thai companies rely significantly on 
credit from banks, and companies tend to create their personal relationship and business 
networks with the banks (Thanapornpun, 2002). Therefore, information from company 
annual reports is unlikely to be a major source of information for the creditors, since they 
are able to obtain the required information directly from the companies. This could lessen 
the need to reduce agency costs of debt through voluntary disclosure. The result also 
implies that the role of corporate disclosure in raising capital of Thai listed companies has 
not been fully recognised by the management. 
The non-significance of leverage has been documented in prior studies (Chow and Wong- 
Boren, 1987; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Depoers, 
2000; Ho and Wong, 2001 a; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gul and Leung, 2004; Huafang 
and Jianguo, 2007). This is also consistent with previous studies in Thailand (Priebjrivat, 
1991; Suphakasem, 2008; Sutthachai and Cooke, 2009). 
6.53 Corporate Governance 
The existence of CEO/Chairman role duality is identified by both univariate and 
multivariate analyses as being significantly related to voluntary disclosure levels. 
However, foreign ownership and proportion of non-executive directors on the board are 
only significant in the univariate analysis and ownership concentration is not significant 
in either univariate or multivariate analyses. 
6.5.3.1 CEO/Chairman Role Duality 
In the Thai context, CEO/Chairman role duality is quite common among listed 
companies. Due to a family business background, many Chairmen and CEOs are 
members of families who owned such companies before listed on the SET. The 15 
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principles of good corporate governance issued by the SET in 2002 give listed companies 
freedom to combine or separate the roles of Chairmen and CEOs. In this study, 
CEO/Chairman role duality exists in the samples both before and after the 1997 financial 
crisis. 
The results from univariate and multivariate analyses tend to support strong significance 
for CEO duality in explaining variation in voluntary disclosures. CEO duality is 
consistently significant with a negative coefficient for all types of information disclosure. 
It is also significant in separate regression models for observations before and after the 
financial crisis. This implies that companies with CEO duality tend to have a lower level 
of voluntary disclosures. A significant and negative association between CEO duality and 
voluntary disclosure is also documented in prior study (Gul and Leung, 2004; Huafang 
and Jianguo, 2007). This result provides support for the agency theory based hypothesis 
that separation of the roles of CEOs and chairmen will help to enhance monitoring 
quality, which may consequently result in improvements in disclosure (Forker, 1992). 
Separation of the roles provides checks and balances mechanism over management 
performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), which could help to reduce agency costs. 
6.5.3.2 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
In Thailand, there are many listed companies in which directors and management came 
from families who owned these businesses before they were listed on the SET. Therefore, 
the role of independent non-executive director in monitoring activities is crucial. 
Furthermore, after the 1997 financial crisis, independent non-executive directors played 
an important role in regaining confidence from shareholders and investors. The 
independence of boards from management is consistent with the agency theory. It could 
help monitor management performance and limit managerial opportunism (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). 
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Results from univariate analysis show that the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board is significant at the I% level for all types of disclosure. The sign is 
positive, confirming the complementary effect between proportion of independent non- 
executive directors on the board and voluntary disclosure. However, this variable is not 
significant in the regression analysis. There seems to be no difference between the results 
for observations before and after the 1997 financial crisis; board independence is not 
significant in the regression models in both time periods. Despite the importance placed 
on independent directors as suggested in the 15 principles of good corporate governance, 
proportion of independent directors on the board does not seem to have much impact on 
voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies. The possible explanation for the lack of 
significance of board independence in this study could results from the effect of Thai 
culture which is relationship oriented. This exceptional characteristic might affect the 
'real' independence of non-executive directors. There is a possibility that controlling 
owners would appoint persons within their social connections of family, friends, 
classmates, and colleagues as non-executive directors. 
Significant positive association between proportion of independent non-executive 
directors and the extent of voluntary disclosures in annual reports has been documented 
in previous studies (Adams and Hossain, 1998; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Huafang and 
Jianguo, 2007). On the other hand, some previous studies (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and 
Leung, 2004; Barako et al., 2006) find support for substitutive relationship, which means 
that independent non-executive directors are a cost-efficient substitute for information 
disclosure. Non-significant association between the existence of independent non- 
executive directors and voluntary disclosures has also been reported in the empirical 
studies (for example, Ho and Wong, 2001a; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006). In the Thai context, there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of 
board independence in explaining corporate disclosures. With one exception is the study 
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by Suphakasem (2008) who finds a significant positive relationship between board 
independence and corporate governance disclosure of Thai listed companies. 
6.5.3.3 Ownership Concentration 
Ownership concentration is not significant in both univariate and multivariate analyses at 
both aggregated and disaggregated level, except for non-financial information disclosure 
where it is significant with a positive coefficient at the 5% level in the univariate analysis. 
The positive association contradicts the agency theory based hypothesis in that voluntary 
disclosure can help to reduce agency costs when shareholdings become more dispersed 
(Hossain et al., 1994). However, the significant positive association between ownership 
concentration and voluntary disclosure is consistent with the findings of Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) and Barako et al. (2006). 
For overall, strategic, and financial information disclosure, ownership concentration is 
found to have no explanatory power, in either the univariate or multivariate analysis. The 
results of insignificance of ownership concentration in explaining disclosure in annual 
reports are similar to those found in either developed (Lutfi, 1989; Depoers, 2000) or 
emerging capital markets (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
A possible reason for the weak association between ownership concentration and 
voluntary disclosure might be due to the measurement of ownership concentration. In 
some cases, the top ten shareholders acquired from the SET database may not reflect the 
real ownership concentration. Shareholding structures in many companies are quite 
complex. For example, a company could be owned by a number of corporate 
shareholders that have the same ultimate owner. In this case, ownership by the 
company's controlling shareholder applied in the analysis is likely to be underestimated. 
In the Thai context, Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) find that ownership concentration is not 
significantly related with the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, Priebjrivat 
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(1991) finds significant negative association between ownership concentration and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
6.5.3.4 Foreign Ownership 
Proportion of foreign shareholding seems to have a certain amount of influence on 
voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies. It is significant at the 1% level, with a 
positive coefficient for overall disclosure, as well as the three specific information 
categories in the univariate analysis. The multivariate results also indicate that there is a 
positive association between foreign ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
However, the level of association tends to be small and not significant at the 5% level. 
Previous studies report mixed results with respect to foreign ownership. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Barako et at (2006), and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) find significant 
positive association between voluntary disclosure and foreign ownership. This finding 
supports the argument that obtaining foreign funds results in a higher need for disclosure 
in order to monitor actions by management (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Generally, 
foreign shareholders would expect that the disclosure level of companies in which they 
have invested be at least comparable to the standard in their home country. On the 
contrary, Naser et al, (2002) find no significant association between foreign ownership 
and corporate information disclosures. The probable reason that could help explain the 
non-significant association between foreign ownership and level of disclosures is that 
foreign shareholders, who are mostly institutional investors, might obtain the information 
directly from the companies. Another possible reason might be the fact that foreign 
investors do not pay much attention to disclosures in annual reports, which are generally 
historical and untimely for decision making purposes. 
Although foreign ownership is the important characteristic of Thai business, it has not 
been included in prior corporate disclosure studies. The results from this study provide 
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support for the influence of foreign ownership on voluntary disclosure practices of Thai 
listed companies. It might be of interest to investigate this factor further in the Thai 
context in order to obtain more insightful information on the effect of foreign ownership 
on Thai business operations. 
6.5.4 The 1997 Financial Crisis 
The results generally show increases in voluntary disclosure levels after the 1997 
financial crisis. The univariate analysis result (Kruskal-Wallis test) shows that there is a 
highly significant difference (p=. 000) in the mean of voluntary disclosure scores among 
the four years. Similarly, the time factors (year dummy variables and crisis factor) 
provide the highest contribution to the regression models. The high-significance of time 
factors helps to explain the high value of adjusted R squared in most of regression models 
in this study. The results of specific information disclosures also confirm the significance 
of time factors in explaining strategic, non-financial, and financial disclosures. The time 
factors seem to have influence on voluntary disclosure even in the separate regressions 
for observations before and after the 1997 financial crisis. The finding of a higher level of 
voluntary disclosures after the financial crisis is consistent with Jaikengkit (2002), who 
discusses the development of Thai financial reporting and predicts that transparency and 
high quality of disclosure will be recognised and practiced by Thai listed companies. 
During the four years selected, the business environment in Thailand has changed 
dramatically, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The results provide support 
that financial reporting practice may follow these changes. Apart from the economic 
disturbance, which may have an impact on disclosure practices, improvement in 
voluntary disclosure could come from company response to several government 
initiatives that promote good corporate governance (see Section 3.6). In order to sustain 
their business during the crisis, companies themselves also use voluntary disclosure as a 
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way of communicating to the public and regaining confidence following the major 
financial crisis. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The results from univariate and multivariate analyses tend to support a strong 
significance of size, industry type, and CEO/Chairman role duality in explaining 
variation in voluntary disclosure. The results also suggest that variation in voluntary 
disclosure could be influenced, particularly from differences in time periods. The results 
generally show increases in voluntary disclosure levels after the 1997 financial crisis. 
Results between univariate and multivariate analyses are not materially different, except 
for those regarding proportion of non-executive directors on the board, foreign 
ownership, and profitability, which are found to be significant only in univariate analysis. 
Leverage, type of auditor, and ownership concentration do not show significant 
association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. In terms of the explanatory power of 
the model, the pooled regression for overall voluntary disclosure shows that variables 
included in the model are able to explain 61.2% of the variation in the voluntary 
disclosure level. The explanatory power of the regression models in this study seems to 
be higher than in prior studies. However, the adjusted R squared of these models may not 
be comparable to previous studies that selected data from the same time period because 
the regression models in this study contain the data of four different time periods and 
time factors seem to be the most influential factors in explaining variation in voluntary 
disclosures. The high value of adjusted R squared of the regression model incorporating 
data from different time period is consistent to the finding of Sutthachai and Cooke 
(2009) who find dramatic increase in the values of adjusted R squared after the year 
dummy variables were included in pooled regression models. Of the three specific 
categories of information, non-financial information is most explained, while financial 
information is the category least explained by the variables specified in the model. 
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Results on specific information disclosure tend to support those reported at the overall 
level. 
In summary, the univariate and multivariate results are significant in terms that they 
explain a significant part of variation in voluntary disclosure for both overall and specific 
information disclosures. The results also support the relative applicability of the 
disclosure theories, especially the agency theory in explaining variation in voluntary 
disclosure. However, the results indicate that part of the variation in voluntary disclosure 
of Thai listed companies has not been captured by the statistical models. This highlights 
the need to identify other factors influencing voluntary disclosure. Opinion from persons 
positioned to influence voluntary disclosure might help to identify other influencing 
factors. Therefore, the next chapter reports on the findings from interviews conducted 
with company management, auditors, bankers, investment analysts, and regulators. The 
information obtained from the interviews will be used to confirm results and enhance the 
interpretation of the quantitative analysis reported in this chapter. 
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Appendix 6-B: Kendall's rank correlations between continuous independent variables 
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'" correlation significant at the 14% level (2-tailed) 
' correlation significant at the 5% level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 6-C: Plots of the regression standardised residuals 
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
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Appendix 6-G: Model summary: Stepwise regression (pooled observations) 
Model incorporating year dummy variables as independent variables 
Model R R Ad 
.R Std. Error R change F change F statistic F value sig. 
1 0.533' 0.284 0.281 0.832 0.284 88.423 88.423 
. 
000 
2 0.659 0.434 0.429 0.741 0.150 58.965 85.185 
. 
000 
3 0.720` 0.518 0.512 0.685 0.084 38.635 79.296 
. 
000 
4 0.754 0.568 0.560 0.650 0.050 25.264 72.317 
. 
000 
5 0.769` 0.591 0.582 0.634 0.023 12.315 63.292 
. 
000 
6 0.776 0.602 0.591 0.627 0.011 6.019 54.956 
. 
000 
7 0.782' 0.612 0.599 0.621 0.010 5.511 48.867 
. 
000 
8 0.788 0.620 0.606 0.615 0.008 4.731 44.085 
. 
000 
' Predictors (Constant), Y2005 
b Predictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002 
Predictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002, SIZ 
d Predictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002, SIZ, CEO 
' Predictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002, SIZ, CEO, IND I 
rPredictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002, SIZ, CEO, IND1, IND4 
Predictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002, SIZ, CEO, INDI, IND4, IND2 
a Predictors (Constant), Y2005, Y2002, SIZ, CEO, IND1, IND4, IND2, FRN 
Model incorporating crisis factor as an independent variable 
Model R R Ad 
.R Std. Error R 
"change F change F statistic F value sig. 
1 0.621 0.386 0.383 0.770 0.386 140.253 140.253 
. 
000 
2 0.702 0.493 0.489 0.701 0.107 46.876 107.991 
. 
000 
3 0.736' 0.542 0.536 0.668 0.049 23.676 87.240 
. 
000 
4 0.751 0.564 0.556 0.653 0.022 10.990 71.135 
. 
000 
5 0.757' 0.573 0.563 0.648 0.009 4.388 58.662 
. 
000 
6 0.763' 0.582 0.571 0.643 0.010 5.052 50.632 
. 
000 
' Predictors (Constant), CRISIS 
b Predictors (Constant), CRISIS, SIZ 
Predictors (Constant), CRISIS, SIZ, CEO 
d Predictors (Constant), CRISIS, SIZ, CEO, INDI 
' Predictors (Constant), CRISIS, SIZ, CEO, INDI, IND4 
Predictors (Constant), CRISIS, SIZ, CEO, INDI, IND4, IND2 
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CHAPTER 7 
Perceptions of Interviewees: Issues Related to Voluntary Disclosure 
7.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the perceptions of persons positioned to 
influence voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies. This chapter answers research 
question 4 which is as follows 
Research Question 4: What are the perceptions of persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure on issues related to voluntary disclosure, and 
how does interview research help to validate and complement 
statistical results? 
An interview study was conducted in order to gain further insight into factors influencing 
voluntary disclosures and investigate other factors not easily captured from quantitative 
analysis. Information obtained from the interview is used to confirm the results and 
enhance the interpretation of findings from quantitative analysis. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 7.2, the interview respondents' views on 
voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies are discussed. Section 7.3 provides 
discussion on the role and importance of annual reports as perceived by the interview 
respondents. Section 7.4 summarises views of the interviewees regarding perceived 
benefits and costs, and credibility of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Perception of 
voluntary disclosure by categories of information is also discussed. Alternative channels of 
voluntary disclosure are discussed in section 7.5. Section 7.6 covers factors influencing 
voluntary disclosure as perceived by the interview respondents. Finally, a conclusion is 
provided in section 7.7. 
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7.2 Voluntary Disclosure of Thai Listed Companies: Respondents' Views 
The interview respondents mainly suggested that substantial improvements have been 
made in the voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies. The 1997 financial crisis is an 
important reason for this change. The crisis revealed a number of significant weaknesses in 
the Thai financial and business sectors. Majority of interview respondents agreed that a 
lack of good corporate governance was the most significant factor contributing to the 
financial crisis. After the crisis, governance has been improved in the public and corporate 
sectors, with transparency and accountability being strengthened. 
"I feel that there has been significant change in corporate governance as well as 
corporate disclosure after the financial crisis. Before the crisis, the concept of 
good CG was not widely known among the general public; even significant 
players like management, shareholders, and stakeholders were not aware of the 
term. Soon after the outbreak of the crisis, the concept of good CG was was 
widely promoted The public has been gradually educated about corporate 
governance and its importance to the Thai economy. " [R3] 
Most companies have paid more attention to the corporate governance issue in order to 
restore investors' confidence. This results in significant enhancement of corporate 
disclosure. Investment analysts highlighted that: 
"More transparent in corporate sectors helps stimulate capital inflows to 
Thailand so that the business can survive after the financial crisis. Therefore, I 
think the economic disturbance definitely had an impact on disclosure 
practices. " [I I] 
"Since the crisis, there has been a dramatic increase in the influence of 
institutional investors; they are taking a more active role in demanding better 
disclosures from companies 
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.... 
actually I feel that most companies disclose too much; some things they don't 
have to disclose, but they disclose. I think we've moved from the era of very low 
disclosure to too much disclosure! " [I2] 
Although law and regulations are main forces behind corporate disclosure policies, 
regulators believed that enforcement alone is not enough to create changes in quality of 
disclosures; good understanding and a feeling of acceptance of the benefits of disclosure 
from companies are more important. Nonetheless, further regulations to enhance the 
uniformity and comparability of financial reporting are still needed for Thai listed 
companies. Regulators also agreed that most companies have re-structured their disclosure 
practice to an acceptable level. However, more educating, training, and open discussions 
from the professional bodies are still needed. In the view of the preparers, the majority of 
management and auditors suggested that there are already too many regulatory 
requirements and some of them are not practical for a number of companies. By allowing 
companies to disclose certain types of informatics voluntarily, disclosure practice could 
become more flexible and logical Management commented that: 
"I think the rules and regulations for financial reporting are already enough. 
The more important issue is how the preparers understand and interpret the 
regulations, which are very abstract in some area, and some people tend to take 
advantage ofthat. " [LI] 
"Some smaller or low performing companies are not quite ready for a big 
transformation. Instead of announcing more regulations, the government should 
encourage corporate sectors to participate in the development of financial 
reporting by providing rewards or benefits such as tax benefit to companies with 
outstanding performance. " [L4] 
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The interview respondents pointed out possible factors that may delay the improvement in 
corporate governance and financial reporting in Thailand. An audit partner identified 
cultural factor as the obstacle in the development of good corporate governance: 
"Thai culture gives too much respect for others, sometimes we need to learn to 
speak for our rights. Many audit committees are just 'rubber stamp committees 
They cannot help monitor management and family owners because they tend to 
be considerate and respect of the owner's decision" [Al] 
A regulator expressed her view on managemert perception regarding the importance of 
financial reporting: 
"Management has not considered financial reporting as an important tool in 
managing its business. This ignorance arises due to the characteristic of the Thai 
financial system The role of financial reporting in reducing the cost of capital is 
not recognised by management " [R I] 
Lack of education seems to be another important obstacle in corporate governance and 
financial reporting development. The majority of interview respondents agreed that most 
staff at every level, from the operational staff to management and audit committees, do not 
understand their duties and how to work on good corporate governance. Therefore, there is 
a need to educate all staff to improve their performance and understand their 
responsibilities better. Continuous courses to keep knowledge up-to-date are very 
important. The SET, SEC, Institute of Directors Association (IOD), and professional 
associations should be responsible for providing educational programmes. 
Regulators and auditors expressed their concern about continuity of the development 
process. They agreed that the improvements in financial reporting practices may not 
continue after the economy has fully recovered. A regulator commented that: 
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"Despite all achievements in the corporate governance reformation, 
considerable doubt exists as to the capability of maintaining the momentum. Thai 
people tend to forget things easily. It is essential to continue to educate 
companies and the public on the importance and benefit of good corporate 
governance. " [R2] 
In summary, corporate disclosures of Thai listed companies have shown good signs of 
improvement after the 1997 financial crisis. Lessons learned from the crisis have led to 
several measures of improvement in accountability of management, and enhancement of 
corporate transparency, and strengthened minority shareholder rights. However, there is 
room for companies to improve in order to be comparable with the international practices. 
The development of regulations should be conducted carefully by taking into account the 
information needs, whilst maintaining flexibility for the preparers. 
7.3 The Role and Importance of Annual Reports as Perceived by Interview 
Respondents 
This section reports perceptions of the interview respondents on the role and importance of 
annual reports of listed companies. The first question in the interview with the management 
of seven listed companies concerned the objectives of their annual reports. Table 7-2 
summarises the objectives of the annual report given by the management. It was obvious 
from the responses that the primary objective of the annual report is fulfilling regulatory 
requirements. A vice president of a property development company said, "... what we are 
doing is basically to comply with the SEC's regulations. The annual report is more of a 
formal requirement... " [L6]. Apart from complying with the regulatory requirements, a 
CFO of an automotive company suggested that annual reports provide a good summary of 
a company's past events and future plans: 
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"... although we release information through different types of media throughout 
the year, the annual report gives a summary of what happened in the past year. 
Users can see the whole picture of our company, not just small and scattered 
pieces of news. In addition ; annual reports also provide some of the future plans 
which is very important for the users. " [L 1] 
Table 7-2 Objectives of annual reports: views from listed companies 
Objectives of annual reports Ll L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 
To meet regulatory requirements        7 
Means of communication to investors/shareholders      5 
Summary of company information for the past year   2 
To reflect a good image of a company   2 
To promote Rood corporate governance of a company   2 
To provide information for prospective investors      5 
To rovide information n for creditorsbankers   2 
Two of the management interviewed suggested that annual reports can be used as a public 
relations tool in order to create a good impression to the public. A Chairman/CEO of an 
agricultural company added that annual reports can help in promoting good corporate 
governance so that the company can be seen as transparently governed. The respondents 
also stressed that annual reports have an important role as a way to communicate to 
shareholders and prospective investors. The majority of management (5 out of 7) regarded 
shareholders and prospective investors as the target audiences of annual reports; creditors, 
bankers and the general public are also mentioned by some of the management. An 
investor relations manager of a health care company viewed that the target audiences of the 
annual report are mainly prospective investors, because annual reports provide only basic 
information that helps in understanding the company. Whereas, the CFO of an automotive 
company expressed different views, he commented that: "There is a wide variety of annual 
report users with different information needs. It is the company's important task to sort the 
users in order of priorityand provide appropriate information for each group... ', [L I]. 
Apart from the responses from listed companies discussed above, regulators also expressed 
their views about the role and importance of annual reports. One of them expressed the 
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view that the annual report is very important because "... it is the only direct medium of 
communication from the company to all of the shareholders. It also helps stakeholders to 
understand the company and minimise misinterpretation of facts. " [R3]. Another regulator 
pointed out an additional role of the annual report in monitoring company management: 
"... shareholders can evaluate company management by verifying the information 
that has been previously published in annual reports. This role is very important 
because it is the confirmation of things that the management has claimed for. It 
also helps assure the shareholders that the management is acting in their best 
interests. "[R2] 
Both of the bankers interviewed also confirmed the importance of information in annual 
reports: 
"Information in annual reports is very important for our analysis. Generally, 
when companies come to us, our first step is to look at their annual reports. We 
learn a lot about the companies by reading their annual reports. We not only 
look for financial and operational performance, but also the company's 
background and chairman's statement, which are also very important. " [B 1] 
"Annual reports are very useful for us. We can use information in annual reports 
to juste the projections and forecasts that companies prepare for us. " [B2] 
For the investment analysts, annual reports seemed to be a good source of information in 
the early stage of their analysis: 
"Although I need more detailed information, annual reports are good source of 
company background Information on annual reports is very useful for me when I 
start my research and also it-lien I need an official reference in my research " 
[13] 
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An auditor expressed a different view that the use of annual reports is limited to financial 
analysts and institutional investors, and minority investors generally do not pay much 
attention to the information in annual reports: 
"... 1 am not sure that additional disclosure in annual reports is necessary, only 
financial analysts would benefit from this, minority and small shareholders 
couldn't care less; as they are only interested in the dividends. " [A4] 
In summary, the company management interviewed all agreed on the importance of annual 
reports. The annual report not only fulfils the regulatory requirements, but also serves 
many useful purposes for both listed companies and stakeholders. The users mainly 
suggested that an annual report is a useful source of information. However, the importance 
of annual reports may vary among different types of users. 
7.4 Vicim on Voluntary Disclosures in Annual Reports 
The following sections discuss perceptions of the interview respondents on voluntary 
disclosures in annual reports. Views of the respondents on perceived benefits and costs of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports are reported in section 7.4.1. Next, the issue of 
credibility of voluntary disclosure in annual reports is discussed in section 7.4.2. 
Perceptions of different categories of information voluntarily disclosed in annual reports 
(financial, strategic, and non-financial and CSR information) are presented in section 7.4.3, 
as are respondents' opinions on the important themes of information that companies should 
disclose voluntarily. 
7.4.1 Perceived Benefits and Costs of Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports 
Overall, the interviewees suggested that cost-benefit analysis plays the most important role 
in voluntary disclosure. Basically, companies would decide to disclose additional 
information when perceiving that the benefits from disclosure outweigh the costs of 
providing such information. A regulator commented that: 
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"Generally, the disclosto-es in annual reports are more on mandatory 
information. The list of mandatory items from the SEC already covers almost 
everything. Companies may disclose additional information voluntarily only 
when they perceive that there are benefits associated with that disclosure. " [R3] 
Table 7-3 summarises the interviewees' response with regard to their perception of benefits 
of voluntary disclosure. Perception of the interviewees on constraints and cost of voluntary 
disclosure is reported in Table 7-4. While the most frequently cited benefits were improved 
company image (12 out of 20), attraction of prospective investors (8 out of 20), and 
improved accountability to shareholders (8 out of 20), the major constraints were 
competitive disadvantages (18 out of 20). 
Table7-3: Perceptions of benefits of voluntary disclosure 
Benefits of voluntary disclosure Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
(3) 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
Improve company image/PR exercise 5 2 2 1 2 12 
Attract investors/lower cost of capital 2 
- 
1 3 2 8 
Improved accountability to 
shareholders 
4 2 
- 
1 1 8 
International comparability 2 2 1 2 7 
Promote good corporate governance 3 1 
- - 
1 5 
Accountability to society I 
- - - 
1 2 
The majority of interviewees agreed that high quality of disclosure will boost company 
image and build people's confidence in the company. A Chairman/CEO claimed "... it can 
be long-term marketing of a company. " [L4]. This view is shared by an investment analyst 
who said "... high standard of disclosure can enhance companies' market value in the long 
run. " [I1]. The respondents mainly suggested that development in capital markets has 
influenced the way companies disclose information. There is intense competition in the 
international funding. International capital providers are having high demands for 
information. Companies that depend on an international source of finance have to make 
sure that the information they provide is comparable to their overseas rivals. Voluntary 
disclosure can help companies to attract potential investors in this modem market 
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environment. A regulator suggested that "... not enough information provided by 
companies can result in high cost of capital " [R3]. However, another regulator expressed a 
different view. She felt that there are still a number of Thai listed companies that do not 
need external funding. This could result in lack of motivation in voluntary disclosure: 
"Although the orientation of companies towards the international market is 
important, there are quite a number of Thai listed companies that have no 
intention to raise funds in the market. They listed in the SETfor other objectives 
such as to get tar benefits. These companies have a lack of motivation in 
voluntary disclosure. " [R2] 
With respect to constraints and costs of voluntary disclosure, the interviewees pointed out 
that competitive disadvantages (18 out of 20), company's image (11 out of 20), litigation 
issues (10 out of 20), and cost of information preparation (7 out of 20) are major 
constraints (see Table 7-4). 
Table 7-4: Perceptions on constraints and costs of voluntary disclosure 
Constraints and costs of voluntary 
disclosure 
Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
3 
Regulators 
3 
Total 
20 
Competitive disadvantages 7 5 1 2 3 18 
Negative information may damage 
company image 
4 2 1 2 2 11 
Litigation issues 3 2 1 1 3 10 
Cost of gathering/processing/ 
disseminatine information 
2 2 1 2 7 
Competitive disadvantage was perceived to be the most important constraint on voluntary 
disclosure. In particular, the views of management are very intense. Competitors' reactions 
are the main reason mentioned. Costly items perceived by the interview respondents are 
narrowly defined segment information, strategy in a specific area, technical know-how, 
trade secrets, cost factors and forward-looking information. 
A vice president of a property development company stressed that providing too much 
detail on company strategy could put the firm at risk: 
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"Although strategic information is very useful, we may not be able to disclose 
too much detail of our financial and marketing strategy. The strategy that we feel 
comfortable to disclose is basic strategy in handling changes in our industry and 
general discussion of our future plans. It's too risky and not worth disclosing 
detailed strategy and trade secrets to the publ ic. " [L6]. 
A regulator expressed different views on the issue of competitive disadvantages: 
"... I don't think that companies will lose competitive advantages by disclosing 
additional information in annual reports. There are less and less secrets in the 
industries in the current competitive environment. Competitors are not going to 
wait for annual reports, as there are many other ways they could get the 
information they need especially in the case of our country, where most of the 
technical know-how is importedfrom abroad " [R2] 
With regard to the disclosure of segment information, regulators seemed to agree with 
listed companies about constraints on the disclosure of segment information: 
"Thai companies are so different from developed countries in terms of scale of 
business. Most of listed companies in developed countries have very complex 
business segments, for example, some companies can have petrochemicals, 
weapons. and household products as their business segments. While many Thai 
listed companies have a very narrow line of business with only a few major 
customers. Providing segment information would cause such companies 
competitive dsad vantage. " [RI ] 
Apart from the constraints and costs of voluntary disclosure discussed above, good 
understanding of the benefits that companies would gain from the disclosure seemed to be 
another important issue. A regulator stressed that there is considerable misunderstanding 
among Thai listed companies about the benefits of voluntary disclosure "... some 
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companies are not aware of the benefits they would gain from voluntary disclosure. They 
feel that voluntary disclosures are nothing but companies' expenses. Understanding the 
benefits companies would gain from voluntary disclosure is very inportant. " [R2] 
7.4.2 Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports 
In general, the interview respondents seemed to be satisfied with the credibility of 
voluntary disclosures in annual reports. The majority of them stated that most companies 
report reliable and credible information in their annual reports. It can be seen from Table 7- 
5 that half of the interviewees agreed that voluntary disclosures in annual reports have high 
credibility, while the other half perceived that there is moderate credibility. None of the 
interviewees felt that voluntary disclosures in annual reports are low in credibility. 
Table 7-5: Perceptions on credibility of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
Credibility of 
voluntary disclosure 
Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
(3) 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
High 5 3 
- 
1 1 10 
Moderate 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Low 
- - - 
- - - 
The majority of management interviewed had confidence in the credibility of information 
their companies disclose: 
"It is eery important that the information we disclose in our annual reports is 
accurate and comprehensive. " [L6] 
"Reliability of information is our first priority because the annual report is 
solely our responsibility. We never disclose any information that we are not 
100"% confident [about]. " [L I] 
"Our financial statement is audited by a Big Four audit firm. We also pay very 
much attention to the correctness of the other parts of the annual report. Both the 
management and board of director have to approve the annual report before 
publishing " [L2] 
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The annual report is an official document and there is a wide variety of users. The majority 
of company management shared the same view that disclosing inaccurate information 
would damage a company's reputation. Also, companies would lose all benefits from 
additional disclosure if the information they disclose is not credible. The regulators also 
stressed that the penalty, which might be incurred, is another factor affecting the credibility 
of information disclosed by listed companies. "... some companies might overstate some 
information but they are not likely to disclose totally untrue information. They are aware of 
the penalty that might be incurred " [R3] 
An investment analyst who followed the same listed companies for quite a long time shared 
the same view: 
"Companies that are dishonest about their disclosure will definitely suffer the 
consequences. I believe that the credibility of disclosure will be verified by the 
market after all. All the companies I encountered are credible enough. I know 
most of the management of companies I'm dealing with I have been following 
these companies for years. I don't see any reason for them to start lying. " [12] 
Overall, regulators seemed to be satisfied with the credibility of voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports. They agreed that there are only a minority of companies that disclose 
inaccurate information. A regulator from the SEC stated that the credibility of the 
disclosures in annual reports is at a satisfactory level: 
"Generally, I xnuld say it [disclosrre in annual reports] is quite credible. I think 
90% of information is correct The other 10% is mainly human error, which 
wouldn 7 affect the investment decision very much.. " [RI ] 
On the other hand, another regulator, who is an accounting standard committee, expressed 
some concern about credibility of the information disclosed by some listed companies: 
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"I think there is still an issue regarding credibility of information disclosed by 
listed companies. Although a majority of companies are quite reliable, some 
companies are still providing inaccurate information. Some companies did it 
intentionally because they wanted to boost the share price. On the other hand, 
some companies, mainly small or newly listed unintentionally disclose wrong 
information. " [R2] 
Apart from companies themselves, the interview respondents agreed with the importance of 
auditors in the credibility of information disclosed by companies. A regulator egressed the 
view that: 
"The biggest and most important part of an annual report is the financial 
statement. In my opinion, the credibility of corporate disclosures depends 
substantially on the audit process. If the financial statement is audited by a 
trustworthy third party, the annual report would be a reliable source of 
information in the eyes of the public. " [R3] 
However, a partner of a local audit firm expressed her concern about the accuracy of 
information in other parts of annual reports. 
Most of the time, we do not have a chance to see a draft of the whole annual 
report of my client companies. The companies always send a copy to me 
afterwards. Sometimes, there are mistakes in the accounting information that 
companies referred to in the parts outside the financial statements. Anyway, most 
of them are not serious mistakes... " [A4] 
In this aspect, a change in procedure for preparing annual reports, by providing auditors 
with a whole draft, could help to improve the way auditors contribute to the credibility of 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
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7.43 Perceptions of Voluntary Disclosure Categories 
It can be seen from Table 7-6 that financial information was perceived by a majority of 
interviewees (16 out of 20) as the most important category of information. Nonetheless, 
three interviewees regarded strategy information as the most important, while one 
perceived non-financial and CSR information to have most importarge. 
Table 7-6: Perceptions on the importance of voluntary disclosure categories 
Voluntary disclosure 
categories 
Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
(3) 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
Financial 5 5 2 2 2 16 
Strategic I 
- - 
1 1 3 
Non-financial and CSR I 
- - - - 
I 
A director of an electronic component manufacturer and a senior manager of a Big Four 
audit firm shared the same viewon the importance of financial information: 
"I think the majority of readers want to know the company's performance. They 
are also interested in the company's strategies, but I don't think they would care 
much about the company's social activities. "[L3] 
"... financial information is more of a fact that is measurable. We never know 
whether companies actually did what they claimed in their strategies and social 
coniributionr. " [A3] 
The users of annual reports, bankers and investment analysts, also placed the importance 
on financial information. It can be seen from Table 7-6 that 4 out of 5 bankers and 
investment analysts interviewed gave priority to financial information. An investment 
analyst pointed out that: 
"My investors are only interested in numbers and strategies that will affect the 
numbers. Unfortunately, we do not pay a lot of attention to CSR, we only care 
about how things affect the stock prices. However, we have our minimum 
assumption that companies we invest in have good corporate governance. " [12] 
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Some of the interviewees gave priority to the disclosure of strategic information. They 
mainly suggested that financial figures are the reflection of company strategies. Therefore, 
strategies are the most important factors in controlling company performance. A CFO of an 
automotive company suggested that: 
"I pay more attention to strategic information. I want the reader to see the 
company like I do. I want them to have the whole picture of the company's 
growth and future, which results from the company's strategies. When we have 
certain opportunities, we need good strategies to be able to handle different 
kinds of risks. Good strategies will boost investors' confidence and will 
eventually lead to good financial figures. Numbers are just a reflection of 
strategies. " [L IJ 
A regulator shared the same view: 
"I am more interested in strategic information It helps readers to know 
companies' direction Financial information is also important, but it's more of a 
history. It's the outcome ofpast strategies. For the social information, we can't 
see how it's going to affect the share prices. There are difficulties in ascertaining 
how much social contribution could turn into share price value. This could make 
companies less enthusiastic in performing social activities. " [R2] 
Companies seem to place least importance on the non-financial and CSR information 
category. A Chairman/CEO of agricultural company was only management to place 
importance on the disclosure of social information: 
"Social responsibility is the selling point of our company. As a pioneer in 
cassava plantation, we have done a lot of research and tried to spread the 
knowledge to the farmer. When global warming became an issue, we tried our 
best to find a way to alleviate the situation. " [L4] 
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Type of business seemed to be an important factor that influences the disclosure of non- 
financial and CSR information. A regulator viewed that companies that their activities are 
related to environment tend to pay more attertion to the social responsibility disclosure: 
"The business operations of some companies might damage the environment. 
These companies tend to disclose their social responsibilities to the public to 
reduce the pressures fom the government and environmentalists. " [R3] 
Cost-benefit, once again, seemed to be the most important factor affecting company 
decision in the type of information they are going to disclose. A director of an electrical 
component manufacturer viewed that companies that perform a lot of social activities will 
also disclose this information. The reason for a low level of non-financial and CSR 
information disclosure could be due to the fact that companies do not engage in social 
activities: 
"If companies made any kind of social contributions, they would definitely 
inform the public. It will only give them a positive image. Large companies with 
a lot of budget surplus are able to contribute, while smaller companies have to 
focus on profit making. " [L3] 
The responses lean towards the idea that only large companies, which achieved their level 
of profit maximisation, are able to engage in social activities. A vice president of a property 
development company tended to belief that social responsibility is more of a cost to their 
companies: 
"... social contribution is not the main objective for listed companies, otherwise 
there would be a foundation listed in the SET. Investors only care about their 
returns. Companies might consider giving back to the society when they achieve 
their level of profit maximisation. " [L6] 
228 
An auditor shared the same view: 
"Most of the companies in the SET are still at the stage of profit maximisation, 
only a few have reached the level that they can afford to pay back to the society. I 
think in the short future, there could be more companies that achieve their profit 
maximisation objective and are ready to contribute to the society. " [A2] 
Table 7-7 presents the view from interview respondents regarding the themes of 
information that companies should voluntarily disclose. The majority of regulators, 
auditors, bankers and investment analysts agreed that they wanted to see listed companies 
disclose more forward-looking information. Information about future prospects of a 
company is very beneficial for all stakeholders. However, obstacles in providing forward- 
looking information were raised by listed companies. Competitive disadvantages, once 
again, were mentioned as a major constraint. In addition, listed companies seemed to be 
worried about not being able to meet investors' expectations. The litigation issue is also a 
factor mentioned by both listed companies and regulators. Another concern was that 
premature disclosure of operating performance is also against the SEC regulations. 
Table 7-7: Important themes of information that companies should disclose voluntarily: views 
from interview respondents 
Themes of Information Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
(3) 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
Future prospects 3 3 2 3 3 14 
Operational statistics 4 3 2 2 2 13 
Litigation issues 2 2 2 1 2 9 
Environmental&social information 2 2 1 2 2 9 
Human resources information 1 1 
- - 
2 4 
Both listed companies and users agreed with the importance of operational statistics 
information. The majority of listed companies responded that they would be willing to 
provide additional information in this area, if it will be beneficial for the users. An 
investment analyst also mentioned that Thai listed companies are quite good at providing 
operational statistics when compared to other listed companies in the region: 
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"... in Thailand the level of disclosure is actually quite good They also release 
information on operational statistics, not just financial statistic4 which is very 
helpful. I find the levels of disclosures here quite ok when compared to other 
countries I encounter. " [12] 
Because companies can decide by themselves whether to disclose additional information or 
not, it was obvious from the responses that the majority of voluntary disclosures tended to 
be good news: 
"For voluntary disclosure, we tend to focus on positive information. It is 
common sense, everybody wants to spread good news and keep bad news to 
themselves. Voluntary disclosures are supposed to be a PR tool. " [L3] 
A regulator commented that companies tend to find a way of drawing attention to good 
news: 
"... It's not all about giving positive information. It's more of a way of drawing 
attention to good news. Sensitive information is communicated differently. For 
ex=ple, when the profit is low, companies might focus on other positive figures 
such as the cashflow insteal " [R2] 
7.5 Alternative Channels of Voluntary Disclosure 
Overall, the respondents agreed that the annual report is a very important source of 
information Nonetheless, other forms of communication were also regarded as important 
for market participants. A major limitation of annual reports is that they may not provide 
up-to-date information when compared to other channels such as newspapers and company 
websites. Therefore, companies may have to choose the most effective channels to 
disseminate their information. Table 7-8 presents other forms of corporate communication 
used by the listed companies interviewed. 
230 
Table 7-8: Other forms of corporate communication used by the listed companies interviewed 
Forms of communication Ll L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 
Announcement to the SET     4 
Press release     4 
Analyst briefings, private discussions    3 
Investor relations unit    3 
Corporate brochurestnewsletters  
 
 3 
Corporate website    3 
Company visit  
lt seemed like a variety of communication channels were being used by listed companies. 
Companies tended to choose disclosure channels that rapidly approach their target 
audiences: 
"WW'e try to choose the disclosure channels that suit the type of information we 
are going to disclose best. Some channels are more effective in terms of target 
audiences as well as the perceived costs and benefit. For example, when we have 
good news, we want the public to know about it as quickly as possible. Therefore, 
we tend to choose newspapers as a media because it's more direct to the 
audience. " [Li ] 
"IVe use different channels of communication because we have different target 
audiences The annual report is a direct communication to the shareholders, 
while the commwrication from our investor relations unit is targeted to potential 
im-estors. For positive information of our company, which we want the public to 
know about, we tend to use newspaper announcement as it hits a wider 
audience. " [L5] 
Although the Internet is widely used in everyday life, listed companies seemed to have 
different views regarding its use for corporate communication. Some companies tend to 
give priority to their websites. On the other hand, some companies did not see much benefit 
from the disclosure of company information through the Internet. A CFO of an automotive 
company viewed that company website is a passive communication: 
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"I think people that are going to view our website must be those who already 
know our company. Therefore, the website is a kind of passive communication. " 
[L1) 
Bankers and investment analysts seemed to be persons who have a relatively high demand 
for information, when compared to other market participants. Most of them responded that 
they use annual reports in the first step of their analysis. Their major concern about the use 
of information in annual reports is that it is not very up-to-date. The investment analysts 
interviewed tended to make more use of information from companies' quarterly reports, 
even though financial statements in quarterly reports are unaudited: 
"... the most important thing for my job is timeliness, the sooner the better. An 
annual report is detailed and more credible but it's backward-looking. I already 
have most of the information in the quarterly reports. " [I3] 
"... future prospects information is the most important information for our 
investment decision Unfortunately, most of the information in annual reports is 
history rather than the future. Therefore, we can only make use of it as a 
supporting document. " [I2] 
Some of the bankers and investment analysts interviewed have been dealing with listed 
companies for a considerable length of time and have created a good relationship with the 
companies. Therefore, they may be able to obtain privileged information through private 
discussions with certain companies. In this case, annual reports seemed to be less 
important. An investment analyst claimed that although she has private access to company 
information, the information she received is not beyond the boundaries of the regulations: 
".. companies are very professional, they won't give you information that they are not 
ready to release to the public. No insider or advanced privileged information is given. " 
[12] 
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Although various forms of communication are being used, auditors expressed their concern 
about the credibility of other forms of corporate communication. They stated that the 
information companies disclose through other media may not be properly verified for 
correctness. A director of a Big Four audit firm viewed that: "... information like a press 
release or company newsletter is not detailed enough for decision making. I still believe 
that information in the annual report is most detailed and should be most beneficial for 
users. " [A2] 
7.6 Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure 
Overall, the interview respondents suggested that various complex factors influence 
voluntary disclosure decisions. Disclosure behaviour seems to be more complicated than it 
was previously assumed by the quantitative analysis. Additional factors, which were not 
included in the statistical models such as quality of staff and management, institutional 
characteristics, and efficiency of company information systems were brought up by the 
interviewees. Table 7-9 summarises interview responses regarding factors influencing 
voluntary disclosure. 
Table 7-9: Perceptions on factors influencing voluntary disclosure: views from interview 
respondents 
Factors Influencing voluntary 
disclosure 
Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
(3) 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
Size 5 3 2 2 3 15 
Profitability 3 2 2 2 1 10 
Leverage 2 2 1 1 1 7 
Industry type 3 3 2 2 2 12 
Auditor 3 2 1 1 2 9 
Ownership structure 3 2 2 2 2 11 
International financing 4 3 1 3 3 14 
Listing age 3 1 - 1 1 6 
Management accountabili 3 3 1 2 2 11 
Governance structure 3 2 1 2 2 10 
Competitiveness 4 2 
- 
3 2 11 
Demand from stakeholders 3 2 1 2 2 10 
Efficiency of company 
information systems 
2 2 
- - 
1 5 
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Following sections discussed the interview responses in respect of each factor influencing 
voluntary disclosure practice. 
7.6.1 Size 
Most of the respondents viewed company size as an important factor that drives voluntary 
disclosure. However, different explanations for the significance of size were provided. This 
can be seen in Table 7-10. The interviewees mainly suggested that large companies usually 
have more institutional shareholders, who have a higher demand for information. 
Therefore, these companies may have to provide additional information to fulfil the 
demands of professional investors. At the same time, additional disclosure can help 
companies attract potential investors. On the other hand, smaller companies with a lower 
proportion of outsiders' interest may not be able to appreciate the potential benefits of 
voluntary disclosures. 
Table 7-10: Company size: views from interview respondents 
Views from interview respondents Listed co. Auditors Bankers Analysts Regulators Total (7) (5) (2) 3 (3) 20 
Large companies have enough 4 3 1 2 3 13 
resources to implement 
Higher business complexity for large 3 4 1 1 2 11 
companies 
Lower proportion of outsiders' 4 2 1 2 2 11 
interest for small companies 
Higher ex ion from stakeholders 3 2 1 2 2 10 
Better eovernance structure 2 1 - 1 2 6 
Six interviewees shared the view that large companies tend to have a better governance 
structure because of the public expectation. This could result in better quality of disclosure. 
Another reason given by the majority of interviewees (13 out of 20) as being an important 
factor influencing voluntary disclosure is the readiness of large companies in terms of 
resources and know-how. Generally, large companies are more informative and tend to 
have proper records, most of information is probably already in their database. In addition, 
they are able to invest in high-quality personnel. Although most of the interview 
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respondents agreed that company size drives the extent of disclosure, some of them 
expressed different views. A regulator suggested that: 
"... there are also some listed companies that are relatively big, but they do not 
rely on external funding. These companies may not disclose much additional 
information because there is nn pressure. " [R2] 
A director of an electronic component manufacturer commented that: "... it's not 
necessarily related to company size. 1 think companies' reputation, quality of management 
and types of shareholders cue more important factors. " [L3] 
In conclusion, the majority of interview responses support the positive association of 
company size on voluntary disclosure. This is consistent with the univariate and 
multivariate results discussed earlier in Chapter 6 (see section 6.5.1.1). The interview 
findings also suggest the capital need theory as an explanation for large companies to 
disclose more voluntary information. 
7.6.2 International Financing 
Apart from company size, the interviewees frequently cited international financing as an 
important factor influencing voluntary disclosure practice. They mainly suggested that 
reliance on international financing makes companies feel that they need to disclose 
additional information to satisfy the requirements of overseas capital providers. Foreign 
investors seem to be satisfied with companies that provide high quality of disclosure, and 
they pay more attention to these companies. In addition, companies also have to make sure 
that the information they disclose is comparable to their overseas rivals. This view is 
shared by an investment analyst who commented that: 
"... if companies still is-ant to attract foreign investors, they must have minimum 
levels of disclosure that are acceptable in the investment community. Thai 
companies have to compare themselves among other companies in the region. 
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They need to benchmark themselves against the best practice. Investors are not 
only interested in Thai companies. But if they are small and closely held 
companies with no need for overseas funding, what do they care? " [12] 
The interviewees' perception regarding the importance of international financing in 
explaining variation in voluntary disclosure practice is consistent with the significance of 
foreign ownership in univariate and multivariate analyses discussed in Chapter 6 (see 
section 6.5.3.4). This could also suggest relevance of capital need theory in explaining 
voluntary disclosure practice. 
7.63 Ownership Structure 
The interview respondents appeared to hold the view that closely held or family-based 
companies arc usually secretive and tend to protect their own interests. These companies do 
not have much interest in attracting potential investors, so they are not under pressure to 
disclose additional information In addition, when ownership and management coincide, 
companies seem to be less transparently governed and have less professional involvement. 
Although the majority of the interviewees suggested that closely held companies tend to 
have a lower level of voluntary disclosure, the results from statistical analysis did not show 
a strong association between ownership concentration and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure (sec section 6.53.3). 
Table 7-11: Family businessestclosety held companies: views from interview respondents 
Views from Interview respondents Listed co. (7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
(3) 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
Ownership and manaeement coincide 3 3 1 I 3 11 
Lack of fessional involvement 2 3 1 2 2 10 
Tend to tect their own interests 2 2 1 1 1 7 
Lower proportion of outsiders' 
interestlnstitutional investors 
2 2 
- 
2 2 8 
No intention to raise funds in the 
market 
1 2 
- 
2 2 7 
A director of an electronic component manufacturer viewed that there seemed to be higher 
levels of disclosure in companies that are controlled by the government, due to higher 
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degrees of public accountability. This view could be interpreted as relating to the 
legitimacy theory. 
7.6.4 Management Accountability 
Management accountability was also suggested by the interviewees as being an important 
factor influencing corporate disclosure. Eleven interviewees shared the view that disclosure 
reflects how management places their sense of responsibility and accountability to all 
stakeholders. A regulator suggested that top management, CEOs and chairmen, tend to 
have an influence on overall disclosure policy, while lower level of management, CFOs 
and managers of investor relations, seem to be more involved in voluntary disclosure 
decisions. 
The respondents were asked whether they perceived CEO/Chairman role duality as a factor 
influencing voluntary disclosure decisions. The responses with regard to this factor are 
mixed, though the responses lean towards the idea that separation of a CEO and Chairman 
role counterbalances the CEO's power. Ideally, the Chairman should be independent so 
that he/she can perform a monitoring function. Five interviewees believed that there would 
be a higher level of disclosures for a company without CEO duality. However, eight 
respondents viewed that there is no difference in the disclosure policy between companies 
with or without CEO duality. 
Table 7-12: CEO/Chairman role duality: views from interview respondents 
Views from Interview respondents Listed co. Auditors Bankers Analysts Regulators Total (7) (5) (2) (3) (3) 20 
Less transparency for a company with 3 2 1 1 2 9 
CEO duality 
Weak internal control system for a 2 3 
- - 
2 7 
company with CEO duality 
Separation between CEO and Chairman 3 2 1 1 2 
counterbalances the CEO's power 
Higher level of disclosures for a company 2 
- 
1 1 1 5 
without CEO duality 
No difference in disclosure policy between 4 2 
- 
1 1 8 
companies with or without CFO duality 
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Although the interview responses regarding CEO duality are mixed, the finding from 
statistical analysis showed that the existence of CEO duality is significant with a negative 
coefficient for all types of information disclosure (see section 6.5.3.1). The statistical result 
implies that companies with CEO duality are associated with lower levels of voluntary 
disclosure. CEO/Chairman role duality is quite common among Thai listed companies and 
some of listed companies interviewed had CEO duality. There is a possibility that the 
response could be influenced by the fact that CEO duality existed in the respondents' 
companies. 
7.6.5 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
The interviewees suggested that independent non-executive directors play an important role 
in corporate disclosure. Table 7-13 summarises the respondents' views regarding 
independent non-executive directors. Ensuring that companies having good communication 
with the shareholders is their important responsibility. When asked about the process of 
annual report preparation, the majority of listed companies interviewed responded that the 
board of directors is involved in the disclosure decision of the companies. Experienced 
directors can help to improve the way companies disclose information. However, some of 
the interviewees seemed to be doubtful about the independence and expertise of 
independent directors. Two regulators criticised the idea that the independence of directors 
depends on the management or controlling shareholders who appoint them. Three of the 
auditors interviewed shared the same view that independent directors tend have insufficient 
business knowledge, which leads to their opinion not being taken seriously. One of the 
auditors also added that independent directors are appointed because of the SEC's 
requiremeil, but they do not have actual authority. 
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Table 7-13: Independent non-executive directors: views from interview respondents 
Views from interview respondents Listed co. 
(7) 
Auditors 
(5) 
Bankers 
(2) 
Analysts 
3 
Regulators 
(3) 
Total 
(20) 
Expected to look after minority 
shareholders' interests 
3 2 1 2 2 10 
Play an important role in corporate 
disclosure 
3 2 1 2 2 10 
Necessi to maintain their good reputation 2 1 1 1 1 6 
Doubts on independence 1 2 1 1 2 7 
No actual authority 
- 
1 
- - 
2 3 
Lack of knowiedee in business 
- 
3 
- - 
2 5 
The role of independent directors could help monitor management's performance, which is 
consistent with the agency theory. A high proportion of independent directors on the board 
can also signal to the public that companies are transparent. Nonetheless, in reality, the role 
of independent directors may be limited by their actual independence and expertise. In this 
study, the statistical result did not show a strong association between proportion of 
independent directors on the board and voluntary disclosure (see section 6.5.3.2). 
7.6.6 Profitability 
The interview respondents expressed different views regarding the influence of profitability 
on voluntary disclosures (Table 7-14). Ten interviewees suggested that profitable 
companies can be expected to disclose additional information, especially that emphasising 
outstanding performance and successful strategies. Companies can make use of 
profitability to attract more investors. In addition, profitability can be seen as a sign that 
companies are well-managed. There is also a view from the interview respondents that 
profitable companies tend to be more relaxed in keeping information confidential. A 
regulator also suggested that less profitable companies tend to focus on the way to improve 
their performance instead of spending time and effort on producing additional information 
for public disclosure. On the other hand, seven interviewees expressed different views 
regarding the effect of profitability on voluntary disclosure. They suggested that less 
profitable companies would disclose more information in order to explain their bad 
performance and inform the public about their strategies to overcome the problems. Three 
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interviewees suggested that less profitable companies might voluntarily disclose other 
positive information to distract public attention away from their bad performance. 
Table 7-14: Profitability: views from interview respondents 
Views from interview respondents listed co. Auditors Bankers Analysts Regulators Total (7) (5) (2) (3) (3) (20) 
Profitable companies tend to disclose their 3 2 1 22 10 
good news 
High profit signals that companies are 3 2 2 22 11 
well-managed 
Profitable companies are more relaxed in 3 3 1 12 10 
keeping information confidential 
Less profitable companies need to explain 3 2 - 117 
their ormance 
less profitable companies tend to I - - 113 
voluntarily disclose other information 
Not relate to voluntary disclosure decisions 1 I I --3 
The interview responses suggested that profitability could affect voluntary disclosure in 
different ways. Profitability could result in a higher or lower level of disclosures. With 
regard to direction of association between profitability and level of disclosure, prior studies 
also report conflicting results (see section 2.7). The conflicting direction of the association 
could help to explain the non-significance of profitability in the statistical analysis (see 
section 6.5.2.1). 
7.6.7 Lcvcrage 
The interview responses lean towards the idea that too much leverage could relate to higher 
risk and reflect inefficiency in company operations. However, with regard to the effect of 
leverage on voluntary disclosure, most of the responses do not indicate any direct 
association bctwcen leverage and voluntary disclosure. While some of the interviewees 
viewed that companies with more debt might face more pressure from stakeholders to 
disclose additional information, other respondents suggested that companies with lower 
leverage would disclose additional informatim to show the public their greater stability. 
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Table 7-15: Leverage: views from interview respondents 
f'iews from interview respondents Listed co. Auditors Bankers Analysts Regulators Total (7) (5) (2) (3) (3) (20) 
Too much leverage reflects inefficiency 3 2 2 2 2 11 
Lower leverage might help attract 3 2 1 2 2 10 
investors 
More stakeholders involved in high 2 2 1 1 2 8 
leverage Companies 
Similar to profitability, the interview responses regarding the effect of leverage on 
voluntary disclosure do not give any clear direction regarding association. This is 
consistent with previous studies that report mixed results on the association of leverage and 
corporate disclosure (see section 2.7). The statistical results also indicate that there is no 
association between leverage and the voluntary disclosure level (see section 6.5.2.2). 
7.6.8 Auditors 
In the interviews with auditors, when asked how they emphasise voluntary disclosure in 
the audit process, the majority of respondents agreed that they pay more attention to the 
compliance with accounting standards: 
"... in the disclosure of certain things that are not enforced by Thai accounting 
standards, we inform client companies about international good practice. 
However, we let the client decide whether to adopt it or not because it is 
voluntary information. " [A2] 
"... information voluntarily disclosed by companies in annual reports is beyond 
our responsibility. Nonetheless, we do play an advisory role in the preparation of 
annual reports. " [Al ]. 
Although it has long been accepted that auditors play a crucial role in corporate disclosure, 
their role in voluntary disclosures might not be as significant as in mandatory disclosures. 
In the univariate and multivariate analyses, type of auditor (Big Four and non-Big Four) 
was not found to be associated with voluntary disclosure scores(see section 6.5.1.3). 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed and interpreted views on voluntary disclosure from persons 
positioned to influence voluntary of Thai listed companies, including company 
management, auditors, bankers, investmert analysts, and regulators. The aim was to obtain 
a broader picture of voluntary disclosure behaviour and indicate factors that have 
significant impact on the extent, credibility, improvement and use of voluntary disclosure 
of Thai listed companies. The discussions include the interview respondents views' on 
voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies, role and importance of annual reports, 
benefits and costs of voluntary disclosure, credibility of voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports, perception of voluntary disclosure categories, themes of information that 
companies should voluntarily disclose, alternative channels of voluntary disclosures, and 
factors influencing voluntary disclosures. 
The interview respondents mainly suggested that there have been substantial improvements 
in voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies after the 1997 financial crisis. Lessons 
learned from the crisis have led to several measures to improve the accountability of 
management, and enhance corporate transparency and disclosure. However, there is room 
for companies to improve in order to be comparable to the international practices. 
Overall, the interview respondents agreed that annual reports play an important role in 
corporate reporting of Thai listed companies. They also emphasised the use of annual 
reports by a wide range of market participants. Cost-benefit associated with the disclosure 
was confirmed as one of the main factors influencing voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports. While improvement of company image, capital-related incentives, and 
international comparability were perceived as strong driving forces of voluntary disclosure, 
competitive disadvantage was seen as the most important constraint of voluntary 
disclosure. 
242 
The majority of respondents placed the highest importance on the disclosure of financial 
information. However, they did not pay much attention to the disclosure of non-financial 
and CSR information. Future prospects information and operational statistics seemed to be 
the most important themes of information, which interviewees would like companies to 
voluntarily disclose. Alternative channels of voluntary disclosure such as press releases, 
analyst briefings, and private discussions were also regarded as important for market 
participants. Nonetheless, some respondents expressed concern about the credibility of 
these alternative channels of disclosure. 
Interviewees suggested that various complex factors influence voluntary disclosure 
decisions. The perceptions of the interviewees on the importance of company size, industry 
type and international financing on voluntary disclosure match the statistical findings. 
Although the majority of interviewees suggested that closely held companies tend to have a 
lower level of voluntary disclosure, the result from statistical analysis did not show a strong 
association between ownership concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
interview responses regarding the effect of profitability and leverage on voluntary 
disclosure did not lead to a clear direction on the association. The conflicting direction of 
the association could help to explain the non-signif icance of leverage and mixed results of 
profitability in the statistical analysis. 
The interview findings suggested that voluntary disclosure behaviour is more complicated 
than previously assumed by the quantitative study. The opinions of preparers, users and 
regulators help to validate and complement the interpretation of statistical findings. The 
interviewers revealed some areas that could influence voluntary disclosure decisions, 
which have not been included in the quantitative study, such as quality of staff and 
management, efficiency of information systems, and company image and reputation. These 
factors might account for some of the unexplained variations in the statistical results 
reported in Chapter 6. 
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In the next chapter, the main results of the thesis are summarised, followed by the 
identification of limitations and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusions, Contribution, Limitations and Suggestions for Further 
Research 
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the thesis and present its main conclusions. In 
addition, implications and limitations of the study are discussed. The chapter ends with 
suggestions for future research 
8.2 Summary of Research Objectives, Research Questions and Method 
This study has sought to answer the question of how to explain voluntary disclosure of 
companies listed on an emerging capital market It intended to investigate the extent of 
voluntary disclosures especially that of Thai listed companies, and the influence of 
company characteristics, financial attributes, and corporate governance related factors on 
voluntary disclosure practices. The research objectives, empirical research questions and 
research methods applied by this study are summarised below. 
8.2.1 Research Objectives 
The research objectives, as previously explained in section 1.4, are as follows: 
Objective 1: To evaluate voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed companies over the 
pcriod 1995.2005. 
Objectihr 2: To examine the contribution of company characteristics, financial attributes 
and corporate governance related factors in explaining variation in the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
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Objective 3: To investigate perceptions of persons positioned to influence voluntary 
disclosure in order to obtain further insights into voluntary disclosure 
practices ofThai listed companies. 
81.2 Research Questions 
This study aimed to answer the following research questions: 
Research Question 1: What is the extent of voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies? 
Research Question 2: To what extent did voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies 
change over the period 1995-2005? 
Research Question 3: To what extent are aspects of company characteristics, financial 
attributes, and corporate governance related factors significant in 
explaining the extent of voluntary disclosure of Thai listed 
companies? 
Research Question 4: What are the perceptions of persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure on issues related to voluntary disclosure, and 
how does interview research help to validate and complement 
statistical results? 
Research Question 5: How are the variations in voluntary disclosure practices of Thai 
listed companies explained by relevant theoretical frameworks? 
The empirical rcsmrch questions were answered in Chapter 5,6, and 7 as follows: 
Research question I was answered in Chapter 5 by analysing and evaluating voluntary 
disclosure scores. The findings of extremely high or low disclosure scores and disclosure 
items, which have received particular attention in prior studies or in real practice, were 
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discussed. The analysis of company characteristics that disclose certain items under each 
category was presented. 
Research question 2 was answered in Chapter 5 and 6. In chapter 5, comparisons of the 
extent of voluntary disclosures in different time periods were included in order to find if 
there were any changes in voluntary disclosure over the period studied. In Chapter 6, time 
factors (a crisis factor and year dummy variables) were included in the univariate and 
multivariate analyses. 
Research question 3 was answered in Chapter 5,6, and 7. A further analysis of association 
between the items disclosed and the explanatory variables based on Kendall's rank 
correlation was performed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 applied univariate and multivariate 
analyses to identify factors that are significartly associated with variation in voluntary 
disclosure levels. Chapter 7 applied an interview study to gain further insight into factors 
influencing voluntary disclosures and investigate other factors not easily captured from 
quantitative analysis. 
Research question 4 was answered in Chapter 7. An interview study was conducted in 
order to gain further insight into factors influencing voluntary disclosures and investigate 
other factors not easily captured from quantitative analysis. Information obtained from the 
interviews was used to confirm the results and enhance the interpretation of findings from 
quantitative analysis. 
Research question S was answered in Chapter 5,6 and 7 by analysing and interpreting the 
outputs of quantitative and qualitati%-e analyses, within the context of voluntary disclosures 
in Thailand and the relevant theoretical frameworks. The analysis was based on relevant 
theoretical frameworks and existing literature on corporate disclosure discussed in Chapter 
2 and a review of tic Thai financial reporting environment in Chapter 3. 
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8.2.3 Research Methods 
The main research methods employed by this study were as follows: 
- 
Voluntary disclosure index (unweighted scoring method) to measure the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
- 
Univariate and multivariate analyses to test research hypotheses. 
- 
Semi-structured interviews to validate and complement statistical findings. 
In order to provide the best understanding of research problems, this study applied 
quantitative and qualitative methods. Therefore, the data were obtained from both primary 
(interview findings) and secondary sources (annual reports). Companies included in this 
study were selected from the SETIOO Index. Quantitative and qualitative data collections 
were conducted separately from examination of annual reports using the voluntary 
disclosure checklist and semi-structured interviews. Results from the qualitative analysis 
were used to confirm the findings and enhance the interpretation of the results from the 
quantitative analysis. 
The hypotheses developed in this study were as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between company size and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between type of industry and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between large audit firms and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between profitability and the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. 
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NS: Ceteris paribus, there is a significant association between leverage and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
116A: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between ownership concentration and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
1168: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between foreign ownership and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. 
117: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between proportion of independent, 
non-executive directors on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
118: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between CEO/Chairman role duality 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
119: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the period after the 1997 
financial crisis and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
In the univariate analysis, continuous independent variables were tested by Kendall's rank 
correlation coefficient (tau), which measures the degree of agreement between two sets of 
ranks. The Kendall test was chosen because it claims to be superior to the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient and it has been applied in numerous studies on financial disclosure. 
In the case of categorical (dummy) variables, Mann-Whitney U tests (for two-category 
variables) and Kruskal-Wallis tests (for more than two-category variables) were performed 
in order to determine whether associations between voluntary disclosure and nominal 
independent variables exist. 
In the multivariate analysis, the multiple regression analysis was conducted at two levels: 
aggregated and disaggregated. At the aggregated level, the total voluntary disclosure score 
was applied as the dependent variable in order to investigate the collective relationship 
between the independent variables and overall voluntary disclosure. This relationship was 
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then investigated for each type of information at the disaggregated level. The distribution 
of the data in this study deviates significantly from normality. Therefore, regressions were 
run based on the normal scores of both dependent and continuous independent variables. 
Normal score transformaticn, based on van der Waerden's approach was applied. 
In both univariate and multivariate analysis, variables reported as significantly influencing 
voluntary disclosures were decided based on statistical significance at either 1% or 5%. 
Apart from the statistical analysis from the voluntary disclosure index, this study included 
semi-structured personal interviews. Interviewees were persons positioned to influence 
voluntary disclosure, including company management, auditors, regulators, bankers and 
investmert analysts. A semi-structured interview was considered appropriate for this study 
because it provides more opportunities for interviewees to express their thoughts and 
views. The interviews were carried out after the statistical analysis so that its results could 
be discussed in the interview. The statistical results also help the researcher gain prior 
knowledge about the companies and assist in construction of the interview questionnaire. 
Content analysis was applied in order to analyse the interview transcripts. 
83 Key Findings of the Empirical Studies 
The examination of the extent of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports revealed 
that even among the most actively traded stocks on the SET, there was considerable 
variability in the amount of information voluntarily disclosed with overall voluntary 
disclosure scores ranging from as low as 0.00% to a maximum of 81.03%. By examining 
the annual reports of 1995,1996,2002 and 2005, the results show a significant 
improvement in voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies in 2002 and 2005, especially 
for items related to the economic situation and corporate governance. As expected, the 
biggest increase in the level of voluntary disclosures at both aggregated and disaggregated 
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levels occurred in 2002. The scores imply that the levels of voluntary disclosures increased 
markedly after the financial crisis period. This could be the response of companies to 
government campaigns to improve corporate transparency after the 1997 financial crisis. 
The positive changes in voluntary disclosure found in this study may raise expectation for 
governing entities that there is an improvement in the quality of financial reporting 
practices ofThai listed companies. 
There seems to be substantial gaps among the ten sub-categories of information. The 
highest score was information about the economic environment, followed by general 
corporate information. In contrast, the lowest scores were segmental information market 
related information, and corporate social responsibility information. Thai listed companies 
tended to provide information that is non-specific in nature. There was a relatively low 
level of quantitative information disclosure. Information associated with high cost, either 
information processing costs or competitive disadvantage cost, was not disclosed 
frequently. This may suggest that Thai listed companies were aware of the potential costs 
and benefits of making voluntary disclosure. 
In terms of factors influencing voluntary disclosure in company annual reports, the results 
from univariate and multivariate analyses tend to support strong significance of size, 
industry type, and CEO/Chairman role duality in explaining variation in voluntary 
disclosure. The results also suggest that variation in voluntary disclosure could be 
influenced, particularly from differences in time periods. Results between univariate and 
multivariate analyses were not materially different, except for those regarding proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board, foreign ownership, and profitability, which were 
found to be significant only in the univariate analysis. Leverage, type of auditor, and 
ownership concentration did not show significant association with the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. In terms of explanatory power of the model, the pooled regression on overall 
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voluntary disclosure shows that variables included in the model are able to explain 61.2% 
of the variation in voluntary level in the annual reports investigated in this study. 
The explanatory power of the regression models in this study seems to be higher than in 
prior studies. However, the adjusted R squared of these models may not be comparable to 
previous studies, which selected data from the same time period, because the regression 
models in this study contain the data of four different time periods and time factors seem to 
be the most influential factors in explaining variation in voluntary disclosures. A high value 
of adjusted R squared of the regression model incorporating data from different time 
periods is consistent with the finding of Sutthachai and Cooke (2009), who find a dramatic 
increase in the values of adjusted R squared after the year dummy variables were included 
in pooled regression models. 
Table 8-1: Summary of statistical results of hypotheses testing 
Variable Expected Observed Statistical s ignificance 
sign sign Univariate Multivariate 
0 S NF F O S NF F 
SIZ Positive Positive (+)"+ (+)++ (+)rr (+)** (+)r" (+)r (+)"r (+)+ 
PRO Positive/ Positive/ (+)+ (+)" x X X X (-)+ X 
Negative Negative 
LEV Positive/ Positive/ x x x x x x x x 
Negative Negative 
OWN Negative Positive/ x x (+)" X X x x x 
Negative 
BOA Positive Positive (+)"" (+)++ (+)+" (+)+" x x x x 
FRN Positive Positive (+)"" (+)"" (+)"" (+)+" x x x x 
AUD Positive Positive/ x x x x X x x x 
Ne ative 
CEO Negative Negative 
IND' 
Agro/food Positive (+)rr (+)rr (+)rr (+)r (+)rr (+)rr (+)r (+)rr 
Industrial Positive! Positive (+)+" (+)"" (+)+" (+)+ (+)+" (+)"" (+)"" x 
Technology Negative Positive (+)++ (+)"" (+)+" (+)+ x (+)+ x 
Resource Positive (+)r+ (+)"" (+)rr (+)r (+)rr (+)+ (+)"r x 
Service Positive (+)++ (+)+r (+)+r (+)r +r x +" , X', 
YEAR ositive P Positive 
H(+
)* 
O- Overall disclosure, S= Strategic information, NF = Non-financial information, F= Financial information 
X not statistically significant, + positive relationship, - negative relationship 
Statistically significant at the 1%"" or the 5%* level 
'property/construction industry is used as baseline 
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Of the three specific information categories, non-financial information was most explained, 
while financial information was least explained by variables specified in the model. Results 
on specific information disclosure tend to support those reported at the overall level. The 
results also support the relative applicability of disclosure theory, especially the agency 
theory in explaining variation in voluntary disclosure. Table 8-1 summarises the results of 
hypotheses testing based on univariate and multivariate analyses. 
The significant improvement in voluntary disclosures of Thai listed companies after the 
1997 financial crisis is consistent with the finding of Sutthachai and Cooke (2009). This 
may confirm the assumption that the financial crisis had an impact on financial reporting of 
Thai companies. With respect to factors influencing voluntary disclosures, the significance 
of company size in explaining variation in voluntary disclosures reported in this study is 
similar to the findings of Sutthachai and Cooke (2009). The non-significant results of 
leverage and type of auditor in explaining voluntary disclosures are consistent with the 
findings of Priebjrivat (1991) and Sutthachai and Cooke (2009). This study give extension 
to the study by Priebjrivat (1991) and Sutthachai and Cooke (2009) by adding 
CEO/Chairman role duality, foreign ownership, and proportion of independent non- 
executive directors on the board in the statistical analysis. These variables were found to be 
influential factors in voluntary disclosure of Thai listed companies. 
The statistical results indicate that part of variation in voluntary disclosure of information 
in annual reports of Thai listed companies has not been captured by the statistical models. 
This highlights the need to identify other factors influencing voluntary disclosure. Opinion 
from persons positioned to influence voluntary disclosure helped to identify other 
influencing factors. Interviews with twenty market participants including company 
management, auditors, bankers, investment analysts, and regulators were conducted to 
gather insight into important issues related to voluntary disclosures. Issues that were 
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discussed and analysed are relevant to views on voluntary disclosure of Thai listed 
companies, role and importance of annual reports as a source of voluntary disclosures, 
perceived benefits and costs, credibility of voluntary disclosures, alternative channels of 
voluntary disclosures, and influential factors of voluntary disclosures. 
The interview respondents mainly suggested that corporate disclosures of Thai listed 
companies showed a good sign of improvement after the 1997 financial crisis. Lessons 
learned from the crisis have led to several measures to improve the accountability of 
management, and enhance corporate transparency and disclosure. However, there is room 
for companies to improve in order to be comparable to the international practices. The 
development of regulations should be conducted carefully by taking into account the 
information needs, whilst maintaining flexibility for the preparers. 
The interview respondents agreed that annual reports play an important role in corporate 
reporting of Thai listed companies. They also emphasised the use of annual reports by a 
wide range of market participants. Cost-benefit associated with the disclosure was 
confirmed as one of the main factors influencing voluntary disclosure in annual reports. 
While improvement of company image, capital-related incentives, and international 
comparability were perceived as strong driving forces of voluntary disclosure, competitive 
disadvantage was seen as the most important constraint of voluntary disclosure. 
The majority of respondents placed the highest importance on the disclosure of financial 
information. However, they did not pay much attention to the disclosure of non-financial 
and CSR information. Future prospects information and operational statistics seemed to be 
the most important themes of information that the interviewees would like to see 
voluntarily disclosed. Alternative channels of voluntary disclosure such as press releases, 
analyst briefings, and private discussions were also regarded as important for market 
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participants. Nonetheless, some respondents expressed concern about the credibility of 
these alternative disclosure channels. 
The interviewees suggested that various complex factors influence voluntary disclosure 
decisions. The perceptions of the interviewees on the importance of company size, industry 
type and international financing on voluntary disclosure matched the statistical findings. 
Although the majority of interviewees suggested that closely held companies tend to have a 
lower level of voluntary disclosure, the result from statistical analysis did not show a strong 
association between ownership concentration and extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
interview responses regarding the effect of profitability and leverage on voluntary 
disclosure did not lead to a clear direction on the association. The conflicting direction of 
the association could help to explain the non-significance of leverage and mixed results of 
profitability in the statistical analysis. 
The interview findings suggested that voluntary disclosure behaviour is more complicated 
than previously assumed by the quantitative study. The opinions of preparers, users and 
regulators helped to validate and complement the interpretation of statistical findings. The 
interviewees revealed some areas that could influence voluntary disclosure decisions, 
which have not been included in the quantitative study, such as the quality of management, 
efficiency of information systems, and company image and reputation. These factors might 
account for some ofthe unexplained variations in the statistical results. 
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on voluntary 
disclosure practices of Thai listed companies as an example of the emerging capital market 
in economic transition. Results from statistical analysis, together with perceptions of the 
influential individuals interviewed, provide a better understanding of voluntary disclosure 
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practices. The examination of voluntary disclosures at the disaggregated level, which has 
not been thoroughly observed in the Thai context, contributes to in-depth understanding of 
disclosure behaviour and helps to validate findings of disclosure at the aggregated level. 
Interviews with persons positioned to influence voluntary disclosure provides further 
insight into factors influencing voluntary disclosure and helps in identifying other factors 
not easily captured from quantitative analysis. In addition, it contributes to the knowledge 
of voluntary disclosure by incorporating the human aspects of disclosure practices in the 
analysis. Voluntary disclosure is a sensitive issue because it is a matter of managerial 
judgement. By including qualitative analysis from interviews, extensive understanding of 
corporate disclosure motives is created. This knowledge can assist policy makers in 
developing a financial reporting regulatory framework in order to achieve higher levels of 
compliance. Findings from this study could contribute to the development of corporate 
transparency and disclosures in developing countries, especiallythose that were affected by 
the 1997 financial crisis. 
8.5 Implications of Findings 
This research outlines company behaviour in voluntary disclosures. It gives informatioq to 
a certain extent, about the characteristics of companies that are likely to have good 
practices. This knowledge provides a significant benefit to users of corporate information 
because it could help them estimate types and extent of information provided by listed 
companies. Therefore, users can adjust their strategy in collecting additional information 
from other sources and act cautiously when evaluating corporate disclosures. This study 
also provides implication for listed companies about the importance of corporate 
transparency and disclosures, which can lead to higher firm value and can be used as a tool 
to differentiate well governed firms from companies that do not practice good corporate 
governance. The 1997 financial crisis caused significant changes in the financial reporting 
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environment in both policy and practice aspects. Lessons learned from the crisis have led to 
several measures to improve the accountability of management, enhance corporate 
transparency, and strengthen minority shareholder rights. High-quality of disclosure was 
found to be an important factor for Thai companies to be able to sustain their business after 
the crisis. 
The knowledge on disclosure behaviour is also important for regulators because it can help 
them to foresee likely responses to financial reporting regulations. This knowledge can 
help regulators in developing future schemes in the financial reporting regulatory 
framework in order to achieve a higher level of compliance. Similar to other developing 
countries, laws and regulations seem to be main force behind corporate disclosure in 
Thailand. If the government can encourage Thai companies to be more aware of the 
importance of corporate transparency and disclosure, some regulations could be replaced 
by a self-monitoring system like in developed countries. The Thai capital market has not 
been fully developed to be capital market-based system. The role of financial reporting in 
raising a company's capital has not been fully recognised by Thai management. In 
addition, there seem to be considerable gaps between disclosure practices of small and 
large companies. Therefore, the development of regulations should be conducted carefully 
by taking into account the information needs, whilst maintaining flexibility for the 
preparers. Allowing certain types of information to be voluntary disclosed by companies 
could help disclosure practice to be more flexible and logical. 
The increase in levels of voluntary disclosure reported in this study may not guarantee an 
improvement in quality of financial reporting. However, it gives some indication of the 
enhancement in voluntary disclosure practices of Thai listed companies. Looking back, 
Thailand has come a long way since the outbreak of the financial crisis; however, it might 
take a long time to achieve the desired behavioural outcome. Therefore, continuity of the 
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development is essential. It is very important to continue to educate companies and the 
public on the importance and benefit of corporate transparency and disclosures 
8.6 Limitations of the Study 
The first limitation of the current study comes from the use of companies in the SETI00 
index as the sample size. This may affect the generalisability of the findings. The findings 
in this study may not be applicable to smaller and less actively traded listed companies. 
Although the sample may not be representative of the whole population, these larger 
companies are expected to be benchmarks for the best practices for Thai listed companies. 
Sampling was also influenced by the availability of annual reports, as discussed in Chapter 
4 (section 43). Access to data of Thai listed companies remains limited, especially for 
corporate annual reports. 
Further limitations may be related to scoring processes of the voluntary disclosure index, 
which have been widely used in prior literature and have been followed by this study. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 (section 4.4), the scoring process in this study includes procedures 
that are considered to be subjective. While every possible effort has been made to reduce 
subjectivity of the research instruments, total elimination of subjectivity might not be 
possible. 
In order to be able to compare the levels of disclosure in different years with the same 
index, disclosure items that became mandatory after 1995 were excluded from the 
checklist. Elimination of these items could create a downward bias to companies that 
voluntarily disclosed such information. Nevertheless, the effect of the elimination is not 
expected to be large. 
There are several sources of information that companies can use to communicate their 
information. However, this study focused on voluntary disclosures in company annual 
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reports. Therefore, voluntary disclosure scores in this study should not be considered as 
absolute scores for the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure. Nevertheless, results from 
the interviews conducted in this study confirm that annual reports can be regarded as a very 
important channel of voluntary disclosure. 
8.7 Suggestions for Further Research 
There is an opportunity for future research to investigate disclosure practices using other 
channels of voluntary disclosure. Future research in Thailand might extend the sample size 
to medium and small-sized companies. This study investigated voluntary disclosure in 
different time periods from four different years. The sample size was limited by data 
availability and constraints of manual data collection. It might create a clearer picture of 
changes in voluntary disclosure by using time-series study. 
The interviews conducted in this study identified other factors that might explain variation 
in voluntary disclosure. Including more factors in the analysis may improve the 
explanatory power of the model applied. However, some factors may not be easily 
quantified. Corporate disclosure is a broad area that one study cannot be expected to cover 
all aspects. Therefore, it may be interesting to investigate corporate disclosure using 
different research designs such as case studies to examine specific issues on voluntary 
disclosure. 
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